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Unpacking Cultural Orientations: Representations of the Person and the Self 
Summary 
This thesis aims to disentangle the concept of culture; more specifically it identifies 
different facets of cultural orientations. It looks at how cultural and national groups 
differ on these dimensions and their impact on individuals and societies. It is argued that 
we need a more nuanced and multifaceted understanding of culture that goes beyond 
focusing on values. 
Chapter 1 discusses definitions of culture and identifies three significant facets 
of culture—values, beliefs and constructions of the self. It is noted that research into the 
latter two facets is far less developed. Chapter 2 outlines research into cross-cultural 
variation in beliefs, more specifically beliefs about personhood, and notes that little is 
known about beliefs that define individualism-collectivism (I-C). Chapter 3 reviews 
self-construal theory and highlights a range of remaining issues which point to the need 
to explore self-construals further. Chapter 4 provides a methodological overview of the 
research. Chapter 5 reports results from two large-scale cross-cultural questionnaire 
studies and presents the construct, and a measure, of contextualism, referring to beliefs 
about the importance of the context in understanding people. Contextualism is shown to 
be a facet of cultural collectivism and a predictor of national variation in ingroup 
favouritism, trust and corruption. Chapter 6 presents a new seven-dimensional model of 
self-construals, which can be organised into three higher-order dimensions at the 
cultural level of analysis: self-differentiation, other-focus and self-containment. 
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Variation in self-differentiation is shown to be best explained by differences in I-C, 
other-focus by differences in national wealth and self-containment by religious heritage. 
Based on a smaller study in four nations, Chapter 7 investigates the seven self-construal 
dimensions at the individual level and tests how they differentially predict outcomes 
related to socio-emotional adjustment. Chapter 8 summarises the findings and discusses 
implications and directions for future research.  
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Chapter 1  
General Introduction 
This thesis is about culture. In particular, it aims to identify valid and useful ways of 
characterising individuals and societies along cultural dimensions. This involves trying 
to disentangle the concept of culture by looking at its different facets, including beliefs 
and constructions of the self; different levels, most importantly individual and national 
level; and different dimensions, including, but not exclusively, individualism-
collectivism (I-C). This more nuanced understanding of cultural differences could be 
helpful not only to guide future research into the impact of culture on psychological 
processes and behaviour, but also in a more general sense help reduce cultural 
stereotypes.  
 The research reported here is based on two large multinational studies as well as 
a smaller four-nation study. The two multinational studies were part of a collaborative 
research project including a total of 38 nations and both student and adult samples, 
which provided an unusually diverse dataset. This starting-point allowed me to ask a 
range of interesting questions about cultural variation, the origin of such variation as 
well as its consequences. I hope that the research presented here will answer most of 
these questions, as well as open up avenues for further questions to be asked.  
This introductory chapter will first discuss definitions of culture and raise 
several important issues in relation to these. It will then distinguish three facets of 
culture—values, beliefs, and constructions of the self—and finally I will outline 
research aims.  
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1.1 Defining culture  
Although culture has become a very popular and well-researched topic in 
psychology and the social sciences more generally, its definition and operationalisation 
are often vague and diffuse, and often vary depending on theoretical standpoints. 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1963) found 164 distinct definitions of culture and this number 
is likely to have increased substantially since they did their review. Although definitions 
vary widely, most seem to agree that culture is something which is shared, multifaceted 
and relatively stable (Taras, Rowney, & Steel, 2009). Nonetheless, differences in how 
culture is defined highlight a range of issues, both conceptual and methodological, 
which are very relevant to the current thesis. The most salient of these issues are 
discussed below (see also Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, and Sam (2011) 
for longer discussions of some of  these issues). 
 
1.1.1 Culture as objective or subjective  
Early anthropological definitions of culture included a focus on observable 
behaviour and artefacts. For instance, Boas (1930) suggested that “culture embraces all 
the manifestations of social behaviour of a community, the reactions of the individual as 
affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the product of human activities 
as determined by these habits” (p. 79). In cross-cultural psychology, however—
mirroring the growing focus on cognitive processes in psychology more generally—the 
focus shifted towards shared meanings and symbols (Berry et al., 2011; Smith, Bond, & 
Kağitçibaşi, 2006). For example, Geertz (1973) defined culture as “historically 
transmitted patterns of meanings embodied in symbols” (p. 89). An even more cognitive 
position is taken by Hofstede (2001) who suggests culture is “the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
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people from another” (p. 9).  Although cross-cultural psychology moved more towards 
cognitive definitions, this has not necessarily been the case in other disciplines, such as 
anthropology. This development nonetheless highlights the question of whether culture 
should be conceived of as something objective, out there in the world, or as something 
subjective in the minds of individuals. Most seem to now agree that culture involves 
interpretation and shared understandings—for instance, behaviour observed without 
reference to the meaning of that behaviour can hardly be described as “cultural”.  
More recently, the debate has centred around whether objective aspects of the 
environment, such as national affluence, should be included in the concept of culture. A 
purely subjective perspective would suggest that these are antecedents of culture, thus 
separate from how culture is defined (e.g. Hofstede, 1980). From a different 
perspective, these objective aspects can also be considered outcomes of culture and are 
therefore an integral part of how we understand culture (e.g. Weber, 1904; see Hofstede, 
2006; Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & de Luque, 2006; Smith, 2006; for a 
discussion). The present research views culture as subjective orientations, or ways of 
interpreting and understanding the world and the self, that are shared among people in a 
society or social group (Smith et al., 2006). It considers objective aspects of the 
environment as potential antecedents, shaping how people interpret the world, but also 
acknowledges the reciprocal relationship where cultural orientations can shape the 
objective environment (Smith, 2006).  
 
1.1.2 Culture as unique or universal  
A further question that arises when trying to define culture is the extent to which 
it is something that is unique to a particular group or society or whether there are 
universal ways of describing cultures. The former perspective was endorsed by the early 
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anthropologist Boas (1930) who argued for cultural relativism—the idea that each 
culture is unique and can only be understood within its own context, making cultures 
incomparable. A slightly less radical position is taken by the indigenous psychology 
movement, which investigates concepts and processes rooted in a particular context but 
also uses these to compare with other contexts (Kim & Berry, 1993). A more universal 
approach to investigating culture was initiated by Hofstede (1980) who analysed 
questionnaire data from participants in initially around 40 nations and based on this 
large dataset identified four cultural dimensions which described his national samples. 
This latter approach makes very different assumptions of what culture is—it assumes 
that there are cultural dimensions that are valid and meaningful universally, even though 
cultures vary in their positions on each dimension. 
The present research falls within this latter approach to culture. Recognising the 
merit and immense value of indigenous research, it does not consider these two 
approaches mutually exclusive. Rather, they should be considered complementary and 
research questions should guide the choice between them. If, as in the present research, 
the aim is to achieve a greater understanding of how cultures differ in terms of certain 
beliefs and constructions of the self and the consequences of these cultural orientations, 
it is necessary to identify common ways of conceptualising and measuring these 
orientations. This allows for meaningful comparisons and identification of cross-cultural 
patterns, which can help to explain observed differences in behaviour and psychological 
functioning. 
This approach is, however, not without difficulties. In the search for universal 
concepts and dimensions, questions about cross-cultural validity are particularly salient. 
Berry (1969, 1989) made the distinction between emic research, which is based on local 
meanings within a certain cultural group, and etic research, which assumes that there are 
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universal concepts that can be measured anywhere. He warned against blindly applying 
constructs and instruments in new contexts without assessing their validity in these 
contexts (imposed etic). Rather, he argued, concepts and instruments need to be 
modified to fit the local contexts and once some common features have been 
established, comparisons between cultures can be made (derived etic). Thus, this thesis 
focuses on identifying cross-culturally appropriate constructs and measures, which 
includes a range of tests of cross-cultural invariance. It should be noted, however, that 
although cross-cultural research may be based on a derived etic approach including a 
large number of cultures, this does not mean that the concepts and processes can be 
considered universal. Achieving truly universal models would involve modifying them 
in accordance with all existing cultures, which is beyond the scope of most research 
projects (Berry, 1989). On the other hand, by including a wide range of nations and 
cultural groups, some of which are normally under-represented in the psychological 
literature, the present research provides a more culturally diverse picture than is 
normally found in social psychological research.   
 
1.1.3 Culture as the property of individuals vs. the property of groups  
A third question refers to whether culture should be thought of as something 
belonging to the individual or as the property of social groups, such as societies or 
nations. Anthropology has traditionally involved a greater focus on the collective level 
with investigations into traditions, rituals, norms, and belief systems of specific groups 
(Eriksen, 2004). Psychology, on the other hand, underwent a gradual shift away from an 
early focus on groups (e.g. Wilhelm Wundt, 1913) to an emphasis on the independent 
and self-contained individual (e.g. Allport, 1920/1972; see Greenwood, 2004 for a 
discussion). It has been argued that this shift mirrored a general trend towards 
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individualism in North America (Sampson, 1977). Cross-cultural psychology has the 
potential to bridge this gap by simultaneously studying individuals and social contexts, 
as well as the interactions between the two. By studying both levels of analysis, culture 
can therefore be thought of as being both the property of individuals and social groups.   
 Nonetheless, the dual focus on individuals and groups adds complexity to the 
field of study. Hofstede (1980) pointed out the danger of the ecological fallacy—that is 
assuming that relationships or dimensions that exist at the cultural level, also exist at the 
individual level of analyses. Similarly, he warned about the reversed ecological 
fallacy—that is assuming that relationships or dimensions that exist at individual level, 
also exist at the cultural level. Hofstede was clear that his cultural dimensions (see 
Section 1.2.1) only applied to the cultural level of analysis. Still, it is not uncommon for 
levels of analyses to be confounded in cross-cultural research, which can lead to 
seemingly contradictory and inconsistent findings (Smith et al., 2006). Thus, the present 
research adopts the dual focus on individuals and groups and includes investigations of 
similarities and differences across levels.  
 It should be pointed out that although nations or groups are used as the unit of 
analysis in many parts of this thesis, it is not assumed that these are necessarily 
homogenous and uniform. Rather, culture is seen as continually contested and resisted, 
generating great individual variation within cultures.  Nonetheless, this thesis suggests 
that some systematic agreement exists within a nation or cultural group which 
differentiates it from other nations or groups.  
 
1.1.4 Cultures vs. nations 
 When defining culture, it also needs to be distinguished from similar concepts 
such as social systems (Rohner, 1984). Rohner defines culture as shared meaning 
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systems, whereas social systems refer to the patterns of interactions and social 
relationships that are found within “culturally organised populations” (p. 127), such as 
nations. Thus, a social system may have a shared culture but culture cannot be reduced 
to a social system. Nonetheless, it has become relatively common in cross-cultural 
research to use nation as a proxy for culture, or to explain differences between national 
groups in terms of culture, often based on Hofstede’s scores of individualism-
collectivism (I-C), without actually measuring cultural orientations (Smith et al., 2006). 
This is arguably problematic since culture is simply inferred from national categories, 
which potentially reinforces cultural stereotypes (Matsumoto, 1999). Given that nations 
can differ on a range of variables, it is not clear whether it is actually a cultural 
difference that has been observed and which cultural dimension could explain the 
observed findings (Smith et al., 2006).  
The nation has also become a common unit of analysis in cross-cultural research 
when cultural orientations are measured. This could be regarded as potentially 
problematic since it does not take account of the large diversity within many nations, 
and nations are sometimes formed along arbitrary political lines (Minkov & Hofstede, 
2011; Smith et al., 2006). Nonetheless, in a recent study, Minkov and Hofstede (2011) 
found that within countries, regions tended to cluster along national lines rather than 
being intermixed with regions from other nations, suggesting within-nation similarity 
and between-nation distinctiveness. Moreover, using the nation as the unit of analyses 
makes it possible to utilize existing databases and national indices and to investigate 
nation-level nomological networks (Smith, 2004a). It could therefore be argued that the 
nation provides a meaningful and useful unit of culture and the present research has 
utilized this approach. Nonetheless, in order to explore potentially important within-
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nation diversity, the second large multinational research project also included different 
cultural groups within many nations. 
 
1.2 Culture as values, beliefs and representations of the self  
The notion of culture as shared meaning systems allows great scope in a wide 
range of research areas and methods. However, this definition could also be considered 
vague and difficult to operationalise. It has been argued that culture to some extent has 
become a catch-all term, used to explain a wide range of phenomena, but which only 
gives the illusion of being a powerful explanatory variable (Eriksen, 2004). Thus, it is 
suggested that we need a more fine-grained and nuanced understanding of culture.  
  Brewer and Chen (2007) provide one answer to how culture can be 
unpackaged. They suggest that cultures provide answers to three fundamental questions: 
questions about the self (self-representations), questions about the world (beliefs) and 
questions about what one should aspire to (values). These three facets mirror the three 
building blocks of psychology: the self-concept, cognition, and motivation. Values give 
us information about what is desired in a culture, whereas beliefs provide information 
about what is regarded as true or false, and self-representations tell us how people 
understand themselves (Smith et al., 2006). Triandis (1993) suggests that the different 
facets of culture are organized around common themes, or cultural syndromes, such as 
I-C. The present research adopts this view. Culture is conceived of as a multifaceted 
construct, including values, beliefs and constructions of the self, which together form 
broad cultural syndromes.  
 
1.2.1 Values 
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Arguably because of the influential work by Hofstede (1980), research into 
values has become the most common approach to culture (Taras et al., 2009). However, 
interest in values has a long history. For example, Weber (1905) explained the societal 
move towards capitalism in terms of protestant values. A more formal theory of values 
was developed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). They suggested that all societies 
face a limited number of fundamental human problems: humans’ relations with time, 
nature, each other, basic human motives and whether humans are inherently good or 
bad. They argued that a set number of solutions to these problems exist and the 
solutions and answers that are preferred in a society reflect the underlying values of that 
society.  They explored the value orientations of five different cultural groups in South-
West USA through interviews and using examples of real-life situations and based on 
these findings, they were able to draw the value profiles of each cultural group, 
identifying how they were similar and different.  
A different approach to values was adopted by Rokeach (1973), who developed 
the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS). This model of values consists of 18 terminal values, 
referring to desired end-states (such as true friendship, family security, and equality) 
and 18 instrumental values, referring to desired modes of behaviour (such as 
cheerfulness, logic, and obedience). This model and measure of values has been widely 
used in a range of disciplines and there are strong parallels with the model of values 
later developed by Schwartz (1992, 2004). 
Nonetheless, as noted above, it was possibly the influence of Hofstede (1980) 
that most notably brought attention to values in cross-cultural psychology. In secondary 
analysis of employee surveys at the multinational company “Hermes” (later identified 
as IBM) in eventually over 70 nations, he established four different value dimensions 
which distinguish cultures: individualism, which defines societies where the individual 
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is loosely rather than closely connected to their social group; power distance, referring 
to societies where there is an acceptance of unequal distribution of power; uncertainty 
avoidance, referring to societies where there is low acceptance of uncertainty and 
ambiguity; and finally masculinity, referring to societies where there is a preference for 
achievement, assertiveness and material success. Individualism has by far received the 
most attention and has generated a vast amount of research, and it continues to be very 
popular. Later Hofstede (2001) added a fifth dimension, long term orientation, as a 
result of the work by The Chinese Culture Connection (1987) who investigated values 
from a Chinese perspective. As noted above, Hofstede’s dimensions refer only to the 
cultural level of analysis and were not designed to characterize individuals. However, 
later research has treated individualism as an individual-level construct, which has 
generated confusion around the construct. 
Although very influential, Hofstede’s (1980) research suffers from some 
limitations. The original goal of the research was to study the work context within the 
organisation, hence, the items used to create the dimensions do not match Hofstede’s 
later descriptions of what the dimensions mean. It should also be noted that Hofstede 
found power distance and individualism to be highly negatively correlated, but he 
separated them on theoretical grounds. This raises questions of how distinct they really 
are. Moreover, most of the data was collected more than 40 years ago, which raises the 
question of whether the nation scores are still valid.   
An alternative to Hofstede’s (1980) research was provided by the GLOBE 
project who surveyed around 17,000 middle-managers in 62 societies around the world 
(House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). This ambitious project investigated 
nine dimensions of values and practices, most of which were derived from Hofstede’s 
research, as well as leadership styles. Interestingly, GLOBE’s values are not correlated 
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with Hofstede’s dimensions, which could be due to the fact that their values were 
measured in terms of the desired behaviour of other people, rather than own preferred 
end state (Smith, 2006). This could also be the reason why many of their values and 
practices dimensions are negatively related, and generally their measures of practices 
are more closely related to other existing indices. Nonetheless, the GLOBE data provide 
an update on Hofstede’s (1980) well-cited cultural indices, using theoretically-based 
measures. 
A different approach to values was developed by Schwartz (1992, 2004). He 
identified an individual-level value structure of 10 value types or domains (self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, tradition, conformity, 
benevolence, universalism), defined as guiding principles in people’s lives. These are 
organised into two higher-order bipolar dimensions, namely self-transcendence/self-
enhancement and openness to change/conservation. He has found support for this 
structure in more than 75 nations. At the nation level he identified a similar, but not 
identical, structure which included seven value types that are organised into three 
bipolar dimensions: autonomy-embeddedness, hierarchy-egalitarianism, and mastery-
harmony. Notably, several studies show that autonomy (vs. embeddedness) is 
conceptually and empirically similar to the individual-level dimension of openness to 
change/conservation (e.g., Fischer, 2011; Schwartz, 2004). Although not originally 
designed to measure individualism-collectivism (I-C), national mean scores on 
autonomy (vs. embeddedness) are correlated with Hofstede’s (1980) and House et al.’s 
(2004) indices of I-C (Gheorghiu, Vignoles, & Smith, 2009). Nevertheless, perhaps 
reflecting its greater theoretical precision, autonomy (vs. embeddedness) can offer 
additional predictive value to other measures of I-C (e.g., Knafo, Schwartz, & Levine, 
2009).  
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1.2.2 Beliefs 
The belief facet of culture has received much less attention in the literature. 
Nonetheless, some important work has been done by Bond and Leung (Bond, Leung, 
Tong, et al., 2004; Leung et al., 2002) who conducted extensive research in over 40 
countries into general beliefs, or “social axioms”. Social axioms refer to broad 
expectancies about the social and physical world. At the individual level, they identified 
five different belief dimensions: social cynicism, social complexity, reward for 
application, religiosity, and fate control. These beliefs have been shown to predict a 
range of psychological and behavioural outcomes such as modesty (Bond, Lun, Chan, 
Chan, & Wong, 2012), norm-directed behaviour (Kurman, 2011), and vulnerability to 
suicide (Lam, Bond, Chen, & Wu, 2010). At the nation-level, on the other hand, they 
found two dimensions: societal cynicism, which mirrors the individual-level dimension 
social cynicism, and dynamic externality, which incorporates the other four individual-
level dimensions.   
Social axioms refer to very broad beliefs about the world, which span a range of 
different domains. Less research has gone into investigating belief dimensions within 
established cultural syndromes, such as I-C. Despite the great popularity of I-C in the 
literature, its belief facet has rarely been investigated. I-C has often been criticized as 
too broad and ill-defined (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Kağitçibaşi, 1997; Oyserman, Coon, 
& Kemmelmeier, 2002), and Brewer and Chen (2007) suggest that disentangling its 
different facets will generate more precise predictions and more consistent findings. 
Thus, there appears to be scope for further investigations into beliefs in relation to I-C 
more specifically.  
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1.2.3 Self-construals 
The “self” orientation to culture has proved highly generative, on the other  
hand,  and has dominated conceptualizations of culture alongside values (Kağitçibaşi, 
1997). Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that people in individualist cultures will 
tend to construe themselves as relatively independent from others, whereas those in 
collectivist cultures will tend to construe themselves as relatively interdependent or 
closely connected with others. It has since become common practice to conceive of and 
measure self-construals in terms of two separate dimensions, independence and 
interdependence (Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, & Nishida, 1996; Singelis, 
1994). Markus and Kitayama’s theory has been interpreted as suggesting that self-
construals mediate the influence of culture on behaviour (Matsumoto, 1999); however, 
over time, self-construals have often become synonymous with I-C orientation, not the 
least in terms of how they are measured. This development has meant that self-
construals are rarely considered outside of the I-C framework. Moreover, self-construal 
theory and research has also been subject to some notable criticisms: overreliance on 
comparisons between North America and East Asia (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 
2011), lack of cultural differences consistent with the theory (Matsumoto, 1999), lack of 
support for a two-dimensional model (Levine et al., 2003), and lack of adequate 
measures (Levine et al., 2003; Smith, 2011). Thus, although a lot of cross-cultural 
research has already been conducted into self-construals, several important questions 
remain with regards to how self-construals should best be conceptualised and measured 
and how they vary across cultures.  
1.3 Research aims  
 The aim of the present research was to disentangle the concept of culture and 
provide greater understanding of how nations and social groups differ on measures of 
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cultural orientations. Building on Brewer and Chen (2007), the present thesis identifies 
three significant facets of culture: values, beliefs and representations of the self. 
Research into values is now at an advanced stage with a clear model of different value 
domains and how these differ across cultures (Schwartz, 1992, 2004). However, 
research into beliefs and self-construals is far less developed.  
Although Bond, Leung and colleagues (Bond, Leung, Tong, et al., 2004; Leung 
et al., 2002) have provided a rich picture of different types of beliefs across cultures, 
little is known about beliefs which define I-C. Given that this is one of the most 
prominent constructs in cross-cultural psychology, disentangling its different facets  
seems like a worthwhile endeavour which could potentially lead to more precise 
predictions of cultural influence. Thus, this thesis aimed to develop a belief dimension 
which would tap into the cultural syndrome of I-C. It aimed to develop a cross-
culturally valid measure of this belief dimension that could be used to describe both 
individuals and cultures (see Study 1, Chapter 5), and assess its usefulness as a predictor 
of societal processes (see Study 2, Chapter 5).  
Research into self-construals, on the other hand, has been dominated by the I-C 
dichotomy and they are often considered synonymous with I-C (e.g. Oyserman, Coon, 
& Kemmelmeier, 2002). Nonetheless, as noted above, several problems remain with 
self-construal theory, including lack of support for a two-dimensional model. Thus, this 
thesis aimed to refine the existing model of self-construals using large and diverse 
datasets which reach well beyond the standard West vs. East comparisons (see Study 3 
and 4, Chapter 6). Moreover, it investigated how national samples differed in terms of 
their construction of the self and which national and societal variables can explain this 
variation (see Study 5, Chapter 6). Finally, it aimed to improve on existing measures of 
self-construals, test the validity of this new measure, as well as investigate how the 
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refined model relates to a range of variables related to socio-emotional adjustment (see 
Study 6, Chapter 7).  
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Chapter 2  
The Person and the Context1 
 
This chapter looks in detail at one of the three facets of culture identified by 
Brewer and Chen (2007)—beliefs. In particular, it seeks to identify what type of beliefs 
would be considered an important part of the cultural syndrome I-C. I highlight the 
importance of the person and its relation to the social context in how I-C is defined and 
by referring to anthropological accounts, implicit person theories, and attribution 
research, I propose the construct of contextualism, referring specifically to beliefs about 
importance of the context in understanding people.  
 
2.1 Individualism-Collectivism and Beliefs  
The central theme of individualism is the conception of the individuals as autonomous 
from groups; the central theme of collectivism is the conception of individuals as 
aspects of groups or collectives (Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha, 1995, p. 462).  
 
As noted above, I-C is one of the most prominent constructs in cross-cultural 
psychology, providing a parsimonious and compelling framework through which 
cultural variation can be understood and predicted (Hofstede, 1980; Kağitçibaşi, 1997; 
Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995). This framework has generated a vast amount of 
research and continues to attract attention. However, questions have been raised 
regarding the validity and usefulness of I-C (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Oyserman et al., 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is closely adapted from parts of Owe et al. (2013).  
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2002). Critics have argued that the construct is too broad and ill-defined and that the 
different facets of cross-cultural variation, such as self-representations, values and 
beliefs, are confounded under its umbrella (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Kağitçibaşi, 1997). 
This causes problems with measurement, and limits the precision with which 
predictions of cultural influence can be made, underlining the need for a more fine-
grained approach that unpacks this broad dimension and teases apart its different facets. 
As noted above, the focus in I-C research has so far been on values and self-construals, 
leaving the belief component largely unexplored. 
As illustrated by the quotation above, diverging beliefs about the extent to which 
individuals are separate from, or closely connected to, the social context have been 
portrayed as a defining feature of I-C (Triandis, 1995; Triandis et al., 1995). Thus, a 
core belief dimension within I-C is likely to involve beliefs about the person and its 
relation to the social context.  
 
2.2 Anthropological accounts 
Since the beginnings of social scientific interest in cross-cultural differences, 
theorists and researchers have often observed that members of different cultures around 
the world (and in different historical periods) seem to have diverging beliefs or 
conceptions about the nature of personhood (Geertz, 1975; Mauss, 1938/1985; Shweder 
& Bourne, 1984). Mauss (1938/1985) described a historical transformation of notions of 
the person from being defined by roles in society and positions in the family in native 
Australian and North American societies, through a person defined by legal and moral 
responsibilities in ancient Rome and Greece, to a person defined by individual 
consciousness in the Enlightenment. Anthropological accounts across cultures also 
highlight great diversity in how the person is conceived. La Fontaine (1985) describes 
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the  Lugbara people of Uganda who define personhood as the infusion of  the adro spirit 
which determines a person’s desires and wishes, the Tallensi people of Ghana among 
which a person’s identity is determined by his or her place in society, and the Gahuku-
Gama people of New Guinea who lack a concept of the person altogether. Rather, this 
latter group sees individuals only in terms of structured roles or distinct personalities. 
She contrasts these conceptions with the Western notion of personhood and argues that 
the latter is driven by legal principles of the nation state. These principles are based on 
individuals as citizens, autonomous equal units, with the same rights and 
responsibilities. Thus, the Western conception makes a clear distinction between the 
person and his or her social role. Individuals are equal as persons with equal 
opportunities, but their social roles are unequal since these roles give some people more 
power than others. 
Similarly, Geertz (1975) suggested that: “the Western conception of the person 
as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe […] 
is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of 
the world’s cultures” (p. 48). He described how in Java notions of the person are 
defined by a contrast between the “inside”, a person’s emotional life, and the “outside”, 
a person’s actions and speech, whereas in Bali persons are defined by fixed roles, like 
characters in a play. Finally, in Moroccan culture people are defined relative to their 
contexts, such as their tribe, place of living, their family background or occupation. 
Individual distinctiveness is therefore achieved through the combination of a range of 
different contextual attributes. It is interesting to note that the idea of the person as 
engaging in performance can also be found in the writings of the North American 
sociologist Goffman (1956). He argued that social interaction can be thought of as a 
theatre and people in everyday life as actors in a play. According to Goffman, 
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performance in social interaction is a conscious process with the aim of avoiding 
embarrassment, a way of managing impressions. He argued that there also exist a 
hidden or private part where individuals do not play a role. Thus, Goffman’s theory 
differs from Geertz’s (1975) description of the Bali identity since in the latter people 
were fully defined in terms of characters in a play whereas Goffman appears to hold on 
to the idea that the person’s traits and characteristics will determine his or her 
performance.  
Shweder and Bourne (1984) found that the way that people thought about other 
people differed across cultures; Indian participants referred to contextual and relational 
features when asked to describe a close acquaintance, whereas Americans provided 
abstract and context-free accounts. Thus, the main difference they identified referred to 
the importance of the context in defining people.  
These accounts paint a picture where the person, on one hand, is defined by 
roles, positions in society and the context, and, on the other hand, as context-free and 
autonomous. Moreover, the variation in these perspectives seems to map on to current 
understandings of variation in I-C. Nonetheless, although research into social perception 
has pointed to similar findings (e.g. Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002) these 
personhood beliefs have rarely been investigated, as is discussed below.  
 
2.3 Personhood Beliefs  
2.3.1 Implicit person theories and essentialism 
Within the psychological literature, beliefs about personhood can be found in 
research into implicit person theories (Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001) and 
essentialism (Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). Dweck and colleagues (Dweck, Chiu, 
& Hong, 1995; Erdley & Dweck, 1993; Levy et al., 2001) have suggested that people’s 
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implicit theories about human nature can be divided into entity theories, which assume 
personality is fixed, and incremental theories, which regard traits and attributes as 
malleable. In a large body of research, they have demonstrated that holding these 
different sets of beliefs has wide ranging consequences. For instance, compared to 
incremental theorists, entity theorists have been shown to make more rigid social 
judgements (Erdley & Dweck, 1993), endorse stereotypes to a greater extent (Levy, 
Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998), and be less likely to use constructive conflict strategies 
(Kammrath & Dweck, 2006).  
Recently, Haslam, Bastian, Bain, and Kashima (2006) have argued that implicit 
person theories should be considered within the wider framework of essentialism. This 
framework involves a coherent set of beliefs that people can be understood in terms of 
underlying essences which determines their identity. These beliefs include that traits and 
attributes are immutable, that people can be classified into discrete categories and that 
such categories are highly informative about the person. Although cross-cultural 
differences in implicit person theories and essentialism have been found, the pattern of 
differences does not map neatly onto previously found differences in I-C across nations 
(cf. Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Church et al., 2003, 2005; Norenzayan et al., 2002). 
Research into entitativity (Kashima et al., 2005) has also revealed a similar pattern 
across cultures, with individuals generally believed to be more real entities than social 
groups. Similarly, Yamaguchi (2001) argues that people universally have a need for a 
sense of control and self-efficacy, but that its shape and form varies with a focus on 
personal control in Western cultures and collective control, for example through 
participation in a group, in East Asian cultures.  
 
2.3.2 Attribution research 
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A clearer pattern of cross-cultural differences has been found among beliefs 
about causes of behaviour, where Americans have typically been found to make more 
dispositional attributions, referring to traits and attributes of the actor, whereas Indian 
and Chinese people have been found more likely to invoke contextual explanations 
(Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994). Such findings have led to a widely held notion 
that people in the West will endorse lay dispositionism (Ross & Nisbett, 1991)—that is, 
the tendency to explain behaviour in terms of traits—to a greater extent than non-
Western, particularly East-Asian, people (Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & 
Uskul, 2009). However, several studies show that East-Asians can make dispositional 
judgments to a similar extent to Americans (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Krull et al., 1999; 
Norenzayan et al., 2002), which has lead Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) to 
conclude that dispositionism is cross-culturally widespread. They argue that differences 
in social perception may stem not from differences in dispositionism, but rather from 
East Asians’ greater endorsement of “situationism”, which they define as the tendency 
to explain behaviour in terms of the context.  
 
2.3.3 Traits vs. context 
Beliefs about the importance of traits have also been investigated by Church and 
colleagues (2003), who contrast implicit trait beliefs with what they call implicit 
contextual beliefs. These beliefs refer to the stability, consistency and predictability of 
traits, and to the possibility of inferring traits from behaviour. Church et al. (2005, 2006) 
found that Americans tend to score higher on implicit trait beliefs and lower on implicit 
contextual beliefs than do Malays, Mexicans, Asian Australians, Filipinos, and 
Japanese. Nevertheless, most of these cultural groups still endorsed trait theories more 
strongly than contextual theories.  
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Thus, members of collectivist cultures do not typically seem to espouse a de-
traited concept of the person. What may be more distinctive is the tendency of members 
of individualist cultures to espouse a de-contextualized concept of the person (Shweder 
& Bourne, 1984). Church et al. (2003) defined contextual theories as the reverse of 
dispositionism, i.e., that traits are unimportant. However, the widespread endorsement 
of dispositionism arguably makes this conceptualization problematic.  
 
2.3.4 Contextualism 
It is clear from the above review that the importance of the context is a 
reoccurring theme when studying variations in conceptions of the person across cultures 
and that this variation seems to roughly map onto our understanding of I-C. 
Nonetheless, beliefs about the importance of the context are rarely investigated without 
being defined in opposition to the importance of traits. Therefore, I propose the 
construct of contextualism, which specifically refers to the perceived importance of the 
context in understanding people. This includes social and relational contexts, such as 
family, social groups and social positions, but also physical environments. It is 
suggested that contextualism comprises an important facet of I-C and taps a largely 
unexplored side of this cultural dimension. 
The theoretical and operational definition of contextualism differs from that of 
Church et al. by focusing instead on people’s beliefs about the importance of context in 
its own right and its role in defining a person. It also differs from concepts of 
essentialism and entitativity (Haslam et al., 2004; Kashima et al., 2005), since 
contextualism is not concerned with whether people have a fixed and underlying nature, 
but refers to the type of factors that are believed to be important in making a person who 
he or she is.  
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2.4 The person and the self 
Before moving on to the next chapter which outlines theory and research into 
self-construals, it is worth noting how beliefs about the person and constructions of the 
self differ. Although this distinction is likely to vary depending on theoretical 
perspectives and may not always be vital, this thesis adopts the distinction made by 
Mauss (1938/1985). He differentiated between personne (person), which refers to 
representations of the person within society, and moi (the self), which refers to an 
individual’s own awareness of their unique identity and his or hers relation to other 
people. Thus, this thesis investigates constructions of personhood, i.e. beliefs about 
what defines a person, and constructions of selfhood, referring to people’s own 
understanding of who they are within their social relationships. Beliefs about people in 
general often differ from beliefs about the self, as is well established in attribution 
research  (Watson, 1982). Given that they do not necessarily coincide, self-construals 
and beliefs about people in general should be treated as different constructs and their 
convergence should be investigated empirically. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 By looking at how I-C is defined as well as anthropological and social 
psychological research into personhood beliefs, this chapter has aimed to identify 
beliefs that are part of the cultural syndrome collectivism. This review of the literature 
suggests that variation in beliefs about the person and its relation to the context may 
broadly follow the same pattern as I-C and therefore provide an interesting starting-
point. I have put forward the construct of contextualism, which refers to beliefs about 
the context in its own right, rather than as the opposite of the importance of traits and 
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dispositions. In Chapter 5, I develop a scale to measure contextualism which will be 
validated in terms of its reliability, invariance across cultures and across levels of 
analysis, and its convergence with other indicators of I-C (Study 1). I investigate how it 
varies across national samples and how it predicts societal processes such as ingroup 
favouritism and corruption, above and beyond values and self-construals (Study 2).  
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Chapter 3  
Constructing the Self 
Alongside values and beliefs, Brewer and Chen (2007) identified constructions 
of the self as an important facet of culture. This chapter discusses the most prominent 
theory of the self in cross-cultural psychology—Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory 
of self-construals. After outlining their theory and its impact, it will discuss a range of 
issues that have arisen in this literature that question the validity of the current model of 
self-construals and highlight the need for more research in this area.   
 
3.1 Markus and Kitayama’s theory 
3.1.1 Independence and interdependence 
Just over two decades ago, Markus and Kitayama (1991) published their classic 
paper on culture and the self, which suggested that people in different parts of the world 
tend to construct the self in two fundamentally different ways. They proposed that 
Western cultures promote an independent construal of the self, whereas non-Western—
in particular East Asian cultures—emphasize an interdependent view of the self. The 
independent self-construal was defined as separate from the social context, bounded, 
unitary, and stable. A person with an independent self-construal would strive for self-
expression, uniqueness and self-actualization, acting autonomously, based on his/her 
own thoughts and feelings, and pursuing his/her own goals. The interdependent self-
construal, on the other hand, was defined as closely connected to the social context and 
therefore flexible, fluid, and varying across contexts. Important goals for a person with 
an interdependent self-construal would be to fit in and maintain harmony with relevant 
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others, which means acting based on expectations and social norms, rather than personal 
wishes and preferences. Thus, they argued, when the self is construed as interdependent, 
personal autonomy will be secondary in importance to maintaining relationships, and 
other people’s goals will be internalized as one’s own goals (see also Markus & 
Kitayama, 2010). 
 
3.1.2 Impact of their theory 
Markus and Kitayama’s paper had a major impact on the field of social 
psychology, by drawing attention to cultural diversity and providing tools for theorizing 
about it. It challenged many ethnocentric assumptions within self and identity research 
and opened up the possibility of examining alternative and more diverse formulations of 
the self (Cross et al., 2011). In contrast to much of the cross-cultural research at the 
time, it provided an explanatory framework for making sense of cultural differences 
(Matsumoto, 1999). Moreover, the theory provided a useful “conceptual bridge” 
between culture and individual psychological processes, helping social cognitive 
researchers to engage with emerging knowledge about macro-level societal differences 
in I-C (Triandis, 1995). Markus and Kitayama’s discussion of culture and the self has 
therefore become extremely influential and well-cited, and self-construals have been 
used to explain a wide range of psychological variables and behaviours, including 
cognitive styles, wellbeing, social anxiety, self-regulation, self-esteem, communication 
styles, and pro-social behaviour, to name only a few (see Cross et al., 2011; Gudykunst 
& Lee, 2003; Smith, 2011, for reviews). They have therefore become a useful tool for 
investigating differences in cognition, affect, motivation and behaviour (Cross et al., 
2011). However, as noted in Section 1.2.3, self-construal theory and research has also 
been subject to some notable criticisms: overreliance on comparisons between North 
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America and East Asia (Cross et al., 2011), lack of cultural differences consistent with 
the theory (Matsumoto, 1999), lack of support for a two-dimensional model (Levine et 
al., 2003), and lack of adequate measures (Levine et al., 2003; Smith, 2011).  
 
3.2 Self-construals Across Cultures 
3.2.1 West vs. East focus 
Although Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory has been highly influential, 
empirical support for some of its key postulates has been rather mixed. Markus and 
Kitayama (1991) relied on a review of anthropological and cross-cultural sources to 
illustrate the proposed differences in self-construals. They referred to many parts of the 
world, but their main emphasis was on a contrast between the US and East Asia, in 
particular Japan. Several of their claims have received little empirical attention—for 
example, that the interdependent self is characteristic of African and Latin American 
cultures (Cross et al., 2011; Matsumoto, 1999). This emphasis on differences between 
North America and East Asia has continued within the self-construal literature, and 
therefore little is known still about how the self is constructed in other parts of the world 
(Cross et al., 2011). It is possible that this narrow focus has restricted theorizing around 
self-construals and consequently may have limited the explanatory potential of the 
constructs.  
 
3.2.2 Inconsistent findings 
Moreover, where self-construals have been measured directly, the results often 
do not map on to the cross-cultural pattern of differences suggested by Markus and 
Kitayama (1991). Self-construals have traditionally been measured in two different 
ways: the Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), in which 
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participants freely list up to 20 things about themselves, and Likert-type scales, most 
commonly the scales devised by Singelis (1994) and Gudykunst et al. (1996). In a 
review of studies using the TST, Oyserman et al. (2002) concluded that there is only 
weak support for the notion that Americans differ from East-Asians in the proportions 
of independent and interdependent self-descriptions. Similarly, studies using the Likert-
type scales have demonstrated divergent and inconsistent results which provide very 
limited support for Markus and Kitayama’s original predictions (Levine et al., 2003; 
Matsumoto, 1999, for reviews).  
Admittedly, these inconsistencies could be related to a range of factors such as 
overreliance on student samples, failure to control for acquiescence response bias 
(Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005), focus on explicit rather than implicit 
independence and interdependence
2
 (Kitayama et al., 2009), reference group effects
3
 
(Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002), and item wordings that are too 
decontextualized and abstract, which would be particularly unsuitable for people with 
an interdependent self (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). However, it has also 
been argued that the dimensions on which cultural groups differ may be more complex 
than the simple distinction between independence and interdependence (Brewer & 
Chen, 2007; Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002; Smith et al., 
2006).  
 
  
                                                          
2
 I return to this issue in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1.  
3
 Although often highlighted in the literature as a potential threat to the validity of 
observed cross-cultural differences, a recent study by Mõttus et al. (2012) showed that 
differences in reference standards are small and do not have a substantial effect on 
national mean scores. In relation to the present research, the systematic cross-cultural 
pattern as well as the correlations with societal variables identified are unlikely to have 
arisen as a product of reference group effects (see Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). 
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3.3 Multiple Dimensions of Self-construals 
3.3.1 Independent, relational and collective self-construals 
Self-construals are most commonly conceptualized and measured as two 
independent dimensions (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994) or as one bipolar 
dimension (Kitayama et al., 2009) and the former model of self-construals has come to 
dominate the literature. However, some have suggested that independence and 
interdependence needs to be unpacked. Kağitçibaşi (2005) argues that the tendency 
within psychology to confound autonomy and relatedness is misguided. This is 
frequently the case when independence is conceptualised and measured; separateness 
and autonomy are often used interchangeably. Instead she proposes a model in which 
these are orthogonal dimensions. Hence, she argues it is possible to endorse both 
autonomy and relatedness. Kağitçibaşi (2005) refers to research in Turkey which shows 
that improvement in economic conditions leads to less utilitarian reliance on the child, 
which in turn promotes autonomy of the child. However, she argues that there is still a 
psychological interdependence within the family. Hence, autonomy does not necessarily 
mean separateness.  
Others have argued that interdependence needs to be considered at different 
levels of inclusiveness, distinguishing between relational and collective interdependence 
(Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000; 
Kashima & Hardie, 2000). These researchers base the dimensions of self-construals on 
the targets of social relationships—close others for relational self-construal, and groups 
for collective self-construal. Harb and Smith (2008) provide a further distinction, 
dividing the relational and collective self-construals into horizontal dimensions, 
reflecting equal relationships, and vertical dimensions, reflecting hierarchical 
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relationships.
4
 These perspectives share the idea that different types of relationships 
have differing importance for the self across cultures. For example, Cross et al. (2000) 
suggest that North Americans, in particular women, define the self in terms of close 
relationships, whereas East Asians are more likely to define the self in terms of group 
memberships (but see Yuki, 2003).   
 
3.3.2 Different domains of independence and interdependence 
Others have argued for the importance of considering different domains or facets 
of independence and interdependence. For instance, Noguchi (2007) found that, 
whereas American participants scored higher than the Japanese on self-focus and 
Japanese participants scored higher than Americans on other-focus, as Markus and 
Kitayama’s (1991) theory would predict, Americans still scored higher on helping 
others. This suggests that the pattern of results depends on which facet of independence 
and interdependence is considered.  
Several other studies have also indicated that self-construals are 
multidimensional (Christopher, Norris, D’Souza, & Tiernan, 2011; Guo, Schwartz, & 
McCabe, 2008; Hardin et al., 2004; Levine et al., 2003; Milfont, 2005; Sato & McCann, 
1998). Hardin et al. (2004) identified six different domains: four facets of independence 
that they labelled autonomy/assertiveness, individualism, behavioural consistency, and 
primacy of self, and two facets of interdependence that they labelled esteem for group 
and relational interdependence. They demonstrated that European Americans and Asian 
Americans differed on autonomy/assertiveness and primacy of self, whereas the two 
groups did not differ on the higher-order factor of independence. They also found that 
the six separate dimensions had incremental explanatory power compared to using only 
                                                          
4
 Harb and Smith’s (2008) model includes six self-construals: personal self, relational-
vertical, relational-horizontal, collective-vertical, collective-horizontal, and humanity. 
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the two higher-order dimensions when explaining social anxiety (Hardin, 2006). Hardin 
et al.’s studies are important as they point to the potential value of considering multiple 
dimensions of self-construals. However, the meaning of factors they identified is far 
from clear. For instance, the factor which they label individualism includes a range of 
different themes: enjoying being unique, acting independently, importance of personal 
identity, respecting people that are modest, and having lively imagination. Moreover, 
the distinction between esteem for group and relational interdependence is not very 
clear since both include items referring to giving something up for one’s group and 
sharing of one’s fate with others. It should also be noted that although Hardin and 
colleagues’ research (Hardin et. al., 2004; Hardin, 2006) involved different ethnic 
groups, their participants were still all North American and their model has received 
mixed cross-cultural support (cf. Christopher et al., 2011; Milfont, 2005). In order to be 
more confident about the underlying structure of self-construals, it seems that more 
cross-cultural research is needed which incorporates a much wider range of cultures.    
One such attempt was provided by Fernández, Paez, and González (2005) who, 
using data from student samples in 29 nations and a shortened version of Singelis’ 
(1994) self-construal scale, identified four dimensions of self-construals. These were 
labelled group loyalty, uniqueness, low context and relational independence. Although 
some of these resemble the factors identified by Hardin et al. (2004), some items that 
were found to load on the same factor in Hardin et al.’s model, loaded on different 
factors in Fernández et al.’s model and vice versa. It is also possible that the factor 
structure that they extracted was influenced by the fact that they only used 13 items. For 
instance, none of the items that make up Hardin et al.’s primacy of self factor were 
included in their study. Moreover, the authors did not account for the multilevel 
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structure in their data and it is possible that their individual-level analyses were 
influenced by nation-level variation.  
These studies raise the question of whether there are different ways of being 
independent and interdependent, which should be considered separately, even though 
there still seems to be some lack of clarity of what the different domains are. 
Investigating different domains of independence and interdependence may provide a 
clearer pattern of cross-cultural differences (Fiske, 2002). For example, it may be that 
striving for self-reliance on the one hand and striving for uniqueness on the other are in 
fact separate facets in which the self is defined in different ways. These separate facets 
may be differentially endorsed in particular cultures, and thus measures that confound 
these different facets may be unable to provide a clear picture of self-construals across 
cultures—perhaps explaining some of the inconsistent findings in the literature. Hardin 
and colleagues’ studies (Hardin et al., 2004; Hardin, 2006) point to the usefulness of 
looking at separate domains, however, their starting-point in terms of samples was too 
limited. Fernández et al.’s (2005) study provides an advancement in terms of their large 
cross-cultural dataset but used a restricted item pool and failed to account for the 
multilevel structure of the data. Hence, questions still remain with regards to how the 
different facets should be conceptualized. The current research aims to answer these 
questions, using two large and diverse cross-cultural datasets, and a wider range of self-
construal items.   
 
3.4 Self-Construals at the Cultural level 
3.4.1 Social constructions of selfhood 
Although self-construals have typically been viewed—and measured—as 
individual-level constructs, I would argue that self-construals can also be 
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conceptualized and measured at a cultural level of analysis. Given that the self-concept 
is an inherent part of the individual, the notion of characterizing cultures along self-
construal dimensions may seem foreign. Nonetheless, individuals’ self-construals are 
here considered to be grounded in social constructions of selfhood. These constructions 
are shared representations of the self and its relation to other people, which are created 
and maintained through interaction and practices within a culture (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966; Moscovici, 1988; Oyserman & Markus, 1998). These ideas or images about the 
self could include for instance that individuals strive for uniqueness or that they are 
highly committed to their group. This does not, however, imply conformity or 
uniformity in representations of the self within a culture—the social constructions may 
be internalized or resisted by individuals, generating substantial variation in individuals’ 
construal of the self within any given cultural context. Nevertheless, it suggests that 
some systematic agreement exists within a culture which differentiates it from other 
cultures. Thus, I argue that constructions of selfhood can be described at a cultural level 
of analysis, and it is expected that these will be important dimensions on which to 
characterize cultures.  
 
3.4.2 Differences across levels 
Investigating self-construals at a cultural level requires a sample of cultures that 
is large enough to use culture as a level of analysis, rather than the two- or three-nation 
comparisons that are more common in self-construal research. Relationships can then be 
investigated using cultures, rather than individuals, as the unit of analyses. This avoids 
the danger of committing the ecological fallacy or the reverse ecological fallacy, 
considering that processes and relationships at these two levels of analysis can be very 
different (see Hofstede, 1980; Smith et al., 2006).  Studies have found different 
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structures at the individual and cultural levels of analysis in several domains of cultural 
orientation. As noted above in Section 1.2.2, Leung et al. (2002) identified five 
dimensions of social axioms at the individual level, whereas at the cultural level the 
axioms were organized into a two-dimensional structure (Bond, Leung, Tong, et al., 
2004). Similarly, Schwartz (1992, 2004) identified 10 different value types at the 
individual level, but found a somewhat different structure with only seven distinct value 
types at the cultural level. To my knowledge, however, no previous research has 
investigated self-construals at the cultural level. Hence, whether or not individuals and 
cultural groups can be positioned on the same self-construal dimensions remains an 
open empirical question.   
 
3.5 Self-construals and I-C 
3.5.1 Self-construals as a product of I-C  
Although research into self-construals has been very generative in terms of 
identifying the consequences of different constructions of the self, it has shed less light 
on why self-construals differ across cultures (Kağitçibaşi, 2005). One of the most 
common explanations for differences in self-construals is I-C. However, the relationship 
between self-construals and I-C is ambiguous and conceptions of this relationship vary 
substantially in the literature. Some describe cultural-level I-C as causing differences in 
self-construals (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Kim, Aune, Hunter, Kim, & Kim, 2001; Park & 
Levine, 1999; Singelis & Brown, 1995), whereas others consider self-construals as 
synonymous with I-C (Oyserman et al., 2002). Still others draw the distinction in terms 
of levels of analysis, defining independence and interdependence as the individual-level 
‘equivalent’ of cultural-level I-C (Smith, 2011). The situation is further complicated by 
the fact that the same items that are used to measure independence and interdependence 
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are also often used to measure I-C. However, as noted above, the present research 
argues that I-C includes more facets than just different social constructions of selfhood, 
notably also values and beliefs. Hence, I-C is not reducible to differences in self-
construals, as argued above in Chapter 1. 
 
3.5.2 Other antecedents of self-construals 
Moreover, even though self-construals may vary meaningfully between 
individualistic and collectivistic societies, it is still not clear whether I-C is sufficient to 
account for variability in different constructions of the self. Georgas, Van de Vijver, and 
Berry (2004) found that psychological variables such as values and wellbeing were most 
strongly predicted by national wealth and religious heritage (see also Inglehart & Baker, 
2000, and a longer discussion in Chapter 6, Section 6.3) and it is possible that these 
variables also predict self-construals above and beyond the influence of I-C. So far, 
there has been a tendency in the literature to rely on names of nations to infer culture 
and make sense of differences in self-construals, often based on comparisons of a small 
number of nations (but see Fernández et al., 2005).  These studies can typically tell us 
that self-construals in, for example, the USA and Japan are different, but they do not tell 
us anything about why they differ—whether it is differences in I-C, economic 
development, religion, or other possible important nation-level variables (Georgas et al., 
2004). Recently, there has been some interesting research into explanations of 
differences in self-construals. Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, and Ramaswamy 
(2006) found that levels of independence in Japan could be explained in terms of 
voluntary settlement in the northern frontier and Oishi (2010) has shown that residential 
mobility promotes independence. Nonetheless, much more research is needed into the 
factors responsible for the observed differences between cultural groups.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
It is clear from the above review that several issues remain in relation to self-
construal theory and research. Although there have been indications of 
multidimensionality, it is still not clear along which dimensions self-construals are best 
conceptualized. Moreover, little is known about how self-construals vary beyond the 
North American and East Asian comparison and why they vary. In the present thesis, I 
aimed to address the issues. In Chapter 6, data from two large and culturally diverse sets 
of national samples is reported, including many national groups that are normally not 
featured in the self-construal literature. The structure of self-construals was tested in 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses among high-school students (Study 3) and 
among adults using an improved measure (Study 4). In Study 5, I investigated the cross-
cultural variation in constructions of the self and sought to explain this variation in 
terms of cultural and societal antecedents. Finally, in Chapter 7, I investigate how self-
construals relate to a range of variables related to socio-emotional adjustment (Study 6).  
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Chapter 4  
Methodological Overview 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to explore dimensions of 
cultural variation and validate these constructs and measures in terms of their reliability, 
cross-cultural and cross-level invariance, and convergent validity. Variation of national 
samples and predictive validity were also explored. This chapter outlines the 
methodological approach I took in order to achieve these aims. Firstly, it will provide an 
overview of the three research projects that the studies in this thesis are based on. It will 
then discuss more general methodological considerations for cross-cultural research.   
 
4.1 Research project overview 
4.1.1 Research project no. 1 
 This was an international collaborative research project into identity motives and 
sources of motive satisfaction (see the Culture and Identity Research Network, 2012). It 
was a questionnaire study in 19 nations, which was centrally coordinated by the 
University of Sussex research team, including Vivian Vignoles, Maja Becker, Rupert 
Brown, Peter Smith, Matt Easterbrook, and myself. Maja Becker was the main 
coordinator of the project but I worked on theory and questionnaire development for the 
measures I was developing as well as translations, UK data collection, data screening, 
analyses, and report writing of these measures. I also supported her in other areas of the 
research. Our international collaborators collected and entered data locally, which was 
then collated and analysed by the Sussex research team.  
38 
 
 
 
 This project was longitudinal and involved two waves of data collection, roughly 
four months apart. Measures investigating identity motives were repeated in order to 
address issues of causality (see Becker et al., 2012) whereas the individual difference 
variables which this thesis is based on were only measured once (details of measures 
can be found in sections 5.2.1.2 and 6.1.1.2). The participants were high-school students 
who participated in the research during normal teaching time and a total of 5,241 
students took part in the study (details of samples can be found in Chapter 5, Table 5.1). 
Overall participation is higher for upper secondary education than for university 
education (UNESCO, 2010), suggesting that these samples were somewhat more 
representative of their respective cultures than university students, which are more 
common in cross-cultural research.  
Study 1 and Study 3 in the present thesis is based on data from this research 
project.  
 
4.1.2 Research project no. 2 
The second research project was an extension of the first and was conducted in 
36 nations but with only one wave of data collection. The organisation of the project 
was the same as the first, but with a larger number of international collaborators. The 
questionnaire included mostly the same measures as in the first project, even though 
some scales were slightly modified (see Section 5.3.1.2 and 6.2.1.2). Rather than 
students, we sampled non-student adults in this second research project. Given that the 
overall aim of the research was to achieve a greater understanding of cultural variation, 
we considered it important to go beyond student samples since these are likely to be less 
representative of their cultures than adults. The adult samples were opportunity samples, 
recruited through a variety of means including a snowballing technique among the 
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researchers’ social networks, through community groups and non-governmental 
organizations, and with help of university students who collected data from their 
relatives. Thus, our adult samples were not representative of their respective nations and 
were not matched in any way. Nonetheless, the diversity of our samples should be 
considered a strength of this research since it has a greater chance of reflecting true 
cultural variation than the more common approach of using university students. 
Moreover, the second research project also sampled different cultural groups 
within nations. As noted above, one criticism of cross-cultural research has been the 
overreliance on nations as the unit of analysis. Although there are indications that this is 
a meaningful and useful approach (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011; Smith, 2004a), we 
wanted to go further and incorporated also different groups within nations. These 
cultural groups were defined in terms of what was relevant in the local context, hence, 
the groups were sometimes geographical, sometimes ethnic or sometimes religious (see 
details in Chapter 6, Table 6.4). In one group, highlanders in Ethiopia, some participants 
were semi-literate or illiterate and they were helped reading the questions by the 
research assistants. 
Study 2, 4 and 5 in the present thesis is based on data from this second research 
project.  
 
4.1.3 Research project no. 3 
The third research project was a much smaller questionnaire study, including 
four national samples from Malaysia, Romania, Thailand and the UK. These samples 
were chosen for practical reasons but they fit in to the common practice in the literature 
of comparing Western and East Asian countries, as well as adding a slightly different 
perspective from an ex-communist European sample. The study was conducted among 
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university and high-school students (see details Section 7.1.1.1). I was in charge of the 
coordination of the project and three international collaborators conducted the data 
collection outside of the UK.  
Study 6 in the present thesis is based on data from this third research project.  
 
4.2 Methodological considerations 
4.2.1 Translations 
Most cross-cultural research involves translation of some form or another. This 
is often a difficult and time-consuming process which involves close scrutiny of the 
translated and the original material. A common practice which we adopted in all of the 
studies presented here is the process of back-translation (Brislin, 1970). This involves 
translating the original material to the other language, then independently translating it 
back to the original. The two original language versions are then compared and any 
discrepancies are highlighted. Through discussions, the translation or the original are 
then improved to resolve inconsistencies. In the present research, a lot of effort was 
made to achieve an optimal translation which would best reflect the original meaning in 
all languages. This often involved lengthy discussions and compromises, where the 
original sometimes had to be simplified to allow more straightforward translation. Back-
translation provides a valuable tool for checking accuracy and comparability of different 
language version. Without such tests, it would be impossible to get a sense of whether 
observed differences are due to substantial cultural differences or different meanings 
attributed to the questionnaire items.  
Nonetheless, I also tried to go beyond using only back-translation and aimed to 
adopt a decentered approach (more details in Section 6.2.1.2). Such an approach holds 
translatability and comparability of meaning at the forefront even at the stage of item 
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generation and avoids words or expressions that are specific to one language or culture. 
Aiming to construct scales that not only would be easy to translate but also easy to 
understand, in particular among non-Western participants, I discussed items with native 
speakers of several other languages and generated many versions which were improved 
based on input and feedback. The aim was to avoid culturally biased material in the 
questionnaires and allow for emic input, even though I recognise that this input could 
have been much greater.  
 
4.2.2 Acquiescence response bias 
Another issue in cross-cultural research is acquiescence response bias, which 
refers to the tendency to agree with items, regardless of their content. This bias has been 
found to be more pronounced in collectivistic cultures (Smith, 2004b), and can lead to 
spurious and misleading results (Schimmack et al., 2005). The present research 
therefore adopted several strategies to reduce this problem. Firstly, unlike many well-
used cross-cultural scales (e.g. Singelis, 1994), reversed items were included as much as 
possible. Secondly, where appropriate, I controlled for acquiescence by modelling it as 
a separate factor within a structural equation framework (Welkenhuysen-Gybels, Billiet, 
& Cambré, 2003, see details in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.1). Thirdly, where modelling an 
acquiescence factor was not feasible, item scores were ipsatized for each individual. 
This involved taking the mean across all items for each individual and subtracting this 
mean from each item (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). 
 
4.2.3 Cross-cultural invariance analysis 
As noted above in Section 1.1.2, a further issue in cross-cultural research refers 
to the cross-cultural validity of instruments. Alongside back-translation and decentring 
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of questionnaire material, I used cross-cultural measurement invariance as a way to test 
comparability. This involved tests of whether the measures had a comparable meaning 
across the nations sampled, so that subsequent analysis of national differences was not 
‘comparing apples with oranges’—that is, observed differences could be attributed to 
genuine differences among the samples rather than methodological artefacts (Chen, 
2008; Fischer & Fontaine, 2011). Establishing measurement invariance involves several 
steps: firstly, the measurement model is tested in each group separately, with the aim of 
identifying a subset of items that show the same factor structure in each group, with all 
indicators related to the factor in the expected manner—known as configural 
invariance. Secondly, in a model which analyzes all samples simultaneously, loadings 
are constrained to be equal and the impact on model fit is assessed. If the fit of the 
constrained model remains acceptable, it is preferred to the unconstrained model 
because it is more parsimonious, and the hypothesis of metric invariance can be 
considered tenable (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; Little, Card, Slegers, & 
Ledford, 2007).
5
  Metric invariance signifies that variance in each item is related to the 
same extent in each sample to variance in the underlying construct. This implies that the 
construct has a comparable meaning across samples, and that one can validly compare 
correlational patterns across samples. Thirdly, the intercepts are constrained to be equal 
and if the fit remain acceptable, scalar invariance can be considered tenable. Scalar 
                                                          
5
 Invariance has traditionally been assessed by the difference in the chi-square statistic 
between the unconstrained and the constrained model. However, given its sensitivity to 
sample size, it is unsuitable for large samples. The alternative criterion of a change in 
CFI smaller than or equal to .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002) has often been used by 
researchers comparing a small numbers of groups. Note, however, that this criterion was 
based on a simulation study with only two groups and little is known about its 
suitability for analyses with a larger number of groups. Indeed, this criterion has not 
typically been used in studies with many cultural groups (e.g. Davidov, Schmidt, & 
Schwartz, 2008; Fischer et al., 2009; Franke & Nadler, 2008; Spini, 2003). 
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invariance signifies that absolute scores on each item are related to the same absolute 
levels of the underlying construct, and thus group means can be validly compared 
(Chen, 2008). By testing the validity of the measures cross-culturally and adjusting 
them to fit also in local contexts, the present research aimed for a “derived etic” 
approach (see Section 1.1.2 above).  
 
4.2.4 Cross-level invariance analysis  
As was also noted above, the need to distinguish between levels of analysis is 
very important in cross-cultural research in order to avoid the ecological fallacy and the 
reversed ecological fallacy (Hofstede, 1980). The large datasets included in the present 
research made it possible to simultaneously investigate structures and processes at both 
the individual and cultural level. In order to test whether the dimensions of cultural 
orientations exist at both levels of analysis and whether they have comparable meaning, 
I tested for multilevel isomorphism. This involves testing whether a comparable 
structure can be identified at both levels, with similar strengths of relationships between 
the items and the underlying construct. If established, isomorphism signifies that the 
internal structure that characterizes individuals can also be applied to nations (for 
discussion see Fischer, 2009). It should be noted, however, that even though a construct 
may have comparable meaning across levels, it does not mean that it necessarily will 
have the same antecedents and consequences.  
These analyses were conducted in multilevel analyses, which require a sample of 
nations. Kreft and De Leeuw (1998) have suggested that 20 groups are sufficient at the 
highest level. The multilevel analyses in Study 1 involved a nation-level sample size 
very close to this (19 national samples) and in Study 4 I used 64 cultural groups, hence, 
I can be relatively confident in the accuracy of the analyses.  
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4.2.5 Nomological networks and outcomes 
In order to further investigate the validity and usefulness of the dimensions of 
cultural orientation identified in the present research, nomological networks and 
potential outcomes were also investigated. This allowed for a greater understanding of 
the meaning of the constructs as well as illuminated how they can be useful in 
understanding societal and individual processes.  
For the nation-level analyses, I consulted relevant existing databases and 
previous research in order to identify suitable variables. These included societal 
variables such as national wealth, inequality, corruption, democracy and urbanisation, as 
well as ecological variables such as climate. I also sourced nation-level scores on 
ingroup favouritism (Van de Vliert, 2010), religiosity (The World Values Survey 
Association, 2011), Hofstede’s (1980) four cultural dimensions, monumentalism (vs. 
flexumility; Minkov, 2007), social axioms (Bond, Leung, Tong, et al., 2004), and 
tightness (Gelfand et al., 2011) among others. This approach is not without problems, 
however. Firstly, the overlap of nations included in the present research and the existing 
databases was often far from perfect, which reduced the sample size and may therefore 
have increased Type 2 error. Secondly, the samples on which the existing data are based 
are likely to be very different from the present research (e.g. business managers vs. 
students), which limits the conclusions that can be drawn. Nonetheless, these analyses 
are valuable since they highlight nation-level patterns and make it possible to relate 
more clearly to previous research.   
For the individual-level analyses in Study 6, I looked at how self-construals 
relate to a range of variables related to socio-emotional adjustment. The main aim of 
these analyses was to get a sense of how the different ways of constructing the self can 
be useful in predicting different outcomes, by showing a unique pattern of correlations.  
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The outcomes included life-satisfaction, depression, social anxiety, self-efficacy, self-
esteem, coping strategies, narcissism, and authenticity. These outcomes were chosen 
because they refer to healthy and constructive psychological functioning (or lack 
thereof), in which different constructions of the self are likely to play a part. Emotional, 
rather cognitive, outcomes have received less attention in self-construal research, hence, 
this particular focus could potentially add something to the literature (Cross et al., 
2011). This study provided only some initial results, however, and there is a lot of scope 
for building on these in future research.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the three research projects that this thesis is based on 
and has discussed several methodological issues which arise in cross-cultural research. 
It is clear that multinational studies pose many challenges, including translations, 
acquiescence response bias, invariance across cultures and levels of analysis, and use of 
nation-level indices which are based on very different types of samples. Nonetheless, 
multinational studies also have the potential to add to the literature in unique ways. In 
particular, the possibility of investigating both individual and cultural-level process 
opens up for a whole set of questions which two-or three nation studies cannot even 
begin to answer. The present research involved two large multinational research projects 
which combined included samples from all inhabited continents. Thus, we included 
samples that are normally underrepresented in the social psychological literature, such 
as African, South American and the Middle Eastern samples. This diverse dataset 
allowed me ask a range of questions about cultural variation and I believe the answers 
to these questions would have been very different without this diversity.  
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Chapter 5  
Contextualism as an Important Facet of 
Individualism-Collectivism6  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate a belief component of I-C. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, this is likely to involve beliefs about the individual’s relation to the social 
context.  Thus, I propose the construct of contextualism, defined as the perceived 
importance of the context in understanding people. This chapter presents two studies 
describing the development and validation of a scale measuring contextualism, 
investigating its correlates at both individual and cultural levels of analysis, and its 
incremental predictive validity. Based on an exploratory pilot study in India and the 
UK, a scale was developed which in Study 1 was refined and tested across 19 nations. 
In Study 2, it was investigated whether nation-level contextualism predicts additional 
variance in cultural variables, after controlling for differences in values and self-
construals, across 35 nations.  
 
5.1. Pilot 
An initial pool of items was piloted among respondents in India and the UK 
(Vignoles, Owe, Lee, & Gadre, 2010). These items referred to the importance of a range 
of different contexts, including relational, group, societal and physical contexts, in 
defining a person. Matsumoto, Yoo, and Fontaine (2009) have found that in 
                                                          
6
 This chapter is closely adapted from parts of Owe et al. (2013). 
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collectivistic cultures, behaviour tends to vary more across different contexts than in 
individualistic cultures, and they call this variation context differentiation. We wanted 
to investigate whether the conceptualization of contextualism was distinct from beliefs 
about the variability of behaviour across contexts and we therefore included items also 
referring to this facet. Items tapping dispositional attributes were also included in order 
to investigate whether these would load negatively on items tapping the importance of 
the social context, in order to test the idea that the importance of the context was better 
to consider in its own right. A pan-cultural factor analysis showed that items referring to 
the importance of the context in defining a person factored together whereas they did 
not factor with items referring to beliefs in context differentiation, demonstrating that 
these are independent dimensions. Nor did items tapping dispositional attributes 
negatively load on the importance of the context dimension.  We also tested correlations 
between contextualism and dimensions of essentialism (Haslam et al., 2004), which 
were small, suggesting that these variables are indeed measuring different things. 
Similarly, we found contextualism to be unrelated to the perceived stability, consistency 
and predictability of traits, as well as to the possibility of inferring traits from behaviour 
(Church et al., 2003). 
 
5.2. Study 1: Introducing and Validating Contextualism 
In Study 1, the contextualism measure was refined using data from participants 
in 19 nations. The internal structure of the scale and its cross-cultural equivalence were 
tested through Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), including separate analyses for 
each group, multigroup analyses, and multilevel analyses.
 
Variation in contextualism 
among cultures and individuals was then investigated, and it was expected that 
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contextualism beliefs would be higher in those nations identified as more collectivist in 
previous cross-cultural research (House et al., 2004). 
The confusion in the literature around the I-C construct can be attributed in part 
to the confounding of different levels of analysis; hence an important task in 
disentangling I-C lies in specifying differences and similarities between levels. I 
therefore examined the relationship between contextualism beliefs and other supposed 
facets of I-C at both individual and cultural levels of analysis. It was expected that 
contextualism beliefs would be correlated with relevant dimensions of values 
(autonomy vs. embeddedness) and self-construals (independent vs. interdependent self-
construals) at the cultural level, as they have been theorized as elements of the same 
cultural syndrome (Triandis, 1993). At the individual level, however, there was little 
reason to expect these constructs to be correlated, as a person’s beliefs, values and 
representations of the self do not necessarily go together consistently and often show 
very little overlap (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nielson, 2004), although 
there is recent evidence of longitudinal reciprocal relationships between values and 
beliefs (Goodwin, Polek, & Bardi, 2012). 
 
5.2.1. Method 
5.2.1.1 Participants and procedure 
A total of 5,241 participants across 19 nations completed the questionnaire. 
Sample sizes ranged from 104 (Namibia) to 737 (Brazil). Table 5.1 reports demographic 
details. In most countries, participants were high-school students, who took part in the 
study during teaching time.
7 
 
  
                                                          
7
 Participants in the Philippines were university students, as they had a similar age range 
to high-school students in other countries. 
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Table 5.1 Demographic Details, Fit Indices, Reliabilities and Means for Each National Sample Study 1 
 
 
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; C = contextualism; A = autonomy (vs. 
embeddedness); I = independence/interdependence.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Country N 
Mean 
age  
SD 
% 
females 
Language χ² df CFI RMSEA α 
Means 
C     A   I 
Belgium 251 18.22 1.09 68 French 14.90* 7 .97 .07 .73 3.04 1.32 1.17 
Brazil 737 17.43 3.62 61 Portuguese   9.23 7 1.00 .02 .63 3.23 1.23 0.66 
Chile 401 16.81 0.63 47 Spanish 15.50* 7 .98 .06 .72 2.73 1.14 0.87 
China 227 16.33 0.67 48 Chinese 13.20 7 .97 .06 .65 2.94 0.48   - 
Colombia 205 16.40 0.89 42 Spanish 10.50 7 .98 .05 .64 2.90 1.40 0.59 
Estonia 234 17.72 0.71 59 Estonian 14.63* 7 .97 .07 .69 3.36 1.20 1.16 
Ethiopia 250 18.47 0.94 45 Amharic   9.58 7 .98 .04 .40 3.62 0.15 - 0.12 
Georgia 250 17.03 0.41 58 Georgian 34.37*** 7 .90 .13 .64 2.92 0.60 0.74 
Hungary 239 17.34 0.86 52 Hungarian   3.15 7 1.00 .00 .69 2.77 1.22 1.19 
Italy  325 18.65 0.79 52 Italian 13.36 7 .98 .05 .72 3.19 0.48 1.01 
Lebanon 300 17.86 0.54 46 Arabic 17.22* 7 .94 .07 .57 3.09 0.56 0.92 
Namibia 104 17.69 0.96 62 English 19.23** 7 .81 .13 .59 2.75 - 0.04   - 
Oman 251 17.11 0.83 49 Arabic   9.19 7 .99 .04 .62 3.23 - 0.06 0.47 
Philippines 301 17.77 1.60 66 English 20.00** 7 .97 .08 .75 3.92 0.14 0.55 
Poland 250 18.07 0.59 57 Polish 37.23*** 7 .94 .13 .79 2.85 0.92 0.81 
Romania 221 17.95 0.86 49 Romanian 18.91** 7 .95 .09 .64 2.98 0.69 1.00 
Spain 242 17.25 0.83 54 Spanish   8.82 7 1.00 .03 .77 2.78 1.32 0.57 
Turkey 197 17.09 0.72 50 Turkish   3.51 7 1.00 .00 .46 3.41 0.12   - 
UK 256 17.69 0.96 76 English   3.98 7 1.00 .00 .74 2.83 1.31 0.81 
Overall 5241 17.51 1.70 55      .69 3.08 0.75 0.78 
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5.2.1.2 Instruments  
Contextualism. There were 14 items tapping the importance of a range of different 
contexts: family, social groups, position in society, the place one comes from, 
occupation, where one lives, social position, role in society and educational 
achievement (see Appendix A). Items were rated on six-point scales ranging from 1 
(completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree).  
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ). A short version of the PVQ (Schwartz, 
2007) was used to measure the bipolar dimension openness to change (vs. conservation; 
12 items) at the individual level and autonomy (vs. embeddedness) at the nation level 
(aggregated national means of 10 items).
8
 This latter dimension is closely related to I-C 
(Gheorghiu et al., 2009). Items gave a short description of a person with gender 
matched to the participant, e.g.“Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important 
to her. She likes to do things in her own original way.”  Participants rated how similar 
each person was to themselves, from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not at all like me). 
These scores were reversed so that higher numbers indicated greater value endorsement. 
Reliability was acceptable at the individual level (α = .60) and good at the nation level 
(α =.78).  
Self-construal scale. Twenty-three items from Gudykunst and colleagues’ 
(Gudykunst et al., 1996) self-construal scale were used. Data for this scale were 
collected in the second wave of the first multinational research project. Hence, a subset 
of participants (3,552 participants in 16 nations) completed this scale. We included 14 
                                                          
8
 The short version of the PVQ, with a total of 21 items, is not optimal for measuring 
autonomy (vs. embeddedness), as ideally one would use more items. However, given 
that acceptable reliability was established in these studies, the decision was made to 
include it. Two fewer items were used at the cultural level as there is a potential shift in 
meaning of these items across levels (Schwartz, personal communication, March 1, 
2011).  
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items tapping independence (e.g., “I should be judged on my own merit”) and nine 
interdependence items (e.g., “It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas 
before making decisions”).9 Items were rated from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree). Since this scale is not balanced, items were ipsatized order to 
remove acquiescence. Initial analyses revealed poor reliabilities for the two original 
dimensions. The items were therefore combined into a single bipolar scale measuring 
independence (vs. interdependence), which showed adequate individual-level reliability 
(α = .63) and good nation-level reliability (α = .81).10  
Nation-level ingroup collectivism. As an additional measure of nation-level I-C, I 
used the GLOBE project’s nation-scores for ingroup collectivism practices (House et 
al., 2004).
11
 
 
5.2.2 Results and Discussion 
5.2.2.1 Refining and testing the contextualism scale 
Before testing the main predictions, the psychometric properties of the scale 
were evaluated, especially its suitability for cross-cultural and multilevel analyses. In 
doing so, the scale was refined, eliminating items that failed to perform comparably 
across our cultural samples. Thus, it was ensured that the scale had a comparable 
meaning across the nations sampled. To do this, I ran a series of CFAs, using AMOS 
                                                          
9
 For reasons of space, two items that seemed irrelevant to high-school students were 
excluded and four items were excluded because of conceptual redundancy.  
 
10
 These analyses were conducted prior to the development of the new self-construal 
model in Chapter 6. I tried unidimensional and bidimensional structures here because 
these have been most commonly used in previous literature (Gudykunst et al., 1996; 
Singelis, 1994). 
 
11
 House et al. (2004) created four different collectivism measures. However, their 
measure of ingroup collectivism practices is closest to the construct of I-C as defined 
and measured elsewhere in cross-cultural psychology (House et al., 2004; see also 
Smith, 2006). 
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16.0 for single-group and multigroup analyses and Mplus Version 5 for multilevel 
analyses. The measurement model included two factors: contextualism was represented 
as a single latent factor, but I also modeled variation in acquiescent responding with an 
uncorrelated method factor that loaded onto every item at a fixed value of 1 
(Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al., 2003). Model fit was assessed using the Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Values of CFI 
above .90 and RMSEA up to .08 are seen as acceptable (Kline, 2005). 
Achieving configural invariance. First, the aim was to refine the scale to include 
only cross-culturally valid items. Initial analyses with the 14 items provided a poor fit in 
most samples, with several items not loading as expected in some countries. Items with 
non-significant loadings in any one of the national groups were removed, with just one 
exception, to create a balanced scale with six items (see Appendix A).
 
Item 3 loaded 
non-significantly in Ethiopia, but was retained in order to keep the scale balanced. 
Modification indices suggested a strong association between items 8 and 14 in most 
groups, and residuals of these two items were therefore allowed to covary. The model 
showed good fit in 16 samples, marginal fit in the Georgian and Polish samples and 
poor fit in the Namibian sample (which had the smallest sample size; see Table 5.1). 
The fit of the model in these three samples could however be improved substantially if 
one more residual covariance was added in each group.
12
 Reliabilities were acceptable 
in most nations (see Table 5.1). 
Testing metric and scalar invariance. I then created a six-item model as a 
multigroup model, again including a method factor, analyzing data from all samples   
                                                          
12
 Adding a covariance in the Georgian sample between the residuals of item 3 and 11, 
in the Polish sample between item 13 and 14 and in the Namibian sample between item 
13 and 11, improved model fit in these samples to an acceptable level. 
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Table 5.2 Multigroup and Multilevel Invariance Analysis Study 1 
 
Model χ² df CFI RMSEA 
RMSEA  
90% CI 
LL UL 
Model 1, configural invariance   276.64*** 133 .97 .06 .05 .07 
Model 2, factor loadings 
constrained  
 469.45*** 223 .95 .07 .06 .07 
Model 3, factor loadings and 
intercepts constrained 
1091.59*** 295 .85 .10 .09 .11 
Model 4, factor loadings and 5 
intercepts constrained 
  781.66*** 277 .90 .08 .07 .09 
Model 5, multilevel baseline 
model. 
  104.02*** 15 .98 .03 - - 
Model 6, multilevel model with 
cross-level constraints on factor 
loadings 
  139.77*** 21 .98 .03 - - 
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; RMSEA = Root mean square error of 
approximation. CI = Confidence intervals; LL = Lower level; UL = Upper level. 
Multilevel analyses did not provide confidence intervals for RMSEA. 
*** p < .001. 
 
simultaneously (see Table 5.2, Model 1), and I tested the impact on model fit of 
constraining first the factor loadings (for metric invariance: Model 2) and then the 
intercepts (for scalar variance: Model 3) to be equal across samples. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3  above, if the fit of the constrained model remains acceptable, it 
is preferred to the unconstrained model because it is more parsimonious, and the 
hypothesis of invariance can be considered tenable (Davidov et al., 2008; Little et al., 
2007).
 
As shown in Table 5.2, Model 2 provided a good fit, supporting the hypothesis of 
metric invariance. However, Model 3 showed a relatively poor fit. Modification indices 
suggested that just one intercept (item 3) was problematic, and this intercept only was 
therefore allowed to vary across groups, thus testing for ‘partial intercept invariance’ 
(Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Model 4). The fit of this model was acceptable, 
indicating that scalar invariance of the remaining five items was tenable. Baumgartner 
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and Steenkamp (1998) have proposed that as few as two invariant intercepts may be 
sufficient in order to make cross-cultural mean comparisons. With five invariant 
intercepts, it seems safe to make such comparisons with the contextualism scale.
13
 
Properties of the scale as a nation-level measure. The analyses above treat the 
contextualism scale as an individual-level measure, confirming that the scale can be 
used validly to characterize individual differences in beliefs, as well as sample mean 
differences, in cross-cultural comparative research. However, it was argued above that 
contextualism can also be viewed as a culture-level construct (see Hofstede, 1980). The 
scale was therefore also tested for multilevel isomorphism, which signifies that the 
internal structure that characterizes individuals can also be applied to nations. First, I 
ran a multilevel CFA, specifying the same model from previous analyses at both 
individual and nation levels, except that no residual covariance was included at the 
nation level. This model showed excellent fit (see Table 5.2, Model 5). The factor 
loadings were then constrained to be equal across levels (Model 6). The fit of the 
constrained model remained excellent, which indicates that multilevel isomorphism is 
tenable.
14 
Thus, the same factor structure can be found at both individual and nation 
                                                          
13
 In the process of refining the scale, eight items were eliminated as they were not 
cross-culturally comparable. Although the remaining combination of six items showed 
the highest level of invariance, it may be desirable to expand the scale in order to 
include a wider range of different contexts. Therefore, I also investigated an eight item 
version, which in addition to the six items included “One can understand a person well 
without knowing about where he/she lives” and “To understand a person well, it is 
essential to know about his/her role in society”, both of which had been found to be 
non-significant in Ethiopia and the latter also in Colombia. This eight-item version 
showed a slightly lower level of invariance. Most notably, three intercepts had to be 
allowed to vary in order to achieve intercept invariance. Nonetheless, depending on the 
nations involved and the level of invariance required, this eight-item version can be 
used by future researchers wanting to measure contextualism. 
 
14
 Given the non-invariant intercepts of item 3 in the multigroup analysis, I looked 
carefully at this item in the multilevel analysis. It had a larger nation-level error 
variance compared to other items but freeing its cross-level constraint did not improve 
model fit. So the loading of the item was similar at both levels of analysis. 
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levels, and the association between each indicator and the underlying construct is 
similar across levels. Hence, the scale appears to have a comparable meaning whether 
applied to individuals or nations, although as was noted in Section 4.2.4, this does not 
mean that nation-level and individual-level variation in contextualism necessarily will 
have the same antecedents or consequences.
 
Reliability at the nation level was excellent 
(α =.87). 
5.2.2.2 Variation in contextualism among nations and individuals 
To test the extent of variation among our samples, I estimated the intraclass 
correlation (ICC)—defined as the proportion of total variance found at the nation level 
rather than the individual level (Hox, 2002). Contextualism had an ICC of .11 (p < 
.001)
15
 indicating that an estimated 11% of the variance is found between nations. This 
is in line with ICCs for the other indicators of I-C: .13 for openness (vs. conservation) 
values and .11 for independence (vs. interdependence; both p < .001). This is also 
consistent with ICC coefficients in other large cross-cultural value research, which has 
found on average 11-12% of variance at the cultural level (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, the Philippine sample had the highest mean of 
contextualism, followed by the Ethiopian and Turkish samples. Notably, the Namibian 
sample scored second to lowest on both contextualism and autonomy (vs. 
embeddedness). Although perhaps surprising given that these variables are theoretically 
opposed, it should be noted that House et al. (2004) found Namibians to be low on 
ingroup collectivism, mirroring the present findings of contextualism.  
Nation-level correlations. Given the small sample size at the nation level and the 
very large sample size at the individual level, it is probably most appropriate to evaluate 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
15
 P-values refer to the cultural level variance component. Statistical significance 
indicates that members of the same group are more similar to each other/more different 
from members of other groups than would be expected by chance. 
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correlations at both levels in terms of size, rather than focusing on p-values. The 
predicted nation-level relationships between contextualism and other indicators of I-C 
were confirmed by substantial negative correlations with autonomy (vs. embeddedness; 
r n = 19 = -.48, p < .05) and independence (vs. interdependence; r n = 16 = -.44, p < .10). 
Among those nations with available data, contextualism showed a positive correlation 
with ingroup collectivism (r n = 12 = .43, ns). Although non-significant given the sample 
size, the magnitude of this correlation is striking, considering that the GLOBE project 
sampled middle-managers, who would have been differentially representative of their 
nations compared to our samples. Overall, contextualism correlated as well with the 
other indices of I-C (mean │r│ = .45) as these indices correlated with each other (mean 
│r│ = .35). Autonomy (vs. embeddedness) correlated strongly with independence (vs. 
interdependence; r n = 16 = .49, p < .10) but less strongly with ingroup collectivism (r n = 
12 = -.19, ns), which in turn was moderately related to independence (vs. 
interdependence; r n = 9 = -.37, ns). Taken together, these nation-level correlations 
support the view of contextualism as a facet of collectivism.  
Individual-level correlations. Prior to analyses, all variables were standardized 
within nations. This removes nation-level differences and analyses at this level are 
therefore ‘within-nations’.  As predicted, correlations between contextualism and 
openness (vs. conservation) and independence (vs. interdependence) were small (r n = 
5209 = -.11, p < .01; r n = 4555 = .01, ns, respectively).
16 
In contrast, the correlation between 
openness (vs. conservation) and independence (vs. interdependence) was slightly larger 
(r n = 4564 = .21, p < .01). This is consistent with earlier findings using this self-construal 
scale (Gudykunst et al., 1996). Overall, however, the different facets of I-C did not 
converge at the individual level. 
                                                          
16
 These correlations remained small (r < .20) when I computed disattenuated 
correlations, which are adjusted for unreliability. 
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5.3 Study 2: Contextualism as a Predictor of Societal Processes 
Study 1 provided evidence for the cross-cultural validity of the contextualism 
scale and its nomological network, which indicated that nation-level contextualism can 
be considered a facet of collectivism. In Study 2, I investigated its predictive validity—
that is, whether or not contextualism is useful as an explanatory construct. The focus 
here is on contextualism as a cultural construct, as it was shown to be part of I-C at this 
level, and does not extend to individual-level contextualism. I investigate to what extent 
nation-level contextualism can explain cross-cultural differences in relevant outcomes 
and whether it will add any explanatory power over and above values and self-
construals.  
It has been suggested that in collectivist cultures, the distinction between 
ingroups and outgroups is sharper than in individualist cultures (Triandis, 1972). This 
pattern could arguably be explained in part by the different sets of beliefs about people 
that are generally held within the culture. Contextualism beliefs refer to the importance 
of contexts, such as family, social groups and social positions, in understanding people. 
With emphasis on these contextual factors, people in highly contextualist nations are 
likely to differentiate between people and engage in differential treatment of others 
based on these factors. In contrast, in nations where a decontextualized conception of 
persons is emphasized, less weight will be given to contextual factors, and therefore 
people are more likely to be treated based on their own personal attributes, rather than 
based on their social position or connections. Contextualism may therefore contribute to 
our understanding of a range of processes in which people are treated differently based 
on their group memberships. Thus, I investigated the role of contextualism in relation to 
three variables where shaper distinctions are made between different groups of people: 
58 
 
 
 
ingroup favouritism, differential trust of ingroup and outgroup members, and 
corruption.  
Although the relationship between I-C and ingroup bias appears somewhat 
complex at the individual level (for a discussion see Smith & Long, 2006), it is likely 
that cultures that emphasize the importance of family and social groups will also 
promote a more favourable evaluation of these groups compared to other groups. 
Similarly, given the importance of group boundaries in collectivistic cultures, it is also 
likely that there will be significantly more trust towards ingroups than towards 
outgroups, especially in cultures high on contextualism, compared to cultures in which 
contextualist beliefs are not highly endorsed.
17
 Moreover, in corrupt societies, certain 
groups are given preferential treatment in distribution of power or resources, often 
based on social status or relational ties. I suggest that strong endorsement of beliefs in 
the importance of social positions, social groups and family in how people are defined, 
will promote a climate where such tendencies are seen as more natural. Finally, 
although beliefs, values and self-construals appear to all be part of cultural-level I-C and 
are correlated at the nation level, a majority of the variance is still not shared which 
suggests they are tapping somewhat different aspects. Hence, it was expected that 
contextualism would predict these outcomes while controlling for values and self-
construal at the nation level.   
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 A related perspective on cultural differences in trust comes from Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi (1994) who make a distinction between unconditional trust based on 
expectations of goodwill, and assurance, or conditional ‘trust’, which is a function of 
individuals’ social relationships. They suggest that collectivistic cultures are low on the 
former but high on the latter (see also Gheorghiu et al., 2009). 
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5.3.1 Method 
5.3.1.1 Participants and procedure  
The same measures as in Study 1 were included in the second large cross-
cultural study. This was a larger study with 35 nations
 18 
(see Table 5.3) and rather than 
high-school students, it included adult samples. A total of 8652 adults took part in the 
study, with samples sizes ranging from 71 (Thailand) to 566 (India). A variety of means 
were used to recruit opportunity samples of adults in different locations, including a 
snowballing technique among the researchers’ social networks, through community 
groups and non-governmental organizations, and with help of university students who 
collected data from their relatives. Table 5.3 reports demographic details.   
5.3.1.2 Instruments  
Contextualism. I used the final six-item scale from Study 1 and investigated its 
equivalence across cultures once again. A multigroup model, again including a method 
factor, analyzing all samples simultaneously, showed a good model fit (CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .07) and the fit remained good when all factor loadings were constrained 
(CFI = .97, RMSEA = .06), however not when all intercepts were constrained (CFI = 
.89, RMSEA = .09). Therefore, I tested for partial intercept invariance again by once 
more freeing the intercept of Item 3 which resulted in an acceptable fit (CFI = .92, 
RMSEA = .08). Hence, I was able to establish the same level of invariance as in the 
previous study with this increased number of samples. Moreover, the scale showed good 
overall reliability at the individual level (α = .75) and excellent cultural level reliability 
(α = .90).  
                                                          
18
 We received data from Nigeria subsequent to conducting these analyses.  Parallel 
analyses including this sample yielded identical conclusions to those reported here. 
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Table 5.3 Demographic Details and Means for National Samples Study 2 
 
Country N 
Mean 
age  
   SD 
% 
females 
Language 
  Means 
 C    A   I 
Belgium 363 36.37 11.56 47 French 2.99 0.61 0.19 
Brazil 500 32.68 12.96 57 Portuguese  3.57 0.60 0.01 
Cameroon 100 26.07  6.10 57  English 3.15 - 0.72 - 0.07 
Chile 300 41.64 14.10 57 Spanish 3.21 0.13 0.45 
China 260 31.38  8.49 69 Chinese 3.85 - 0.41 - 0.04 
Colombia 300 36.96 12.59 62 Spanish 3.17 0.36 0.48 
Egypt 164 31.12 9.98 52 Arabic 3.45 - 0.47 - 0.19 
Ethiopia 300 34.07 9.15 42 Amharic 4.22 - 0.02 0.13 
Georgia 219 41.23 14.42 58 Georgian 3.55 - 0.56 - 0.32 
Germany 257 40.04 15.11 59 German 3.35 0.03 0.23 
Ghana 116 28.58 5.08 24 English 3.19 - 0.50 0.05 
Hungary 243 35.54 12.48 47 Hungarian 3.32 0.26 0.35 
Iceland 124 35.29 13.29 68 Icelandic 3.15 0.46 0.17 
India 566 35.69 10.83 44 
Hindi, 
English 
3.53 - 0.29 - 0.26 
Italy 173 39.01 13.13 71 Italian 3.47 - 0.78 0.02 
Japan 284 43.83 15.34 62 Japanese 3.03 0.18 0.23 
Lebanon 265 35.12 14.01 49 Arabic 3.27 0.04 0.26 
Malaysia 150 28.05 7.92 63 Malay 3.79 - 0.32 0.00 
Namibia 204 24.61 5.70 66 English 2.91 0.06 0.51 
New 
Zealand 
204 34.91 13.06 49 English 3.39 0.61 0.26 
Norway 102 37.01 13.53 59 Norwegian 2.79 0.16 0.18 
Oman 160 25.21 4.98 45 Arabic 3.36 - 0.31 - 0.09 
Peru 154 35.52 15.04 58 Spanish 3.53 - 0.13 0.28 
Philippines 308 28.58 11.22 51 
English, 
Tausug 
3.99 - 0.18 - 0.12 
Romania 482 35.74 13.19 58 Romania 3.22 - 0.10 0.15 
Russia 262 30.92 12.19 79 Russian 3.20 0.00 0.11 
Singapore 110 34.95 12.74 54 English 3.73 0.02 - 0.02 
South 
Africa 
496 30.80 11.46 59 English 3.45 0.07 0.39 
Spain 180 40.11 14.60 52 Spanish 3.40 0.37 0.02 
Sweden 101 45.18 16.01 65 Swedish 3.11 0.63 0.07 
Thailand 71 27.99 6.71 69 Thai 3.92 0.40 0.03 
Turkey 248 39.83 10.46 61 Turkish 3.55 - 0.34 0.11 
Uganda 444 34.62 6.35 51 English 3.70 - 0.15 - 0.04 
UK 228 47.19 17.32 66 English 3.16 0.16 - 0.08 
USA 
214 31.60 13.26 66 
English, 
Spanish 
3.63 0.63 0.63 
Overall 8652 35.02 12.99 56  3.41 0.02 0.12 
Note. C = contextualism; A = autonomy (vs. embeddedness); I = independence (vs. 
interdependence).  
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Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ). I used the same short version of the PVQ 
as in Study 1 and the same dimension of autonomy (vs. embeddedness) as in the 
previous study (α = .65). 
Self-construal scale. The scale included in this study was slightly shorter than in 
Study 1 with eight items measuring independence and eight items measuring 
interdependence. As before, these were combined into a bipolar scale, independence 
(vs. interdependence). Because of the often complex sentence structure and their 
abstract and decontextualized nature, the original items from Gudykunst et al. (1996) 
were reworded (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2 for more details). For example “It is 
important to maintain harmony within my group” was reworded as “You show your 
inner feelings even if it disturbs the harmony in your family” (reversed). Moreover, 
rather than rating the items on agree-disagree scales, participants were asked “How 
well does each of these statements describe you”, which was rated on nine-point scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (exactly). Individual-level scores were aggregated to the 
nation level (α = .59). 
Ingroup favouritism. Nation scores for ingroup favouritism were taken from Van 
de Vliert (2010), who demonstrated that nation-level compatriotism (from the World 
Value Survey, WVS
19
), nepotism (from World Economic Forum, 2004) and familism 
(from House et al., 2004) formed a common factor (α = .86 among the nations sampled 
here). 
Differentiated trust. The fifth wave of the WVS asks about levels of trust in 
people from different groups, including family, the neighbourhood, people one knows 
personally, people of another religion and people of another nationality (Welzel, 2010). 
These were rated on four-point scales ranging from 1 (trust completely) to 4 (do not 
                                                          
19
 Information on question wording, fieldwork, samples, and available data sets is 
available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
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trust at all) but these were reversed for ease of interpretation. A measure of the 
difference in trust between ingroups and outgroups was constructed by subtracting the 
mean of outgroup trust (other religion and nationality; α = .93) from the mean of 
ingroup trust (family, neighbourhood and known personally; α = .78).20 
Corruption. National scores of corruption were derived from the 2010 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2011). The index is 
calculated so that a low score means high corruption, but the scores were reversed so 
that high scores meant high corruption. 
 
5.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Means of contextualism, values and self-construals are shown in Table 5.3. 
Compared to in Study 1, these show a wider range, especially towards the ‘collectivist’ 
end of the scales. This could be a reflection of the more diverse set of nations and the 
adult rather than student samples. Intercorrelations of the variables are given in Table 
5.4. Compared to in Study 1, contextualism appears to be more clearly distinct from 
values and self-construals, increasing the chances of finding differential effects of these 
variables. The difference between the two studies could be due to the fact that the 
different facets of I-C are more loosely connected in the more diverse adult sample. It 
should be noted, however, that contextualism still appears to be part of I-C, as it is still 
strongly correlated with ingroup collectivism (see Table 5.4).  
In order to investigate whether nation-level contextualism predicts ingroup 
favouritism, differentiated trust and corruption while controlling for autonomy (vs.  
                                                          
20
 In addition to these five items, one item refers to ‘people you meet for the first time’. 
Since it is not clear whether this item refers to a member of the ingroup or the outgroup, 
I did not include it in the measure of differentiated trust. However, if included in 
outgroup trust, it does not substantially change the results. 
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Table 5.4 Correlations Among Variables in Study 2  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Contextualism -      
2. Autonomy (vs. 
embeddedness) 
  -.21 -     
3.Independence (vs. 
interdependence) 
  -.33†    .53** -    
4. Ingroup 
favouritism  
   .56**   -.58***  -.41* -       
5. Differentiated trust    .44*   -.55**  -.45*   .76*** -  
6. Corruption    .39*   -.57***  -.27   .83***   .64** - 
7. Ingroup 
collectivism 
   .54*   -.57**  -.47*   .94***   .80*** .73*** 
Note. All variables are at the nation level. N = 35 for correlations between 
contextualism, autonomy/embeddedness, independence/interdependence and corruption. 
N = 33 for correlations with ingroup favouritism. N = 24 for correlations with 
differentiated trust.  N = 21 for correlations with ingroup collectivism.  
The correlation between ingroup favouritism and ingroup collectivism is particularly 
high because of an overlap of items between one facet of ingroup favouritism 
(familism) and ingroup collectivism. Because of this overlap, we did not control for 
ingroup collectivism in the regression analyses.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.  
 
 
embeddedness) and nation-level independence/interdependence, three separate 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted. Each outcome was regressed on values 
and self-construals entered into the first step. Contextualism was then entered alongside 
values and self-construals in the second step, in order to assess whether it would explain 
additional variance. The results from these analyses are shown in Table 5.5. Values and 
self-construals explained 35% of the variance in ingroup favouritism, and adding 
contextualism explained an additional 18% of variance, ∆F(1,29) = 11.14, p < .01. In 
line with predictions, contextualism was a significant predictor of ingroup favouritism 
(β = .45, p < .01). Hence, in nations where contextual attributes are generally considered 
to be important, ingroups also tend to be favoured. Similarly, values and self-construals  
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Table 5.5 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Ingroup Favouritism, 
Differentiated Trust and Corruption Study 2 
 
 Ingroup favouritism Differentiated trust Corruption 
Predictor 
 ∆R2   β   ∆R2   β   ∆R2     β  
Step 1 .35**  .34**  .32**  
Autonomy (vs. 
embeddedness) 
 -.50**   - .43†  -.59** 
Independence (vs. 
interdependence) 
 -.15   - .23   .05 
Step 2 .18**  .12*  .09*  
Autonomy (vs. 
embeddedness) 
 -.48**   - .40†  -.58** 
Independence (vs. 
interdependence) 
 -.02   - .19   .15 
Contextualism   .45**       .35*   .32* 
Total R
2
 .53  .46  .41  
n  33   24   35  
Note. All variables are at the nation level.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
 
explained 34% of the variance in differentiated trust, and adding contextualism 
explained an additional 12% of variance, ∆F(1,20) = 4.38, p < .05. As predicted, 
contextualism was a significant predictor of differentiated trust, (β = .35, p < .05), such 
that in nations high on contextualism, the difference between trust in ingroups and 
outgroups was larger. Finally, values and self-construals explained 32% of the variance 
in corruption scores, and adding contextualism explained an additional 9%, ∆F(1,31) = 
4.78, p < .05. Contextualism was a significant predictor of corruption (β = .32, p < 
.05)—the stronger the endorsement of contextualism beliefs in a nation, the higher the 
level of corruption, as predicted.  
The above results highlight the importance of contextualism in cultural 
processes. Contextualism predicted ingroup favouritism, differentiated trust and 
65 
 
 
 
corruption, which confirms the notion that nation-level contextualism is related to 
sharper distinctions between people based on their contextual attributes and differential 
treatment based on these distinctions. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
these relationships were not tested at the individual level; the question of whether 
individual endorsement of contextualism beliefs is related to these outcomes still 
remains open. From these results we also cannot ascertain whether these results are a 
truly cultural phenomenon or the effect of aggregated individual processes, and 
multilevel analyses would be needed to disentangle these effects. 
Contextualism was shown to be a significant predictor while controlling for 
values and self-construals, and it explained a substantial amount of incremental 
variance. Thus, although these cultural variables are interrelated, they are not 
synonymous. Rather they can complement each other as cultural measures, each tapping 
somewhat different aspects of culture. It should be noted, however, that although 
independence (vs. interdependence) was significantly correlated with ingroup 
favouritism and differentiated trust, it was never a significant predictor when entered at 
the same time as autonomy (vs. embeddedness). It appears these two variables share a 
substantial amount of variance and their explanatory power overlaps to some extent. In 
light of this, contextualism seems to be a more useful addition to values as a cultural-
level predictor.
21
 
 
5.4 General Discussion 
 A central theme within I-C refers to beliefs about individuals; still, this facet has 
rarely been explored. Moreover, although research has shown that variation in the 
importance of the context in person perception appears to map onto variation in I-C, no 
                                                          
21
 It may be that the more differentiated model of self-construals presented in Chapter 6 
will have greater explanatory power.  
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clear conceptualization and measurement of this variation has previously been put 
forward. I propose the construct of contextualism, defined as the importance of 
contextual attributes in understanding a person, to fill this gap in the literature. The 
operationalization of contextualism differs from previous measures of personhood 
beliefs in focusing on the context in its own right, rather than as the inverse of 
traitedness. 
 
5.4.1 Contextualism as a Facet of Collectivism 
I propose that contextualism should be considered an important facet of cultural 
collectivism. It was demonstrated that contextualism shows a similar proportion of 
nation-level variability to other supposed facets of I-C, such as values and self-
construals, and the pattern of mean scores across nations appeared to broadly reflect 
differences in I-C.  At the nation level it converges with indicators of I-C as strongly as 
they converge with each other. It should be noted, however, that the nation-level 
correlations were not so high as to suggest that these constructs are interchangeable. 
Low autonomy values cannot simply be equated with high contextualism, as illustrated 
by the Namibian sample in Study 1 which scored low on both dimensions. Similarly, 
the Cameroonian sample scored low on both dimensions and the Thai sample scored 
high on both dimensions in Study 2. Moreover, while scoring highest on independence 
(vs. interdependence), the sample from the USA also scored relatively high on 
contextualism. It is therefore important to measure I-C in terms of multiple facets, in 
order to capture the breadth and richness of this construct.  
The importance of measuring these different facets separately was also 
demonstrated in Study 2. Nation-level contextualism was shown to predict incremental 
variance in ingroup favouritism, differentiated trust and corruption after controlling for 
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variation in values and self-construals. This confirms contextualism as a useful cultural 
construct which can contribute to our understanding of cultural processes and 
demonstrates the importance of considering cultural beliefs alongside the more common 
approach of studying values. This supports Brewer and Chen’s (2007) assertion that 
more precise predictions can be made by disentangling different facets of I-C.   
The need to disentangle I-C refers not only to its different facets but also to its 
different levels of analyses. In Study 1, I found that the different proposed facets of I-C 
covaried predictably at the nation level, and although they were more distinct in Study 
2, a similar pattern was found among these more diverse samples. At the individual 
level, however, the corresponding correlations were mostly very small, supporting the 
notion that these variables are distinct. This is consistent with previous research that has 
identified small correlations between general beliefs and values and has shown that each 
makes its own unique contribution to predicting behaviour (Bond, Leung, Au, et al., 
2004; Leung et al., 2007). The present results suggest that I-C does not form a coherent 
dimension of individual-level cultural orientation (see also Triandis, 1993). Instead, its 
different aspects need to be considered separately, and each will make its own 
contribution to the unpacking of cultural influences. Thus, although values, beliefs and 
self-representations are distinct at both levels, they are more meaningfully related as 
cultural constructs. It would therefore seem more reasonable to conceive of I-C as a 
cultural-level construct, as it was originally conceptualized (Hofstede, 1980). 
 
5.4.2 The Contextualism Scale 
The contextualism measure has excellent potential for use in cross-cultural 
research. It is brief, easy to administer, and includes a balance between positive and 
reverse-scored items—thus avoiding the problem of acquiescence bias. Controlling for 
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acquiescence is important in cross-cultural psychology (Schimmack et al., 2005), and 
yet many well-used cross-cultural scales include no reverse-scored items (e.g. Singelis, 
1994). Tested across 19 and 35 nations with student and adult samples, the scale showed 
evidence of invariant factor loadings, and five of the six items showed invariant 
intercepts. Considering the very different cultural groups and many different languages 
involved in the study, this level of performance is at least comparable with other well-
validated and well-used scales in the cross-cultural literature. Difficulty with invariance 
of intercepts is not unusual in cross-cultural research (e.g. Davidov et al., 2008; Spini, 
2003). Nonetheless, freeing only one intercept still makes it possible to conduct cross-
cultural comparisons, as this still leaves five invariant intercepts, well beyond 
Baumgartner and Steenkamp’s (1998) benchmark of at least two invariant intercepts. 
By comparing the internal structure at the individual and the nation levels, I was 
able to establish cross-level isomorphism for the scale. Thus, the belief dimension of 
contextualism is defined similarly at both levels of analysis. This is important 
considering arguments in the cross-cultural literature against assuming that culture-level 
constructs can necessarily be measured with the same meaning at the level of individual 
differences, and vice versa (reviewed by Smith et al., 2006). Although the same internal 
structure was found at both levels of analysis, it should be emphasized that this does not 
mean that individual-level and nation-level contextualism are the same thing. 
Individual-level contextualism refers to beliefs in the minds of individuals whereas 
nation-level contextualism refers to normative beliefs generally held within nations, and 
these are likely to have different antecedents and different psychological and 
behavioural consequences. 
For example, one might speculate that contextualism beliefs will be 
differentially linked to reality at the two levels of analysis. It seems likely that nation-
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level variation in contextualism beliefs will be associated with actual differences in 
societal functioning, such as social practices and institutions (Yamagishi, 2011). As 
illustrated by the outcomes predicted in Study 2, in some societies it really does matter 
more than in other societies what family one comes from or what social position one 
occupies, and one might expect that variation in normative beliefs about personhood 
will be influenced by these differences in societal functioning, as well as helping to 
sustain them. In contrast, to the extent that individuals within a nation are located within 
a common societal context, individual-level variation in contextualism beliefs should 
reflect different ways of thinking about the same world, rather than differences in the 
world that is thought about. Still, it should be acknowledged that individuals may 
encounter different social practices and institutions as a result of regional, ethnic or 
socioeconomic differences within a given nation, as well as idiosyncratic experiences; 
and these differences in the social reality faced by different individuals may also be 
linked to contextualism beliefs. 
 
5.4.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
Some limitations of these studies should be acknowledged. Although 
contextualism is regarded as a central belief dimension within I-C, it should be noted 
that there may be other types of beliefs that vary systematically between individualist 
and collectivist societies. Future research could explore these alternative belief 
dimensions and their relationship to contextualism, as well as values and self-construals. 
It may also be the case that beliefs about personhood vary depending on the target of the 
beliefs; for instance, one might perceive members of some groups in society in a 
relatively decontextualized manner and members of other groups in a more 
contextualized manner. Thus, future research should test to what extent contextualism 
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beliefs are uniform across different target groups in society. An especially important 
case of such variation may be when the target is the self. Hence, it might be interesting 
to adapt the items of the contextualism scale to refer to the self (e.g. “To understand me 
well, it is essential to know about which social groups I am a member of.”), in order to 
explore to what extent a contextualized view of the self is related with contextualist 
beliefs about others, as well as with more commonly used measures of cultural 
differences in self-construal.
22 
The present research was able to demonstrate predictive validity of 
contextualism at the nation level of analysis, which highlights contextualism as a useful 
cultural construct. However, in order to completely disentangle individual and cultural-
level effects, multilevel analyses are needed which investigate these simultaneously. As 
an example of this multilevel approach, Becker et al. (2012) found that culture-level 
variation in contextualism, but not individual-level variation, predicted people’s use of 
different sources of distinctiveness in constructing their identities (Vignoles, 
Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). Thus, it was the surrounding cultural climate of 
contextualism beliefs, rather than the degree to which an individual personally 
internalized those beliefs, that predicted this aspect of identity construction. 
 
5.4.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, a central theme within I-C refers to beliefs about the person and 
this thesis proposes the construct of contextualism as tapping this mostly unexplored 
facet of I-C. In this chapter, I have shown that belief in the importance of the context in 
defining a person is a cross-culturally valid construct which can be applied to both 
individuals and cultures. At the nation level, it correlated with other proposed facets of 
                                                          
22
 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of Owe et al. (2013) for these 
suggestions. 
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I-C as strongly as these facets correlated with each other and it could therefore be 
considered a part of cultural collectivism. Moreover, contextualism predicted 
incremental variance in cultural variables where sharp distinctions are made between 
people based on contextual attributes. These findings highlight the importance of 
contextualism as a cultural construct, which alongside values and self-construals can 
contribute to a greater understanding of I-C and allow more precise predictions of 
cultural influence. 
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Chapter 6 
Self-construals beyond the West vs. East 
Dichotomy 
 This chapter aims to build on Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) original theoretical 
project by investigating the structure of explicit self-construals across a large number of 
cultures from many different parts of the world. By going beyond the narrow focus on 
North America and East Asia and two or three-nation comparisons, I aimed to shed new 
light on the theory and investigate new possibilities in relation to self-construals. 
Specifically, I investigated whether self-construals are best conceptualized in terms of 
two broad dimensions—independence and interdependence—or whether the variation in 
constructions of the self is more complex. Moreover, in nation-level analyses, I tested 
whether cross-cultural differences in self-construals could be explained adequately by I-
C, or whether additional contextual and societal variables are needed to make sense of 
how self-construals vary. 
Study 3 was conducted with over 3,000 high-school students in 16 nations. 
Given that 16 nations are not adequate for multilevel analysis, I first explored the 
structure of self-construals at the individual level only. In Study 4, we sampled over 
8,000 non-student adults across 64 cultural groups, allowing me to test dimensionality 
at both the individual and cultural group level. In Study 5, using the same self-construal 
data as in Study 4, I investigated how 36 national samples differed in representations of 
the self and which nation-level variables can explain this variation. These studies 
included countries that have been underrepresented in the previous literature on self-
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construals—and in psychology more generally (see Arnett, 2008; Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010)—and thus they provide an important step toward a more complete 
picture of self-construal around the world.  
 
6.1 Study 3: Exploring Self-construals 
Study 3 was designed to test the dimensionality of self-construals at the 
individual level using a cross-cultural dataset spanning 16 nations. In an early analysis 
of six national samples from the current data set (samples from the UK, Italy, Georgia, 
Ethiopia and Lebanon), Owe (2009) found seven dimensions of self-construals: 
uniqueness, consistency, self-reliance, self-direction, inclusion of others in the self, 
commitment to others, and harmony. However, it was not possible to establish a higher-
order structure among these dimensions. Nonetheless, in order to ascertain whether this 
was also the case using the larger, more cross-culturally diverse dataset, I initially tested 
the common two-dimensional structure, including separate factors of independence and 
interdependence. Subsequently I tested alternative models: a one-dimensional bipolar 
structure (independence vs. interdependence) and a three-dimensional structure with 
factors of independence, relational-interdependence and collective-interdependence. 
These analyses were conducted in Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) while 
statistically modelling acquiescent response bias. In line with the earlier study using a 
subset of nations (Owe, 2009), and the previous literature, none of these models 
provided a satisfactory fit.  Although the earlier study had suggested seven dimensions, 
I considered it most appropriate to more openly explore the structure at this stage with 
the larger sample, in order not to overlook important variation in the data. I therefore 
moved on to investigate multidimensional structures in exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA).  
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6.1.1 Method 
6.1.1.1 Participants and procedure 
The data for Study 3 was collected in the first large cross-cultural study involving 
high-school students
 23
 in the second wave.
 
Thus, a total of 3,541 participants across 16 
nations completed a pool of self-construal items (see Table 6.1 for demographic details).  
 
6.1.1.2 Instruments  
Self-construal items. The items were taken mainly from the scale devised by 
Gudykunst et al. (1996) since I had concerns about face-validity of items in the 
 
Table 6.1 Demographic Details for Each National Sample in Study 3 
Country N Mean age  SD 
% 
females 
Language 
Belgium 252 18.17 1.11 57 French 
Brazil 551 17.63 2.84 62 Portuguese 
Chile 336 17.03 .56 46 Spanish 
Colombia 123 16.64 .57 44 Spanish 
Estonia 189 17.66 .71 62 Estonian 
Ethiopia 236 18.48 .93 45 Amharic 
Georgia 174 17.03 .40 55 Georgian 
Hungary 177 17.30 .83 49 Hungarian 
Italy  187 18.61 .70 62 Italian 
Lebanon 208 17.84 .57 45 Arabic 
Oman 181 16.91 1.83 45 Arabic 
Philippines 218 18.19 1.31 71 English 
Poland 121 17.84 .43 57 Polish 
Romania 179 18.02 .84 48 Romanian 
Spain 185 17.16 .76 54 Spanish 
UK 224 17.63 .77 75 English 
Overall 3541 17.63 1.50 56  
                                                          
23
 Participants in the Philippines were university students, as they had a similar age 
range to high-school students in other countries. It should be noted that students 
attending university as opposed to high-school are likely to be at a different stage in life 
and may therefore construct their self in different ways. However, removing the 
Philippine sample from the analyses presented below revealed almost identical results 
and hence the decision was made to retain this sample in the analyses.   
75 
 
 
 
scale devised by Singelis (1994).
24
 For example, it is not clear how the item “I value 
being in good health above everything” is tapping independence.  Items designed to 
measure the relational self (Cross et al, 2000) were also included. Thus, the item-pool 
included items representing the independent, relational-interdependent and collective 
interdependent self-construals, as defined by Brewer and Chen (2007), and it included 
items from each of the multiple dimensions identified by Hardin et al. (2004) as well as 
by Fernández et al. (2005). In addition, some new items were constructed which were 
conceptual opposites of existing items, in order to reduce the problem of acquiescence 
response bias (Smith, 2009). For example, “Being different from others makes me 
uncomfortable” was included as the reverse of “I enjoy being unique and different from 
others in many ways”. Thus, the reverse items did not involve negatively phrased items, 
as these can be difficult to translate to some languages. The decision was made not to 
include items representing Harb and Smith’s (2008) six dimensional model of self-
construals, nor Kashima and Hardie’s (2000) three-dimensional model, because the 
focus of the present research was on different domains of independence and 
interdependence, rather than on different targets of social relationships, and space 
limitations prevented use of both of these approaches. There were 38 items in total, 
which were rated on scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely 
agree). Four items were included in the first wave of data collection
 
and the remaining 
items in the second wave were split between two parts of the questionnaire (23 towards 
the beginning and 11 towards the end), creating three different measurement occasions 
with different items in each occasion.   
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 As noted in Chapter 5, for reasons of space, we excluded two items that were not 
appropriate for high-school students and four items because of conceptual redundancy. 
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6.1.2 Results  
6.1.2.1 Testing one-, two-, and three-factor models 
 Prior to analyses, all variables were standardized within nations in order to remove 
between-nation variability (Leung & Bond, 1989). As noted in Chapter 5 Section 5.2.2, 
this removes nation-level differences and the problem of clustering within nations, and 
analyses are therefore ‘within-nations’. Three models were tested in CFA using Mplus 
Version 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010): a one-factor model where all items loaded onto a 
common factor, a two-factor model of independence and interdependence and a three-
factor model including independence, relational interdependence and collective 
interdependence. The variance of each latent variable was set to 1. In addition to the 
substantive factors, in each analysis variation in acquiescent responding was modelled 
with three method factors (one for each measurement occasion, in order to account for 
systematic variance associated with each occasion), which were uncorrelated with the 
substantive factors but allowed to covary with each other. These method factors loaded 
onto every item within each occasion at a fixed value of 1. Thus, each item was only 
related to one method factor (Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al., 2003). Model fit was 
assessed using the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), for 
which values above .90 indicate a reasonable fit, and Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), for which values up to .05 are seen as good and values up to 
.08 as acceptable (Kline, 2005). If at least two out of three fit indices indicated good fit, 
the model would be regarded as acceptable. 
Table 6.2 provides the fit indices for each of the three models. As is evident 
from the table, none of these models provided an adequate fit to the data.  Even though 
values of RMSEA could be regarded as reasonable, values of CFI and TLI were far  
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Table 6.2 One-, Two-, and Three-Dimensional Models in Study 3 
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; RMSEA = Root mean square error of 
approximation. CI = Confidence intervals; LL = Lower level; UL = Upper level. 
*** p < .001. 
 
from acceptable.
25
 Moreover, a substantial proportion of the standardized factor 
loadings were below .30. From these results it is clear that independence and 
interdependence do not factor together in a simple one- or two-factor structure, nor does 
the tripartite structure adequately account for the patterns in the data. Thus, I moved on 
to explore more complex structures in EFA.  
 
6.1.2.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
In order to examine a multidimensional structure, all 38 items were submitted to 
EFA using principal axis factoring and oblique, direct oblimin rotation using SPSS 18. 
In order to remove acquiescence as well as any systematic variance associated with the 
clustering of items in separate measurement occasions, ipsatized item scores were 
created within measurement occasion for each individual. This involved taking the 
mean across all items within each occasion for each individual and subtracting this 
mean from each item (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). As before, all items were also 
standardized within nation. The scree plot showed two points of inflection, one after   
                                                          
25
 I found similar results using only items from the Gudykunst scale: the one-factor 
model had a CFI of .48, a TLI of .52 and a RMSEA of .08, and the two-factor model 
had a CFI of .75, TLI of .72, and RMSEA of .05. 
Model χ² df CFI TLI RMSEA 
RMSEA 
90% CI 
LL UL 
One-dimensional 
model 
7909.972*** 659 .599 .572 .056 .055 .057 
Two-dimensional 
model 
6502.435*** 658 .677 .655 .050 .049 .051 
Three-dimensional 
model 
6261.728*** 656 .690 .668 .049 .048 .050 
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Table 6.3 Factor Loadings for Six-Factor Solution from Exploratory Factor Analysis 
with Oblique Rotation in Study 3 
 
Self-construal item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I prefer to be self-reliant rather than depend 
on others. 
1  .68 -.11 -.02 -.02 .05 -.11 
I try not to depend on others.
1
 .64 .01 -.03 -.01 .00 -.04 
I prefer to turn to other people for help 
rather than solely rely on myself. 
-.50 -.02 -.03 .03 .03 -.02 
It is important for me to act as an 
independent person. 
1, 2
 
.47 -.04 .04 -.05 -.03 .12 
I should decide my future on my own. 
1
 .29 .07 .09 .18 .01 .01 
Being able to take care of myself is a 
primary concern for me. 
1, 2
 
.24 .14 -.04 .18 .06 .05 
I take responsibility for my own actions. 
1
 .23 .11 .22 .03 .06 -.02 
I should be judged on my own merit. 
1
 .16 .04 -.01 .09 -.02 .11 
I consider my happiness separate from the 
happiness of my friends and family. 
.01 -.54 -.07 .13 -.04 .07 
If a person insults a member of my family or 
my friends, I feel personally insulted myself. 
3 
.06 .46 .00 .05 -.02 .01 
When I think of myself, I often think of my 
close friends and family also. 
3
 
-.09 .44 .15 -.02 .02 -.07 
If a person hurts someone close to me, I feel 
personally hurt as well. 
3
 
-.03 .43 -.02 -.02 .00 .01 
My close relationships are unimportant to 
how I feel about myself. 
3
 
-.01 -.34 .11 .03 -.03 -.01 
I usually feel a strong sense of pride when 
someone close to me has an important 
accomplishment. 
3
 
-.01 .33 .07 .02 .04 .08 
I always support a group decision even when 
I know it is wrong. 
1
 
-.24 -.29 -.06 -.10 .00 -.06 
I stick with my group even through 
difficulties. 
1
 
.12 .27 .08 -.15 .08 .02 
It is important to consult close friends and 
get their ideas before making a decision. 
1
 
-.20 .23 -.08 -.05 .06 -.11 
I always see myself in the same way, 
independently of who I am with.
2 .00 -.06 .55 .01 .00 .03 
I sometimes feel like a different person 
when I am with different groups of people. 
.00 .00 -.48 .03 -.01 .05 
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Self-construal item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I am the same person at home that I am at 
school/college. 
2
 
-.09 .02 .46 .07 .00 -.07 
My social surroundings may change, but I 
will still be the same person. 
.01 -.03 .41 -.02 .01 .04 
My perception of myself depends on who I 
am with. 
-.20 -.07 -.40 .02 -.08 .00 
I will sacrifice my self-interest for the 
benefit of my group. 
1, 2
 
.02 -.03 -.06 -.56 .01 -.10 
My relationships with others are more 
important than my personal 
accomplishments. 
1, 2
 
-.05 .03 -.04 -.50 .03 -.02 
My personal accomplishments are more 
important than maintaining my social 
relationships. 
-.05 -.32 .01 .46 -.05 -.03 
I will stay in my group if they need me, even 
when I am not happy with the group. 
1, 2
 
-.09 -.08 .01 -.26 .03 -.05 
My personal identity, independent of others, 
is very important to me. 
1, 2
 
.17 .15 .03 .23 -.01 .19 
I help people I know, even if it is 
inconvenient. 
1
 
.02 .12 .02 -.23 -.03 .03 
If there is a conflict between my values and 
the values of groups of which I am a 
member, I follow my values. 
1
 
.13 .08 .12 .21 -.05 .15 
It is important to maintain harmony within 
my group.
2 -.06 -.02 -.02 -.03 .69 .06 
It is important to me that I respect decisions 
made by my groups. 
1, 2
 
-.03 -.01 -.01 -.05 .62 -.01 
What happens to me is my own doing. 
1
 .10 -.04 .06 .04 .17 .04 
I am a unique person, separate from others. 
1
 .01 -.16 -.05 -.04 -.05 .46 
Being different from others makes me 
uncomfortable. 
1
 
-.04 -.12 -.22 .06 -.03 -.43 
I enjoy being unique and different from 
others in many ways. 
1, 2
 
.06 -.03 -.02 .00 .05 .37 
I avoid standing out among my friends. .07 -.07 .00 -.02 .00 -.31 
I am comfortable being singled out for 
praise and rewards. 
1, 2
 
.00 .00 -.05 .08 .02 .26 
I try to abide by customs and conventions at 
school/college. 
1, 2
 
-.04 .15 -.04 .13 .08 -.15 
Note. 
1 
Items from Gudykunst et al. (1996); 
2 
Items from Singelis (1994); 
3 
Items from 
Cross et al. (2000). Factor loadings > .30 are in boldface.  
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two factors and one after six factors. Given that a two-factor model had shown 
unsatisfactory fit in the previous analyses and that the six-factor solution provided a 
more easily interpretable solution than the two-factor solution, the six-factor solution 
was retained (see Table 6.3), which explained 22% of the variance.  
This factor structure replicated the findings from the earlier study using the 
subset of nations, but with six rather than seven factors.
26
 The first factor seemed to 
represent self-reliance (e.g. “I prefer to be self-reliant rather than depend on others”) 
and self-direction (e.g. “It’s important for me to act as an independent person”) and it 
was therefore labelled Self-reliance/Self-direction. The second factor was comprised 
mainly of items tapping the relational self and seemed to represent a close 
interconnectedness with other people (e.g. “If a person insults a member of my family or 
my friends, I feel personally insulted myself”), and it was therefore labelled Inclusion of 
Others in the Self. The third factor was made up of items related to consistency and lack 
of contextual influence on the self (e.g. “I always see myself in the same way, 
independently of who I am with”) and it was therefore labelled Consistency. The fourth 
factor seemed to be tapping commitment or dedication to other people, where others are 
more important than one’s own accomplishments and self-interest is weighted against 
the interest of others (e.g. “I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group”) 
and it was labelled Commitment to Others. The fifth factor seemed to represent a desire 
for harmonious relationships (e.g. “It is important to maintain harmony within my 
group”) and it was labelled Harmony. Finally the sixth factor seemed to be tapping 
desire for uniqueness and being different (e.g. “I am a unique person, separate from 
others”) and it was therefore labelled Uniqueness.  
 
                                                          
26
 Considering early analyses had indicated seven factors, I also extracted a seven factor 
solution in EFA. However, this structure did not provide an easily interpretable solution.  
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6.1.3 Discussion  
 The above analyses show that the dimensionality of self-construals cannot be 
represented by a simple two-dimensional structure of independence and 
interdependence, nor by a three dimensional structure. These findings are in line with 
those reported by Levine et al. (2003) who, using different self-construal scales in 
several cross-cultural samples, failed to achieve an acceptable fit for a two-dimensional 
model. Rather, the structure of self-construals was found to be multidimensional, 
spanning several different domains of self-representation. Six factors were identified, 
referring to different ways of seeing oneself and one’s relations with other people: Self-
reliance/Self-direction, Inclusion of Others in the Self, Consistency, Commitment to 
Others, Harmony, and Uniqueness.  
 Although the factors were named in this way, it should be emphasized that these 
are bipolar factors, and there is no inherent value in labelling each factor in the 
particular direction that was chosen. Moreover, rather than being viewed as subtypes of 
independence and subtypes of interdependence, each of the factors might be understood 
as opposing a pole that has typically been considered part of independence with a pole 
that has typically been considered part of interdependence. Thus, the factors also might 
be named self-direction/self-reliance vs. receptiveness to social influence/dependence 
on others; inclusion of others in the self vs. separateness of self and others; consistency 
vs. contextual variability; commitment to others vs. commitment to personal goals/self-
centeredness; harmony vs. self-expression; and uniqueness vs. fitting in/similarity. The 
shorter names described above are used here primarily for ease of presentation. 
Although I have named the factors differently, they show some resemblance to 
those reported by Hardin et al. (2004). Both models include dimensions referring to 
consistency (Hardin et al.’s Behavioural Consistency), to the weighing of self-interest 
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against the interest of others (my Commitment to Others and Hardin et al.’s Relational 
Interdependence), to maintaining harmonious relations (Hardin’s et al.’s Esteem for 
Group), and to being different and standing out (Hardin et al.’s 
Autonomy/Assertiveness)
27
. However, whereas Self-direction and Self-reliance formed 
a single factor in the present research, items referring to these facets were respectively 
divided into Primacy of Self and Individualism in their model. Four of the dimensions I 
identified also resemble Fernández et al.’s (2005) four factors. They too found a 
Uniqueness factor as well as a factor referring to consistency of the self (which they 
named Low Context). Moreover, their Relational Interdependence overlaps with the 
present Harmony factor and their Group Loyalty has a lot in common with the present 
Commitment to Others. However, as noted above in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2, the 
meaning of the dimensions identified by Hardin et al. and Fernández et al. lack clarity in 
many respects. The latter findings were also based on a limited item-pool and failed to 
account for between-nation variability (Leung & Bond, 1989). The present research, on 
the other hand, based on a large cross-cultural dataset, identified a model with six 
clearly distinct dimensions with easily interpretable themes. 
Nonetheless, several questions remained. The early analyses using the subset of 
the data from 6 nations (see Owe, 2009) had suggested seven rather than six factors, 
with Self-reliance and Self-direction making up two separate factors. Given this 
discrepancy, questions remained of how stable the six-factor solution was and whether 
it would be replicated with an even larger, more diverse sample. Moreover, the variance 
accounted for by the six factors was relatively small and the factors all included some 
                                                          
27
 The four items in Hardin et al.’s (2004) Autonomy/Assertiveness factor with loadings 
above .30 in their EFA six-factor solution refer to speaking up in class, being singled 
out for praise and rewards, avoiding arguments although one disagrees (reversed) and  
going along with what others want although one rather do something different 
(reversed). This factor could therefore be seen as tapping being different and standing 
out, which is similar to my Uniqueness factor. 
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items with very low loadings. Experience of working on the translations of the items 
had suggested that many of them had a complex sentence structure as well as expressing 
rather decontextualized and abstract concepts, often making them difficult to translate 
(Brislin, Lonner, & Thorndike, 1973).  Research has shown that people who are not 
socialized into a Western cultural worldview are less familiar with abstract, 
decontextualized introspection about the self (see Smith, 2011), and therefore many of 
the original self-construal items may not be optimal for cross-cultural research. Thus, I 
was interested to see whether these items could be improved, in order to increase the 
precision with which the dimensions were measured.  
Further outstanding questions included whether or not the individual-level 
structure would be replicated at the cultural-level of analysis and whether a higher-order 
structure could be identified to account for the relationships among the different 
dimensions. Study 4 was designed to address these questions. 
 
6.2 Study 4: Structure of Self-construals at the Individual and 
Cultural level 
 The purpose of Study 4 was to test whether the multidimensional structure of 
self-construals identified in Study 3 could be replicated with a different type of analysis 
(CFA rather than EFA), among even more diverse samples and using an improved set of 
items. The multidimensional structure was compared against one-, two-, and three-
dimensional models, in order to confirm that it provided a better representation of the 
data. Unlike Study 3, this study was conducted among non-student adults across a larger 
number of cultural groups. As noted above, given that an earlier analysis had suggested 
that Self-reliance and Self-direction may not factor together (Owe, 2009), I also tested a 
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model in which Self-reliance and Self-direction formed two separate factors, in addition 
to the six-factor model.  
A further aim of Study 4 was to investigate the structure of self-construals at the 
cultural level. I tested whether the same dimensions that characterize individuals can 
also be used to characterize cultures, in other words I tested for multilevel isomorphism. 
Finally, I explored whether the multiple dimensions could be organized into a higher-
order structure at both levels of analysis. A one-dimensional structure was tested, with 
all factors loading onto one bipolar higher-order dimension, and a two-dimensional 
structure, reflecting higher-order independence and interdependence. However, these 
higher-order models did not provide an acceptable fit to the data and I therefore 
explored alternative higher-order structures by inspecting the interrelationships between 
the first-order factors.  
 
6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Items were included in the second multinational research project into identity 
motives and motive satisfaction, which included 36 nations. However, rather than using 
nations as cultural groupings, we sampled different cultural groups within nations, 
where this was relevant and possible. As described in Chapter 4 Section  4.1.2, the 
nature of the different groups varied from nation to nation, such that in some cases the 
differences were geographical (e.g. Eastern and Western Germany), religious (e.g. 
Baptists and Orthodox Christians in Georgia) or ethnic (e.g. Basoga, Baganda and 
Bakiga in Uganda). The study included 8,292 adults from 64 different cultural groups  
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Table 6.4 Demographic Details in Study 4 and Study 5 
Country N Cultural groups (N) 
Mean 
age 
SD % fem. Language Religion 
Belgium 337 Low SES (173); High SES (164) 35.85 11.50 48 French Catholic 
Brazil 482 
South Brazil (147); Northeast Brazil (150); Central Brazil 
(185) 
33.30 12.81 56 Portuguese Catholic 
Cameroon 100 Bafut (100) 26.07 6.10 67 English 
Other 
Christian 
Chile 286 Mapuche (148); Majority Chileans (138) 41.29 14.07 58 Spanish Catholic 
China 259 Eastern China (125); Western China (134) 31.36 8.50 68 Chinese 
Buddhist/ 
Hindu 
Colombia 299 Urban Colombians (149); Rural Colombians (150) 36.97 12.61 62 Spanish Catholic 
Egypt 140 Egyptians (140) 30.46 8.95 51 Arabic Muslim 
Ethiopia 289 Highlanders (146); Urban dwellers (143) 33.78 8.89 43 Amharic Orthodox 
Georgia 209 Orthodox (130); Baptists (79) 41.45 14.45 57 Georgian Orthodox 
Germany 244 Eastern Germany (146); Western Germany (98) 40.06 15.14 59 German Protestant 
Ghana 87 Ashanti (87) 27.21 3.52 19 English 
Other 
Christian 
Hungary 238 Majority Hungarians (147) Romas  (91) 35.57 12.48 47 Hungarian Catholic 
Iceland 117 Icelanders (117) 35.08 13.20 69 Icelandic Protestant 
India 519 
Trivandrum (150); Delhi Hindus (138); Delhi Muslims 
(138); Pondicherry (93) 
35.56 10.82 45 
Hindi, 
English 
Buddhist/ 
Hindu 
Italy 169 Urban Italians (82): Rural Italians (87) 39.01 13.10 70 Italian Catholic 
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Country N Cultural groups (N) 
Mean 
age 
SD % fem. Language Religion 
Japan 277 Hokkaido island (73); Mainland Japan (204) 43.73 15.12 62 Japanese 
Buddhist/ 
Hindu 
Lebanon 230 West Beirut (106); East Beirut (124) 34.35 13.70 49 Arabic Muslim 
Malaysia 147 Malays  (147) 28.00 7.95 63 Malay Muslim 
Namibia 199 Owambo (130); Damara (69) 24.69 5.74 66 English Protestant 
N. Zealand 185 Pakeha (185) 34.93 12.72 50 English Protestant 
Nigeria 94 Nigerians (94) 31.14 9.28 42 English Muslim 
Norway 96 Norwegians  (96) 37.07 13.89 59 Norwegian Protestant 
Oman 154 Omanis (154) 25.38 4.89 46 Arabic Muslim 
Peru 151 Rural Peruvians (72); Urban Peruvians (79) 35.39 15.12 58 Spanish Catholic 
Philippines 303 Christians (149); Muslims (154) 28.47 10.93 51 
English, 
Tausug 
Catholic 
Romania 473 Urban Romanians (318); Rural Romanians (155) 35.76 13.08 58 Romanian Orthodox 
Russia 233 Russians  (108); Caucasians (125) 30.91 11.85 79 Russian Orthodox 
Singapore 98 Singaporeans (98) 33.86 12.57 53 English 
Buddhist/ 
Hindu 
S. Africa 481 South African Indians (272); South African Whites (209) 30.69 11.32 60 English Protestant 
Spain 173 Urban Spaniards (103); Rural Spaniards (70) 40.06 14.61 53 Spanish Catholic 
Sweden 97 Swedish people (97) 44.87 16.21 65 Swedish Protestant 
Thailand 71 Thai people (71) 27.99 6.71 69 Thai 
Buddhist/ 
Hindu 
Turkey 241 Alevis (113); Majority (128) 39.61 10.44 61 Turkish Muslim 
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Country N Cultural groups (N) 
Mean 
age 
SD % fem. Language Religion 
Uganda 438 
Baganda (150); Basoga (114) 
Bakiga/Banyankore (174) 
34.79 6.02 51 English Catholic 
UK 211 Urban British people (122); Rural British people (89) 46.25 17.13 66 English Protestant 
USA 165 Colorado residents (90); Hispanics (75) 30.66 12.59 64 
English, 
Spanish 
Protestant 
Overall 8292  34.87 12.82 56   
Note. SES = Social Economic Status
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(see Table 6.4 for demographic details).
28
 A variety of means were used to recruit 
opportunity samples of adults (see Section 5.3.1.1 in Chapter 5).  
6.2.1.2 Instruments  
Self-construal items. In line with the discussion above, the items were reworded 
in order to make them less decontextualized and abstract. Firstly, rather than presenting 
items on agree-disagree scales, I wanted to make the task of responding more concrete, 
and participants were thus asked “How well does each of these statements describe 
you” (see Schwartz, 2003, for a similar approach). Secondly, the items were reworded 
to refer to ‘You’ rather than ‘I’, in order to make the task feel less introspective and 
abstract (Smith, 2011). This wording was also chosen to make it more natural in 
interview situations where semi-literate participants were helped reading the questions 
by the research assistants. Thirdly, the wording of the items was changed in order to 
make them more meaningful to participants, for example “It is important to maintain 
harmony within my group” was reworded as “You show your inner feelings even if it 
disturbs the harmony in your family” (reversed). As can be seen in this example, many 
of the original items use the very general ‘my group’, which may not be very 
meaningful to respondents. Considering that the family is the most important group to 
most people (Fischer et al., 2009), items were reworded to refer instead to the family 
and in some cases to friends. The items were rated on nine-point scales ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 9 (exactly), with three intermediate anchor-points (see Appendix B). The 
goals was to use a decentered approach, which avoids words or expressions that are 
specific to one language or culture. Once an initial item pool had been generated in 
English, the items were translated to French, Swedish, and Turkish in order to test their 
translatability and the items were discussed with native speakers of these languages. 
                                                          
28
 Only participants who had lived in their respective country for more than 10 years 
and had lived there since before the age of 10 were included in these analyses 
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After some subsequent changes and improvements were made and some items were 
dropped, the items were translated to Romanian and an early version of the scale was 
piloted among 20 students in Romania who provided some feedback on the items. After 
some initial analysis, the resulting scale included 21 items with three items for each 
dimension, including three items each for Self-reliance and Self-direction, to account 
for both of these facets (see Appendix B for full list of items). The scale included a 
range of reversed items, in order to represent the bipolar nature of the factors and to be 
able to control more effectively for acquiescence response bias.  
 
6.2.2 Results  
The analyses were conducted in several stages. In first-order analyses, I initially 
tested the six-factor structure identified in Study 3 as well as a seven-factor structure in 
which Self-reliance and Self-direction were modelled as two separate factors, at the 
individual level only. These models were compared against one-, two- and three-factor 
models, in order to confirm the superiority of a multidimensional structure. The best 
fitting model was then also applied to the cultural level, in order to test for multilevel 
isomorphism. In second-order analyses, I then moved on to explore whether the separate 
dimensions could be organized in a meaningful higher-order structure at both the 
individual and cultural level. All analyses were conducted in Mplus Version 6 (Muthén 
& Muthén, 2010) and all models included an uncorrelated method factor, modelling 
acquiescence, which loaded onto every indicator at a fixed value of 1 (Welkenhuysen-
Gybels et al., 2003).  First-order factors were scaled by fixing the first indicator to 1 and 
second-order factors were scaled by fixing the variance of the factor to 1. In analyses at 
the individual level only, item scores were centred within cultural groups. 
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6.2.2.1 First-order analyses 
  As can be seen in Table 6.5, the seven-factor model (Model 2) provided a good 
fit to the data according to all three fit indices, whereas the fit of the six factor model  
(Model 1) was not acceptable.
29
 These results indicate that Self-reliance and Self-
direction are better considered as separate dimensions using this larger more diverse 
three-factor models (Models 3, 4, 5, respectively), which all showed poor fit to the data, 
replicating the findings in Study 1.
30
 Thus, the seven-factor model was retained in 
further analyses.  
Next, the seven-factor model was tested simultaneously at the individual level 
and at the cultural level (Model 6, see Table 6.5).
31
 This involved testing the same seven 
factors with the same indicators at both levels of analysis. At the cultural level, the 
indicators represent the latent random intercepts of the individual level indicators and  
                                                          
29
 These analyses were multilevel, although I modeled the seven dimensions only at the 
individual level, with item scores centered within cultural groups. Because of the large 
number of groups, it was not appropriate to test measurement invariance using the 
traditional multi-group approach (Selig, Card, & Little, 2008). However, any multilevel 
model assumes invariance unless the parameters are freed to be non-invariant by the 
introduction of random slopes (Selig et al., 2008). The fact that the model did not 
contain random slopes, i.e. the model assumed no variation in factor loadings, and it 
fitted the data well indicates that invariance is tenable (Davidov et al., 2008; Little, 
Card, Slegers, & Ledford, 2007). 
 
30
 The two-dimensional model was specified in two different ways. In the first version, 
items from Self-direction, Self-reliance, Uniqueness and Consistency loaded on the 
Independence factor and items from Inclusion, Commitment and Harmony loaded on 
the Interdependence factor (shown in the table). I also tested a two-dimensional model 
where all the positive items from Self-direction, Self-reliance, Uniqueness and 
Consistency and all the reversed items from Inclusion, Commitment and Harmony 
loaded together on an Independence factor, and all the positive items from Inclusion, 
Commitment and Harmony and all reversed items from Self-direction, Self-reliance, 
Uniqueness and Consistency loaded together on an Interdependence factor. The fit of 
this alternative model was also unacceptable (CFI = .56, TLI = .51 and RMSEA = .08). 
 
31
 Because of initial problems with a negative residual variance at the cultural level, the 
residual variance of one item (item 18, see Appendix B) was set to 0 at the cultural 
level. 
91 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 Confirmatory Factor Analyses in Study 4 
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; RMSEA = Root mean square error of 
approximation.  
Mplus does not give confidence intervals for RMSEA in multilevel analyses.  
*** p < .001. 
 
these vary across cultural groups (Muthén & Muthén, 2010). This multilevel model fit 
the data well, with all items loading significantly on their respective factors at both 
levels. Hence, it was clear that the structure that characterizes individuals can also be  
applied to cultural groups. This model explained 35% of the variance at the individual 
level and 69% of the variance at the cultural level. I then proceeded to examine a stricter 
form of isomorphism, where the loadings were constrained to be equal across levels 
Model χ² df CFI TLI RMSEA 
First-order analyses      
Model 1: Six-factor model  4053.910*** 173 .844 .811 .052 
Model 2: Seven-factor model 1833.341*** 167 .933 .916 .035 
Model 3: One-factor model 9695.615*** 188 .619 .574 .078 
Model 4: Two-factor model 8697.585*** 187 .659 .617 .074 
Model 5: Three-factor model 8250.886*** 184 .676 .631 .073 
Model 6: Multilevel seven-factor 
model 
2206.650*** 335 .927 .909 .026 
Model 7: Multilevel seven-factor 
model loadings constrained 
2313.213*** 350 .924 .909 .026 
Second-order analyses      
Model 8: Multilevel one-
dimensional second-order model 
3470.970*** 380 .880 .867 .031 
Model 9: Multilevel two-
dimensional second-order model 
3318.176*** 380 .886 .874 .031 
Model 10: Multilevel model with 
three higher-order dimensions at the 
cultural level.  
2320.234*** 362 .924 .912 .026 
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(Model 7).
32
 This model also fit the data well, indicating that not only is the structure 
comparable, the association between each indicator and the underlying construct is 
similar across levels.  
 
6.2.2.2 Second-order analyses 
Next I investigated whether the seven first-order dimensions could be 
represented in a higher-order structure. Firstly, I tested whether a one-dimensional 
second-order structure at both levels of analysis would fit the data (Model 8, see Table 
6.5).
33
 This involved having all first-order factors as indicators of one second-order 
factor.  A two-dimensional second-order structure of Independence and Interdependence 
was then tested. Higher-order Independence included Self-reliance, Self-direction, 
Consistency and Uniqueness as indicators and higher-order Interdependence included  
Inclusion, Commitment and Harmony, at both levels of analysis (Model 9).
34 
Both 
models were tested while keeping the first-order loadings constrained across levels. As 
can be seen in Table 6.5, neither of these models achieved an acceptable fit. Moreover, 
both included non-significant loadings within the second-order structure. Thus, it was 
clear that neither model could account for the pattern of relationships among the factors. 
In particular, from inspecting the two-dimensional model, it became evident that 
Harmony did not factor with Inclusion and Commitment, and that Uniqueness and Self-
direction did not factor with Self-reliance and Consistency at the cultural level.  
                                                          
32
 At this stage two residual variances at the cultural level were set to 0, in order to 
avoid negative values (residual variances of items 18 and 8, see Appendix B). 
 
33
 Four residual variances at the cultural level were set to 0 (item 18, item 1, item 15, 
and item 8 see Appendix B) 
 
34
 In order to avoid negative residual values, six residual variances had to be set to 0 
(item 1, item 15, item 8, Inclusion and Self-reliance at the cultural level and Self-
direction at the individual level) 
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Table 6.6 Correlations among Latent Factors in Multilevel Analyses in Study 4. 
Individual-level above the Diagonal; Cultural-level below the Diagonal.  
 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
In order to identify an alternative higher-order structure, the latent correlations 
were inspected at both levels of analysis (see Table 6.6). At the cultural level, a very 
high negative correlation between Harmony and Uniqueness suggested that these two  
factors may be part of the same higher-order dimension. Because Uniqueness is about 
being different and standing out and Harmony refers to conforming and fitting in, this 
makes theoretical sense. Hence, a third higher-order factor was created with these two 
dimensions as indicators. Given that Self-direction did not correlate with Self-reliance 
and Consistency at the cultural level but did correlate with the other four factors, it was 
allowed to cross-load onto the other two higher-order factors. Thus, the resulting higher-
order model at the cultural level included three dimensions which were labelled 
accordingly: (a) Self-differentiation, which included Uniqueness, Harmony (reversed) 
and Self-direction; (b) Other-focus, which included Inclusion, Commitment and Self-
 
  1   2    3   4   5   6   7 
1. Self-reliance   -  .33***  .07  .29*** -.03** -.08***  .37*** 
2. Self-direction   .08   - -.59***  .02 -.49*** -.47***  .39*** 
3. Inclusion 
 
.79*** 
-.56**   -  .20***  .38***  .53*** -.18*** 
4. Consistency 
  
.56*** 
  .06  .23   - -.14***  .15***  .03 
5. Harmony -.17 -.53**  .25 -.41**   -  .38*** -.37*** 
6. Commitment  .20** -.35*  .69*** -.14  .03   - -.27*** 
7. Uniqueness  .37*  .42** -.05  .32* -.81***  .18   - 
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direction (reversed); and (c) Self-containment, which included Self-reliance and 
Consistency
35
. 
At the individual level, on the other hand, the pattern of correlations was less 
clear, with most dimensions only moderately interrelated (see Table 6.6). In order to 
make further sense of this, the correlations were investigated separately for each cultural 
group. These analyses revealed very divergent results. For instance, the correlation 
between Inclusion and Commitment ranged from -.07 in Ghana to .53 in Western China, 
with 19 out of 64 correlations below .20. Similarly, the correlation between Self-
direction and Uniqueness ranged from -.15 among Indian Muslims to .45 in rural Spain, 
with 29 out of 64 correlations below .20. Given that the correlations varied to such a 
degree across cultural groups, it was not considered meaningful to impose a higher-
order structure at this level. Rather, the manner in which the different dimensions relate 
to each other is likely to differ depending on culture, and it was therefore considered 
most appropriate to define individual-level self-construals in terms of seven dimensions. 
Hence, I tested a model with seven first-order factors and no higher-order 
structure at the individual level, whereas at the cultural level the seven factors were 
organized into the three-dimensional higher-order structure described above, keeping 
the first-order loadings constrained across levels (Model 10). This model showed an 
acceptable fit and all second-order indicators were significant.
36
 The higher-order 
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 It should be noted that the present concept of self-containment differs from that of 
(Sampson, 1977), who used the term self-contained individualism to describe the 
cultural ethos within American society and within psychology as a discipline. 
Sampson’s portrayal of self-containment is more extreme, ”needing or wanting no one” 
(p. 770), whereas the present construct of self-containment does not rule out important 
connections with other people. Rather, it refers more specifically to a self that is defined 
without reliance on other people or contextual influence. 
 
36
 This model had four residual variances set to 0 at the cultural level (item 18, 
Inclusion, Uniqueness and Self-reliance). The only large cultural-level correlation not 
accounted for by this model was the substantial correlation between Inclusion and Self-
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structure of Self-differentiation, Other-focus, and Self-containment therefore may be 
useful to describe self-construals at the cultural level, whereas at the individual level the 
seven first-order factors should be considered separately.  
 
6.2.3 Discussion 
Study 4 was designed to test, using a new set of self-construal items, whether the 
structure identified in Study 3 would apply to the more diverse adult samples and at the 
cultural-level of analysis, as well as whether a possible second-order structure could be 
identified. The results suggested that a similar, although not identical, structure could be 
replicated in Study 4. In particular, whereas Self-reliance and Self-direction had 
factored together in Study 3, these two dimensions were separate and not very highly 
correlated at either level of analysis among the adult samples in Study 4. The seven-
factor model was found to fit the data well, whereas the one-, two-, and three-
dimensional models did not, replicating the results from Study 3. Thus, a 
multidimensional model is needed to account for dimensions of self-construals at both 
individual and cultural levels of analysis. 
Given that isomorphism of the first-order structure was established, it can be 
concluded that it has comparable meaning at the individual and cultural level. Hence, 
the same seven dimensions can be used to describe cultures as well as individuals, 
without committing the ecological or reversed ecological fallacy. However, although 
these structures were found to be comparable, it is important to note that this does not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
reliance. In order to establish that I had indeed identified the best model, we also ran 
two alternative models, one where Inclusion loaded on the Self-containment factor, 
alongside Self-reliance and Consistency (AIC = 780447.00) and one model where Self-
reliance and Inclusion formed a higher-order factor and Consistency was a separate 
first-order factor (AIC = 780445.820). Both of these fitted the data less well than the 
original model with three higher-order factors (AIC = 780431.07). Smaller AIC 
indicates better fit and was used here as these were non-nested models (Kline, 2005) 
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mean that they have the same meaning. At the individual level, these dimensions refer 
to different ways that the individual sees the self and its relation to others. At the 
cultural level, on the other hand, these dimensions are better thought of as referring to 
normative, social, and cultural constructions of selfhood. 
At the cultural level, the multiple factors could also be organized into three 
higher-order dimensions: Self-differentiation, where emphasis is placed on being 
different and standing out (over conforming and fitting in); Other-focus, where 
emphasis is placed on being committed to others and sharing their happiness and 
sadness (over one’s personal achievements and a sense of separateness from others); 
and Self-containment, referring to the self as complete in itself, independent from the 
context and from reliance on other people (over a self that depends on the context to 
shape its behaviour and on the assistance of others).  Hence, dimensions which 
traditionally would be considered part of independence and interdependence did not all 
factor together. This demonstrates that self-construals cannot be organized into a simple 
one or two-dimensional structure. Rather, the structure reflects different dimensions of 
variation in how people construe themselves and their relations with others. I should 
emphasize that these three dimensions should not be used when investigating 
individuals’ self-construals. Given that the first-order dimensions could not be 
organized in the three factor structure at the individual level, characterizing individuals 
along these dimensions would mean committing the ecological fallacy.  
 
6.3 Study 5: Cross-National Variation and Antecedents of Self-
construals 
Study 4 showed that self-construals are organized into a multidimensional 
structure with seven different self-construal dimensions, referring to different ways of 
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seeing the self and its relation to other people. At the cultural level, these seven 
dimensions could be organized into three higher-order factors. Study 5 was designed to 
answer two main questions—how do our national samples differ on these higher-order 
dimensions, and why do they differ—by supplementing the self-construal data from 
Study 4 with additional measures from our study and from archival sources. How they 
differ was shown by estimating the extent of nation-level variation and by plotting the 
national samples on each of the three dimensions. The question of why they differ was 
investigated by testing a range of nation-level variables as potential predictors of 
variation among our national samples in self-differentiation, other-focus, and self-
containment.  
As noted in Chapter 3 Section 3.5.1, national differences in self-construals are 
commonly attributed to differences in I-C (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Kim et al., 1996; 
Singelis & Brown, 1995), with individualistic cultures thought to promote an 
independent view of the self and collectivistic cultures thought to promote an 
interdependent view of the self. However, this assumption is rarely tested. Some 
researchers have investigated this link using nation as a proxy for culture among a small 
number of nations (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Kim et al., 2001; Park & Levine, 1999; 
Singelis & Brown, 1995). This approach is problematic as it reinforces stereotypes by 
simply assuming that a nation is collectivistic or individualistic, when in fact national 
samples often do not vary as would be predicted (Matsumoto, 1999; Oyserman et al., 
2002; Takano & Osaka, 1999). Perhaps because many measures of I-C and self-
construals share the same items, few studies have attempted to investigate their 
relationship empirically. The present study avoids this problem by measuring I-C with 
multiple indicators that do not include self-construals across a large number of nations. 
To my knowledge, this is the first empirical test of the nation-level relationship between 
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I-C and self-construals with a relatively large nation-level sample size.
37
 Given that 
three separate higher-order dimensions of self-construals had been identified, it seemed 
possible that they might not all be equally related to I-C. Nonetheless, based on an 
intuitive understanding of the three higher-order self-construal dimensions and the 
common view in the literature (Smith, 2011), three hypotheses were tested:  
Hypothesis 1: self-differentiation is higher in individualistic nations. 
Hypothesis 2: other-focus is higher in collectivistic nations. 
Hypothesis 3: self-containment is higher in individualistic nations. 
There are also indications that other important factors may predict self-
construals. Triandis (1989) suggested that in addition to individualism, cultural 
complexity and looseness (as opposed to tightness) promotes independence.  
Nonetheless, in a study investigating a range of different nation-level indicators, 
Georgas et al. (2004) found that the combined effects of national wealth and religion 
provided the most effective predictions of psychological variables such as values and 
wellbeing. 
Different types of economic activity and modernization have been shown to 
have great impact on cultural orientations. For example, farming and fishing 
communities, where people have to work together to survive, appear to promote a social 
relatedness and interdependence, whereas herding, hunting and gathering societies 
promote independence (Berry, 1967; Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). A similar 
distinction has been made between traditional and industrialized societies, where the 
latter appears to promote independence and autonomy (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
Inkeles, 1977). Wealth has also experimentally been found to promote independence 
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 Fernández, Paez, & González (2005)
 
looked at the relationships between dimensions 
of self-construals and Hofstede’s (1980) individualism. However, this analysis was 
conducted at the individual level with disaggregated nation-level individualism scores 
and thus the probability estimates cannot be trusted (Hox, 2002) 
99 
 
 
 
and disjoint agency (Adams, Bruckmüller, & Decker, 2012). Based on this literature, 
the following additional hypotheses were therefore also tested:  
Hypothesis 4: self-differentiation is higher in wealthier nations. 
Hypothesis 5: other-focus is lower in wealthier nations. 
Hypothesis 6: self-containment is higher in wealthier nations. 
The second variable emphasized in Georgas et al.’s (2004) research was 
religion. Religious beliefs are important in defining what it means to be a person and 
what is good (Snibbe & Markus, 2002). Christianity, and Protestantism in particular, 
has often been linked to self-sufficiency, autonomy and a focus on the individual 
(Dumont, 1985; Sampson, 2000; Weber, 1904) and Sanchez-Burks (2005) has shown 
that the low relational focus in work settings in the United States can be explained by a 
Protestant ideology. In contrast, Ho (1995) describes a lack of focus on the individual 
self within four Eastern traditions, Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism. 
Rather, the self is decentered and defined by, or at one with, social relationships, the 
universe and nature.  Moving away from the West vs. East contrast, Sampson (2000) 
argues that the self within rabbinic Judaism is defined in the dialog with others. The self 
is not separated from others nor is it at one with others, but is formed instead in the 
space “in between”. Hence, he argues that the rabbinic self is independent and 
interdependent at the same time. Furthermore, in an anthropological study of Thull, a 
Pakistani tribal community, Keiser (2003) describes a self which is rooted in a strong 
Muslim identity, defined by virtue, moral behaviour, honour, and revenge.  
Although the relationships between religious traditions and constructions of the 
self are likely to be complex, some hypotheses were identified and tested based on the 
above discussion and an intuitive understanding of the three dimensions. These 
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predictions do not specifically include Protestantism since it was chosen as the reference 
group (see Section 6.3.2, footnote 45). 
Hypothesis 7: self-differentiation is lower in Islamic nations. 
Hypothesis 8: other-focus is higher in Islamic nations. 
Hypothesis 9: self-containment is lower in Islamic nations. 
Hypothesis 10: self-differentiation is lower in Buddhist/Hindu nations. 
Hypothesis 11: other-focus is higher in Buddhist/Hindu nations. 
Hypothesis 12: self-containment is lower in Buddhist/Hindu nations. 
Inglehart and Baker (2000) suggest that national cultures have historically been 
shaped by religious institutions even though the number of people who actively practice 
religion is declining in many parts of the world. Thus, rather than looking at the 
religious compositions of our samples, I was interested in the influence of the dominant 
religious tradition within a country. Each national sample was therefore categorized 
based on the largest religion in that nation.  
Finally, the additional predictive value of a range of other potential nation-level 
antecedents was explored. Van Herk and Poortinga (2011) suggest that in addition to 
affluence and religion, societal and political organization and dispositional attributes of 
the population are also important nation-level correlates. Variables relating to societal 
structure, such as inequality, ethnic and religious fractionalization, urbanization, and 
democracy, were therefore included. I also included a range of normative variables, 
reflecting nation-level value and belief systems. Moreover, research has found that the 
physical environment can also shape people’s cultural orientations, for example climate 
(Van de Vliert, 2010) and prevalence of pathogens (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & 
Schaller, 2008). I therefore also included some potential environmental antecedents, in 
addition to the structural and normative correlates. For the sake of parsimony, variables 
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that are highly related to affluence, such as life-expectancy or educational levels, were 
not included. It should be pointed out that this part of the research was largely 
exploratory, with the goal of identifying the nomological network—potential 
relationship between cultural constructions of the self and characteristics of the national 
context, and I did not test any specific hypotheses involving these additional variables. 
 As noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2, it should also be noted that our data was 
not representative of the nations sampled. We aimed to sample widely within each 
nation, including different cultural groups and wide age ranges where possible. Thus, 
the present research provides an improvement on the overreliance on undergraduate 
student samples in the cross-cultural literature. Nonetheless, the lack of 
representativeness precludes any strong conclusions about the prevailing self-construals 
within the nations included in the study. I return to this issue in Chapter 8.  
 
6.3.1 Method 
6.3.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Participants in the second multinational research project also completed selected 
measures of cultural values and beliefs, which are described below, alongside the self-
construal measure described in Study 4. The sample included participants from 36 
nations (Table 6.4 reports demographic details). These data were supplemented by a 
variety of publicly available archival indices for the nations included, which are 
described below.
38 
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 Study 3 used nation as the unit of analysis, in order to be able to use existing indices 
of ecological and sociopolitical contexts, which are not available for specific cultural 
groups within nations, although I recognize that such analysis overlooks meaningful 
variation within nations. Multilevel analyses using nation as the level-2 unit confirmed 
the seven factor structure with the three higher-order dimensions also at the nation-level 
(CFI = .93, TLI = .91, and RMSEA = .03) 
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6.3.1.2 Instruments 
Self-construal items. The same items as in Study 4 were aggregated to the nation 
level. Before they were aggregated, items were ipsatized within the scale for each 
individual in order to remove acquiescence, because the dimensions did not have a 
balanced set of positive and negative items (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Because of its 
cross-loading on two of the higher-order dimensions, items measuring self-direction 
were not included in these measures. Reliabilities at the nation level were good (self-
differentiation, six items: α = .77; other-focus, six items: α = .82; self-containment, six 
items: α = .84). 
Indicators of I-C. I used four indicators of I-C: two from archival sources and 
two from our own dataset. The archival measures included individualism values 
(Hofstede, 1980) and ingroup collectivism practices (House et al., 2004). Autonomy (vs. 
embeddedness) values (Schwartz, 2004) and contextualism beliefs (see Chapter 5) were 
also measured in the present dataset. Autonomy (vs. embeddedness) was measured in 
the same way as described in Study 1 and nation-level reliability for autonomy (vs. 
embeddedness) was acceptable (ten items
39
, α = .79). Contextualism was measured in 
the same way as described in Study 2 and nation-level reliability was good (six items, α 
= .90). All indicators of I-C were used when exploring correlations. However, in the 
regression analyses I used only autonomy (vs. embeddedness) and contextualism 
because these were the only two indicators for which all 36 data-points existed.
40
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 We included two items fewer than are normally used at the individual level as there is 
a potential shift in meaning of these items across levels (Shalom Schwartz, personal 
communication, March 1, 2011). 
 
40
 Autonomy (vs. embeddedness) correlated r =  .36 with Hofstede’s (1980) 
individualism and r = -.56 with ingroup collectivism practices, and contextualism 
correlated r = -.44 with individualism and r = .54 with ingroup collectivism practices. 
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National affluence. This was measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita 2009 (World Bank, 2010) which was log-transformed in order to reduce 
skewness (see Van de Vliert, 2010, for a similar approach).  
Religious variables. Based on Georgas et al. (2004), the national samples were 
categorized into the following religious categories: Christian Protestant, Christian 
Catholic, Christian Orthodox, other Christian, Muslim, Buddhist/Hindu. Given that 
there were insufficient numbers, a traditional beliefs category was not included. 
Following Georgas et al., the categorization was based on percentages of population 
belonging to the religious denominations (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011; see Table 
6.4). Although official figures suggest very low adherence, China was categorized as 
Buddhist since there are indications that this is now one of the biggest religions 
(Xueying, 2009). Similarly, Russia was categorized as Orthodox, although estimates of 
official worshipers are low (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). Some nations did not have 
a clear majority religion. These included Germany (evenly split between Catholics and 
Protestants), which I categorized as Protestant since the data were collected in the more 
Protestant regions, and Uganda (even split between Catholics and Protestants), which I 
categorized as Catholic because of its greater historical influence (Pirouet, 1980). Some 
samples had substantial minority groups: Nigeria, which was categorized as Muslim, 
although there is a substantial Christian minority; Ethiopia, which was categorized as 
Orthodox, although there is a substantial Muslim minority; and Lebanon, which was 
categorized as Muslim, although there is a significant Christian minority. Parallel 
analyses were conducted categorizing these samples in the alternative ways (see 
footnote 46 in Section 6.3.2.2). A measure of religiosity was also included, taken from 
the World Values Survey database (The World Values Survey Association, 2011) and 
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originally measured by one item (How important is God in your life?), rated on a scale 
from 1 (not at all important) to 10 (very important).
41
 
Structural variables. These included income inequality, measured by the GINI 
index (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011), where a high score denotes high inequality 
in a nation; ethnic and religious fractionalization, referring to the degree of ethnic and 
religious heterogeneity in a country (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & 
Wacziarg, 2003); urbanization, measured as the percentage of the population living in 
urban areas (United Nations, 2010); and democracy, measured as political rights and 
civil liberties (Freedom House, 2010), which are calculated on a scale from 1 (highest 
level of freedom) to 7 (lowest level of freedom), but here I reversed the scores for or ease 
of interpretation. 
Contextual threat variables. These included climate harshness, measured as the 
sum of absolute deviations from 22°C in the coldest and warmest months (Van de 
Vliert, 2010); vulnerability to natural disasters, measured as the average number of 
deaths per million inhabitants from floods, tropical cyclones, and droughts (Esty, Levy, 
Srebotnjak, & De Sherbinin, 2005); and historical and contemporary pathogen 
prevalence (Fincher et al., 2008). 
Other normative variables. These included several archival sources: Hofstede’s 
(1980) published indices of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity; and 
the two published nation-level dimensions of social axioms (Bond, Leung, Tong, et al., 
2004)—dynamic externality, which combines beliefs about the importance of religion 
and fate with an emphasis on effort and control; and societal cynicism, which refers to 
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 In order to maximize the available data, I used the aggregated data file which includes 
data from five waves (1981-2008). Information on fieldwork, samples, and available 
data sets is available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
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negative beliefs about human nature and social institutions. I also included Minkov’s 
(2007) three cultural dimensions: monumentalism (vs. flexumility), referring to a 
cultural tendency of pride, absolutist thinking, and inflexibity; indulgence (vs. restraint), 
referring to gratification of desires, personal freedom and leisure; and exclusionism (vs. 
universalism), referring to sharp distinctions between ingroup and outgroup and 
exclusion of outsiders. Inglehart & Baker’s (2000) two value dimensions were also 
included: secular-rational vs. traditional values, which concerns orientations towards 
authorities such as religion, nation and the family, and self-expression vs. survival 
values, which contrast societies where quality of life is central with societies where 
physical and economic security is the focus. A further archival source used were 
Gelfand and colleagues’ (2011) published nation scores for tightness (vs. looseness), 
which refers to the extent to which a nation has many strong norms and a low tolerance 
of deviant behaviour. Some additional variables were also taken from our own dataset: 
Schwartz’s (2004) egalitarianism (vs. hierarchy) values (six items: α =.87) and harmony 
(vs. mastery) values (three items: α =.58)42, which were measured within the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire described above; and essentialist beliefs about personhood 
(Bastian & Haslam, 2007), measured in terms of immutability (e.g. “You can’t really 
change your deepest attributes”) on six-point scales (six items, α =.84).  
 
6.3.1.3 Analysis  
The analyses were conducted in several stages. Firstly, I investigated how the 
national samples differed on the three self-construal dimensions. This included 
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 The short version of the PVQ, with a total of 21 items, is not optimal for measuring 
Schwartz’s (2004) cultural-level value dimensions, as ideally one would use more 
items. This is of particular concern for harmony (vs. mastery) which only included three 
items and had a lower reliability. The findings in relation to this dimension should 
therefore be treated with caution.   
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estimating the extent of nation-level variance and, in a simply descriptive manner, 
nation-level plots showing the three self-construal dimensions were inspected. This 
allowed me to identify how the dimensions relate to each other and to ascertain the 
presence of any geographical patterns among the samples. Second, using hierarchical 
multiple regression, I then tested whether I-C predicted difference in self-construals and 
whether national affluence and religion could account for incremental variance beyond 
that explained by I-C. Finally, a range of additional contextual variables were also 
explored and their potential importance for different conceptions of the self was 
assessed. These additional variables were taken from a range of different sources and 
the number of available data points varied greatly. Because of list-wise deletion of 
missing data, it would have left only a very small number of common data-points if they 
were tested in the same model. Hence, the exploratory variables were tested in separate 
models. The results from this part of the analyses should therefore be treated with some 
caution, given that these variables are likely to have some overlapping variance.  
Although the focus of Study 5 was on the nation level, I continued to use 
multilevel analyses in order to control for compositional differences in our samples. By 
controlling for individual differences in gender, age and family wealth
43
, I was able to 
rule out the possibility that the observed relationships were due to compositional 
differences in these characteristics among our national samples. Moreover, in order to 
control for overlapping effects among the self-construal dimensions, all three self-
construals were tested in the same model. Analyses were conducted using Mplus 
Version 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010). 
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 This was measured by one item in our survey “Compared to other people in [nation], 
how would you describe your family’s level of financial wealth?” which was rated on a 
seven-point scale ranging from 1 (very poor) to 7 (very rich). 
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6.3.2 Results 
6.3.2.1 National sample differences 
In order to test the extent of variation among our national samples on the three 
self-construal dimensions, the intraclass correlations (ICC) were estimated. As outlined 
in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.2, this refers to the proportion of total variance found at the 
nation level rather than the individual level (Hox, 2002). Self-differentiation had an ICC 
of .09 (p < .001)
 44
, other-focus had an ICC of .10 (p < .001), and self-containment had 
an ICC of .08 (p < .001), indicating that an estimated 8-10% of the variance is found 
between nations. This is above the recommended cut-off of .06 for aggregation of 
individual-level constructs to a higher-level (Gelfand et al., 2011) and is similar to what 
has been found in other large cross-cultural studies (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.2). 
This suggests that self-construals differ systematically between nations and that they 
can be considered to exist at a collective level. Although these findings indicate that 
most of the variance is at the individual level, which also includes variance due to 
unreliability, studies have shown that even this smaller proportion of variance can 
meaningfully predict psychological outcomes (Becker et al., 2012; Gheorghiu et al., 
2009). Next, the pattern of differences was investigated by inspecting national sample 
plots (Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3).  
Figure 6.1 plots self-differentiation against self-containment. In many ways, this 
plot confirms common notions of differences in self-construals—the US scored high on 
both dimensions, whereas many East Asian samples and samples from Cameroon and 
Uganda scored low on both dimensions. This pattern mirrors conceptualizations of I-C. 
However, this plot identifies three different groups of samples that scored low on self-
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 P-values refer to the cultural-level variance component. Statistical significance 
indicates that members of the same group are more similar to each other/more different 
from members of other groups than would be expected by chance. 
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Figure 6.1 National means of self-differentiation and self-containment. Since self-differentiation is a bipolar dimension, the scores range 
around 0.  
109 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 National means of self-differentiation and other-focus. Since self-differentiation is a bipolar dimension, the scores range around 
0.  
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Figure 6.3 National means of self-containment and other-focus. 
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differentiation, but varied in their emphasis on self-containment—West and mid-
African samples scored particularly low on self-containment, followed by East Asian 
samples and Middle Eastern samples scored high. In the same region as the Middle 
Eastern samples are also Ethiopia and Georgia, which traditionally are not considered 
part of the Middle East, but their geographical proximity to this area and their shared 
historical influence of Islam can explain their similarity to Middle Eastern samples. This 
pattern suggests that self-construals vary on more dimensions than I-C, which is 
highlighted by the inclusion of samples normally underrepresented in the self-construal 
literature. Interesting to note in this plot is also that two South American samples, Chile 
and Colombia, scored high on both dimensions and thus scored very similar to the US 
sample. Moreover, the Japanese and Swedish samples scored particularly low on self-
containment but scored moderately high on self-differentiation.  
Figure 6.2 plots other-focus against self-differentiation. Many Middle Eastern 
samples scored particularly high on other-focus and low on self-differentiation, closely 
followed by the South East Asian samples, whereas most European samples scored high 
on both. Samples from South America, the US, and New Zealand were found at an 
intermediate position on other-focus, while scoring high on self-differentiation. Finally, 
many African samples scored low on other-focus and moderate on self-differentiation.  
Figure 6.3 plots other-focus against self-containment. Most European and Middle 
Eastern samples scored high on both dimensions whereas many African samples scored 
low on both dimensions. Samples from the US, New Zealand and South America scored 
high on self-containment but as noted above, intermediate on other-focus.  
6.3.2.2 Predictors of self-construals 
Correlations between the self-construal dimensions and the nation-level 
variables are shown in Table 6.7. This table shows that self-differentiation was  
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Table 6.7 Relationships between the Three Higher-Order Self-construal Dimensions and 
Other National-level Variables in Study 5 
 
  Correlations 
 
N 
Self-
differentiation 
Other-focus Self-
containment 
Other-focus 36  -.14      
Self-containment 36   .09  .22      
GNI
1 
36   .67***  .42***  -.16 
Indicators of I-C     
Individualism 26   .51**  .31†  -.21 
Autonomy (vs. embeddedness) 36   .61*** -.07   .01 
Contextualism  36  -.54***  .07   .29* 
Ingroup collectivism practices  22  -.64***  .12   .35* 
Religious variables     
Christianity 36   .50*** -.30*   .06 
Islam  36  -.43**   .21   .34* 
Catholicism
2
  36   .07          -.09   .20 
Protestantism
2 
36   .37*   .08  -.28† 
Orthodoxy 
2 
36  -.36**   .04   .16 
Buddhism/Hinduism 36  -.10   .26†  -.32* 
Other Christian
2 
36  -.21 -.40**  -.23 
Religiosity 30  -.40*** -.51***   .49*** 
Structural variables     
Inequality 33  -.17 -.49**   .29* 
Urbanization 36   .55***   .31*   .00 
Ethnic fractionalization 36  -.45*** -.65***   .20† 
Religious fractionalization 36  -.16 -.34*  -.13 
Political rights 36   .74***   .02  -.16 
Civil liberties 36   .75***           .05  -.11 
Contextual threat variables      
Climate harshness 36   .47**   .38*  -.01 
Vulnerability to natural 
disasters 
35  -.35*  -.10   .25† 
Historical pathogen prevalence 30  -.74***  -.22  -.03 
Contemporary pathogen 
prevalence 
32  -.59***  -.32*   .24† 
Other normative variables     
Power distance 26  -.68***         -.06   .26* 
Uncertainty avoidance 26   .19  .02   .35* 
Masculinity 26   .01 -.04   .04 
Egalitarianism (vs. Hierarchy) 36   .56***  .33*   .12 
Harmony (vs. Mastery) 36   .30*  .43**   .10 
Tightness 17  -.58**  .31  -.24 
Dynamic externality 25  -.81*** -.24   .16 
Societal cynicism 25  -.36 -.02   .03 
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  Correlations 
 
N 
Self-
differentiation 
Other-focus Self-
containment 
Essentialism 36   .05  .33*   .28† 
Monumentalism (vs. 
Flexumility) 
21  -.44** 
        -.28† 
  .53*** 
Indulgence (vs. Restraint) 23   .08 -.45*   .19 
Self-expression vs. survival 
values  
28        .59***          .26†         -.36** 
Secular-rational vs. traditional 
values 
28      .42**          .49***     -.48*** 
Note. Separate models were run for each nation-level variable because of differences in 
the number of nations with available data 
1 
GNI was log-transformed in order to reduce 
skewness.  
2
 Controlling for Christianity. Estimates shown are all at the nation level. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
related to a range of variables, whereas other-focus and self-containment showed a more 
differentiated pattern. In order to test which of these variables predicts differences in 
self-construals, these were entered in a series of regression analyses. Indicators of I-C 
were entered in the first step.
  
Next, I tested whether affluence (Step 2) and religion 
(Step 3) would account for additional variance in addition to I-C. I used the Protestant 
group as the reference category against which other religious heritage  
groupings were compared.
45
 Finally, the effects of the additional contextual variables 
were investigated (Step 4). As noted above, because of the exploratory nature of this 
final step and because many of these variables contained fewer than 36 data points with 
different nations missing for each variable, I tested each of these additional variables in 
separate models while still controlling for I-C, wealth and religion. 
                                                          
45
 Religion was entered in the form of five dummy variables (Catholicism, Orthodoxy, 
Buddhism/Hinduism, Islam and Other Christian) with the Protestant group used as a 
reference group. A significant result for the religious dummies should therefore be 
interpreted as a significant difference from Protestantism. I chose the Protestant group 
as the reference group for two reasons. Firstly, it was one of the largest groups and 
secondly, it reflects a common practice in the literature of comparing other cultures 
against the West (e.g. Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). I do not wish to 
portray Protestantism as normative but I considered it a useful reference point given the 
focus in the literature. 
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Table 6.8 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Self-differentiation, 
Other-focus and Self-containment in Study 5 
 
 
N 
Self-
differentiation 
Other-focus Self-
containment 
Predictor 
 ∆R2     β ∆R2     β ∆R2     β 
Step 1 36 .52      .05  .08  
Autonomy (vs. embed.)    .52***  -.10    .13 
Contextualism   -.40**   .18    .29† 
Step 2 36 .05  .40  .01  
Autonomy (vs. embed.)     .39**  -.48**    .07 
Contextualism    -.28*   .52***    .34† 
GNI     .28†   .85***    .13 
Step 3 36 .13  .13  .29  
Autonomy (vs. embed.)     .16  -.33*    .19 
Contextualism   -.27*   .36*    .29 
GNI    .27†   .77***    .12 
Catholicism     .09   .10    .25 
Orthodoxy   -.15   .25†    .26 
Buddhism/Hinduism   -.16   .25†   -.18 
Islam   -.36*   .38*    .43* 
Other Christian   -.18  -.07   -.09 
Total R
2
  .70  .58  .38  
Step 4        
Structural variables        
Inequality 33 .01  .13 .08  -.34** .03   .19 
Urbanization 36 .00 -.03 .01   .18 .01   .20 
Ethnic fractionalization 36 .00 -.06 .14 -.53*** .00   -.01 
Religious 
fractionalization 
36 .00  .03 .06 -.29* .02  -.16 
Political rights 36 .02   .28† .00  .09 .01   .09 
Civil liberties 36 .02   .25 .00  .07 .01   .10 
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N 
Self-
differentiation 
Other-focus Self-
containment 
Predictor 
 ∆R2     β ∆R2     β ∆R2     β 
Contextual threat 
variables 
       
Climate harshness 36 .02   .20 .06  .36* .02   .20 
Vulnerability to natural 
disasters 
35 .00  -.11 .00  .11 .00   .08 
Historical pathogen 
prevalence 
30 .01  -.27 .07 -.59* .06  -.56† 
Contemporary 
pathogen prevalence 
32 .00  -.02 .03 -.33 .00  -.01 
Other normative 
variables 
       
Religiosity 30 .01   .18 .09 -.46** .09   .43* 
Power distance 26 .03  -.45 .01  .03 .01  -.21 
Uncertainty avoidance 26 .03   .27 .01  .16 .15   .57** 
Masculinity 26 .00   .08 .02 -.13 .01   .09 
Egalitarianism (vs. 
Hierarchy) 
36 .00   .10 .08  .44** .06   .37† 
Harmony (vs. Mastery) 36 .00   .08 .09  .43** .01   .07 
Tightness 17 .02  -.38 .00 -.26 .01  -.22 
Dynamic externality 25 .03  -.40 .03 -.44 .09  -.67* 
Social cynicism 25 .01   .20 .00  .03 .03   .27 
Essentialism 36 .03   .23† .01  .14 .13   .48** 
Monumentalism (vs. 
Flexumility) 
21 .00   .10     .02 -.29    .17   .76** 
Indulgence (vs. 
Restraint) 
23 .05   .38† .11 -.54** .02   .19 
Self-expression vs. 
survival values 
28 .00   -.07     .03   .43†    .07 -.57† 
Secular-rational vs. 
traditional values 
28 .07  -.48* .03   .31 .17 -.73*** 
Note. In Step 4, variables were tested separately but with all Step 3 variables in each 
model. ∆R2 in Step 4 was calculated in comparison with Step 3 models that only 
contained the same national samples as the Step 4 model. Analysis exclusionism (vs. 
universalism) revealed unrealistic numbers, most likely because of non-identification, 
and is therefore not included here.  Estimates shown are all at the nation level.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001  
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Main predictors. In Step 1, the two indicators of I-C explained 52% of the 
variance in self-differentiation (see Table 6.8). In line with predictions, I-C was a 
significant predictor of self-differentiation, with individualistic societies scoring higher 
(Hypothesis 1). However, contrary to predictions, I-C did not explain a substantial 
amount of variance in other-focus (Hypothesis 2) nor self-containment (Hypothesis 3)   
and the two predictors were not significant. In Step 2, national affluence did not account 
for a substantial amount of incremental variance in self-differentiation (Hypothesis 4) 
and self-containment (Hypothesis 6). However, it was a highly significant predictor of 
other-focus and explained an additional 40% of variance: other-focus was higher in 
more affluent nations, contrary to predictions (Hypothesis 5). Moreover, when including 
national affluence in the model, both indicators of I-C also became significant 
predictors of other-focus. Hence, it seems that collectivism predicts other-focus when 
looking at nations with similar levels of wealth, but differences in national affluence 
suppress this relationship.  
In Step 3, religion accounted for an additional 13% of variance in self-
differentiation, 13% of variance in other-focus and a more substantial 29% of variance 
in self-containment. Hypotheses 7 was supported: self-differentiation was negatively 
predicted by Islamic religious traditions. However, contrary to predictions, self-
differentiation was not significant lower in Buddhist/nations (Hypothesis 10). In line 
with predictions, other-focus was higher in Islamic nations (Hypothesis 8) but it was 
only marginally related to Buddhism/Hinduism (Hypothesis 11). I originally predicted 
that self-containment would be lower in Islamic nations but the results revealed that it 
was in fact higher (Hypothesis 9). These results emphasise that self-containment is 
something different from individualism and appears to be distinctive of Islamic cultures. 
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Finally, in line with predictions, self-containment was lower in Buddhist/Hindu nations 
(Hypothesis 12).
46
   
In conclusion, this pattern of results suggests that self-differentiation largely 
conformed to expectations and common views in the self-construal literature. 
Hypotheses 1, 4 and 7 were supported—self-differentiation was lower in Islamic nations 
and higher in individualist and wealthier nations, although affluence was only a 
marginal predictor when controlling for I-C and it did not add much additional variance. 
The predicted relationship to Buddhism/Hinduism was not found (Hypothesis 10). 
Other-focus, on the other hand, revealed a more surprising pattern, especially in terms 
of its relation to national wealth. It was positively predicted by affluence—hence, the 
opposite relationship to what was hypothesized was observed (Hypothesis 5)—and it 
was only related to collectivism once controlling for national wealth (Hypothesis 2). 
Hypothesis 8 was supported—other focus was predicted by Islamic religious tradition 
but it was only marginally related to Buddhism/Hinduism (Hypothesis 11). Finally, self-
containment showed a very different pattern of results compared to what was originally 
predicted. It was not higher in individualist nor wealthy nations (Hypotheses 3 and 6). 
In fact, there were indications that it was higher in collectivist nations.  Moreover, 
religion was the best predictor of self-containment—it was higher in Islamic nations, 
contrary to predictions, and there were indications that this self-construal dimension was 
lower in Buddhist/Hindu nations, which was in line with predictions (Hypothesis 12).  
                                                          
46
 I ran parallel analyses with Germany categorized as Catholic, Uganda as Protestant, 
Ethiopia as Muslim, Nigeria as Other Christian, and Lebanon as Catholic. These 
alternative analyses revealed almost identical results, with one exception: when 
Lebanon was categorized as Catholic, Islam was no longer a significant predictor of 
self-containment and Catholicism was instead a marginal positive predictor. A 
substantial proportion of variance was still explained in self-containment with this 
alternative categorization of Lebanon (R
2
= .35) and additional analyses using 
Catholicism or Islam as a reference group suggested Buddhism/Hinduism was a 
negative predictor of self-containment. 
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Exploratory predictors. The exploratory variables were entered in Step 4 with 
separate analyses for each variable (see lower part of Table 6.8). Regarding self-
differentiation, only the secular-rational vs. traditional value dimension was a 
significant predictor (∆R2= .07). This relationship was negative, which may seem 
surprising given that self-differentiation is more typical of wealthy nations, as is 
secular-rational values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Secular-rational vs. traditional values 
have also been found to correlate with autonomy (vs. embeddedness; Schwartz, 2004). 
Hence, the negative relationship observed here could due to the fact that I control for 
both wealth and autonomy (vs. embeddedness) in these analysis and with a large 
amount of shared variance, it is unclear what this negative relationship means. Overall, 
it seemed that self-differentiation was best explained by I-C, national wealth, and 
religion, which together explained 70% of the nation-level variance. The many 
correlations between self-differentiation and other variables identified in Table 6.7 are 
therefore arguably the product of common associations with I-C, wealth and religion.  
In contrast, other-focus was significantly predicted by several other variables, 
which each accounted for considerable additional variance. These included the 
following negative predictors: inequality (∆R2= .08), ethnic fractionalization (∆R2= .14), 
religious fractionalization (∆R2= .06), historical pathogen prevalence (∆R2= .07), 
religiosity (∆R2= .09), indulgence (vs. restraint; ∆R2= .11); and the following positive 
predictors: harmony (vs. mastery) values (∆R2= .14), egalitarian (vs. hierarchy) values 
(∆R2= .07) and climate harshness (∆R2= .06). Self-containment was also positively 
predicted by religiosity (∆R2= .09), uncertainty avoidance (∆R2= .15), essentialism 
(∆R2= .13), and monumentalism (vs. flexumility; ∆R2= .17); and negatively predicted by 
secular-rational vs. traditional values (∆R2= .17) and dynamic externality (∆R2= .09). 
Given that the exploratory predictors were tested in separate analyses because of 
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differences in the number of available data points, repeated tests for significance were 
performed which increases risk for Type 1 error. After conducting a Bonferroni 
correction (based on 24 simultaneous tests), the only significant exploratory predictors 
of other-focus were ethnic fractionalization and harmony (vs. mastery) and the only 
significant exploratory predictors of self-containment were essentialism and secular-
rational vs. traditional values. Thus, the findings with regards to the other predictors 
noted above need to be treated with caution.  
 
6.3.3 Discussion  
Study 3 was designed to answer two questions—how our national samples 
differed on the three self-construal dimensions and why they differed. These two 
questions are discussed in turn. In terms of sample differences, the US sample’s top 
position on self-differentiation was consistent with the widely held perception that 
North Americans strive to be different and unique (Oyserman et al., 2002). On this 
dimension, the European samples scored intermediate between US and Asian samples, 
in line with previous research (Kitayama et al., 2009; Oyserman et al., 2002). However, 
it is important to note that this was not the case for all three self-construal dimensions. 
In particular, many European samples scored higher on other-focus compared with 
samples that are traditionally characterized as collectivist, which highlights the fact that 
this self-construal dimension is positively related to affluence, societal equality, and 
ethnic and religious homogeneity. Nonetheless, most East Asian samples scored low on 
self-differentiation and self-containment and relatively high on other-focus, supporting 
the traditional view in the literature (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Notably, however, the 
Japanese sample scored moderately high on self-differentiation, while scoring very low 
on self-containment. Considering that these two facets are usually confounded in 
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previous measures of independence, this pattern may help to explain why Japan is 
sometimes characterized as interdependent and sometimes independent in previous 
studies measuring self-construals in Japan (see Levine et al., 2003; Matsumoto, 1999).  
Perhaps surprising to some, many of our South American samples scored 
similarly to the US sample. Hofstede (1980) originally classified many South American 
nations as collectivistic, based on data collected in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
present results, on the other hand, are more in line with recent findings reported by 
Kolstad and Horpestad (2009) and suggest that much has happened in Chile, Colombia 
and Peru since Hofstede collected his data around 40 years ago. It should be noted, 
however, that we did not sample any Central American nations. Considering that it was 
these nations that occupied the lowest position on Hofstede’s individualism index and 
that they have seen slower economic development, it is possible that the pattern of 
results may have been very different for Central American samples.  
Middle Eastern samples are less frequently featured in the self-construal 
literature. Nonetheless, Harb and Smith (2008) found that self-construals in Arab 
cultures emphasized hierarchical structures and family relationships. The emphasis on 
family was present also within the present results, as illustrated by Middle Eastern 
samples’ high position on other-focus. Moreover, the relatively high endorsement of 
self-containment may be a product of a cultural emphasis on honour, which many 
regard as characteristic of this region (Abu-Lughod, 1985; Gregg, 2005). Self-
containment involves a self that is not malleable and that does not rely on others, 
perhaps reflecting the honour code’s emphasis on toughness and machismo (Gregg, 
2005).  
Finally, there is only limited research into self-construals among African 
samples, but the existing evidence suggests that interdependence is emphasized in 
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African contexts (Adams, 2005; Chasiotis, Bender, Kiessling, & Hofer, 2010; Cheng et 
al., 2011; Eaton & Louw, 2000; Hansen, Postmes, van de Vinne, & van Thiel, 2012; Ma 
& Schoeneman, 1997). Low to moderate scores on self-differentiation support this 
notion and low self-containment scores suggest that the context has great influence on 
how the self is defined, which is in line with descriptions in the anthropological 
literature (Beattie, 1980). However, most African samples scored relatively low on 
other-focus. Thus, the African samples are distinguished from other collectivist regions 
in that they do not emphasize this particular conception of the self. I return to this issue 
in the General Discussion (Section 6.4.2). It is important to note that there was also 
substantial variation among the African samples. The Nigerian sample scored more 
similar to East Asian samples than to other African samples on other-focus and self-
containment. The Namibian and South-African samples also scored similar to the 
European samples on self-differentiation and self-containment. These two samples are 
distinguished from our other African samples in terms of national wealth and religion, 
since they have a clearer Protestant tradition, which may be contributing to their 
similarity to some of the European samples. 
Our second question referred to why our national samples differed on the self-
construal dimensions. It is often assumed in the literature that differences in self-
construals are the product of differences in cultural-level I-C. The present study 
provided what I believe to be the first large-scale empirical test of this assumption, and 
it can be concluded that it is only partially correct. Self-differentiation was found to be 
higher in individualist nations, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. However, Hypothesis 2 
was only partially supported: other-focus was higher in collectivist nations only when 
national wealth was accounted for. Moreover, Hypothesis 3 was fully rejected, self-
containment was not higher in individualist nations, in fact the opposite relationship was 
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indicated. Thus, although nation-level I-C appears to be a very important factor to 
consider in relation to self-construals, the picture is much more complex than the 
current literature suggests.  
In addition to I-C, the present results suggested that national wealth and religion 
also need to be taken into account when explaining why self-construals differ across 
cultures. Contrary to Hypothesis 5, national wealth was a substantial positive predictor 
of other-focus. Moreover, religion explained a large proportion of variance in all three 
self-construal dimensions, most notably in self-containment.  This pattern of results, in 
combination with those for I-C, suggests that the three self-construal dimensions 
function very differently, with different antecedents. I-C provided the best explanation 
for variance in self-differentiation, national affluence in combination with I-C was the 
best predictor of other-focus, and self-containment was best predicted by religion. 
Furthermore, several other contextual variables accounted for a considerable 
proportion of variance in other-focus and self-containment. The present results 
suggested that, in addition to national wealth and collectivism, societies that are equal, 
homogenous, secular, and endorse harmony and egalitarian values and restraint (rather 
than indulgence), promote other-focus. There therefore seem to be two different ways a 
society can come to endorse this conception of the self—either through societal equality 
or through collectivist values and practices (when looking at nations of similar wealth). 
European nations tend to score high on equality (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011), 
which can explain why the European samples scored high on this dimensions. The 
similarly high scores of Middle Eastern and East Asian samples on this dimension are 
arguably more driven by collectivism. In contrast, societies that are religious, that 
endorse monumentalism, traditionalism, uncertainty avoidance and essentialism, and 
that deemphasize beliefs about a dynamic externality, appear to promote self-
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containment. As a general pattern, it seems that self-containment is endorsed in nations 
that emphasize absolutist thinking, structure and rules and deemphasize ambiguity.   
It can be concluded that I-C does not tell the whole story when it comes to 
explaining differences in self-construals. I identified several other important predictor 
variables related to the structural and normative context. It should be noted, however, 
that there may be other important contextual variables that were not included in the 
present analysis. It is also important to note that these conclusions are based on 
correlational data, and it is possible that it is instead the different constructions of the 
self that promote different types of societies or that the processes are bidirectional. 
 
6.4 General Discussion  
 The present results suggest that Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) descriptions 
were in many ways accurate—in the US the self is constructed as desiring to be unique 
and different from others, and in East Asia it is constructed as desiring to fit in and 
adapt to others. However, with two large and diverse cross-cultural datasets, including 
many national groups that are normally underrepresented in the self-construal literature, 
a more differentiated and multifaceted picture has been presented. It can be concluded 
that variation in self-construals is more complex than the two-dimensional model of 
independence and interdependence would suggest, and that a multidimensional model 
was needed to account for variation in representations of the self (Study 3). This model 
was then tested in an adult sample, which demonstrated that the structure was best 
represented as a seven-dimensional model at both individual and cultural levels of 
analysis (Study 4). Although cultural variation in correlations among the factors 
precluded an individual-level higher-order structure, I was able to identify three higher-
order dimensions at the cultural level: self-differentiation, other-focus, and self-
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containment. These dimensions showed different patterns of national sample scores and 
different nomological networks (Study 5).  
The present research found that self-differentiation was best predicted by 
individualism and to some extent also by religion, in particular Protestant rather than 
Islamic heritage. This was illustrated by the high scores of our US and European 
samples on this dimension. Other-focus was best predicted by national wealth but also 
by collectivism (when controlling for affluence), societal equality, homogeneity and 
secularism and European, Middle Eastern, and East Asian samples all scored high on 
this dimension. Finally, self-containment was best predicted by religion, 
monumentalism (vs. flexumility), and traditional rather than secular-rational values. In 
particular, it was strongly endorsed in Muslim societies. 
 
6.4.1 Dimensionality of Self-Construals 
 Traditionally, the multiple dimensions that were identified have been considered 
part of the same overarching constructs, independence and interdependence. For 
example, notions of self-reliance and consistency have been considered under the same 
umbrella as the desire to be different and to stand out as facets of independence. 
However, as was illustrated in Figure 6.1, these facets only seem to co-occur in some 
nations. In others, such as our Middle Eastern samples, an emphasis on self-containment 
was combined with a de-emphasis on self-differentiation. Hence, it would not be 
appropriate to characterize this region as either independent or interdependent. Rather, 
different domains of relatedness need to be considered separately when categorizing 
individuals or regions. It is possible that the heavy reliance on comparisons between 
North America and East Asia in previous theory and research has obscured these more 
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fine-grained distinctions. Thus, the present research provides an update on self-construal 
theory—extending the scope both geographically and theoretically. 
It is also possible that the habit of confounding these different dimensions has 
contributed to inconsistencies in the literature. As noted above, the fact that Japan is 
sometimes characterized as interdependent and sometimes as independent (see Levine et 
al., 2003; Matsumoto, 1999) could be explained in part by the fact that our Japanese 
sample scored low on self-containment but moderately high on self-differentiation. 
Hence, how “independent” Japanese people are seems to depend on which facet is being 
measured. It is important to note that the present dimensions also differ from previous 
measures of independence and interdependence by each having two poles: for example 
uniqueness is posed against fitting in/similarity, and inclusion of others in the self is 
posed against separateness of self and others. This further illustrates the point that the 
seven dimensions are not sub-factors of independence and interdependence. Although 
they can be thought of as each containing one independent and one interdependent pole, 
they do not factor together to form a higher-order dimension of independence and 
interdependence.  
Contradictory findings among national samples have led Kitayama et al. (2009) 
to conclude that explicit measures of self-construals lack validity, and they propose that 
national differences in independence and interdependence should instead be measured 
implicitly by scores on a range of experimental tasks. Their implicit approach adds an 
important level to the relationship between culture and self and has the potential to 
enrich the field in many ways. However, I disagree with their conclusion that the 
explicit measures are not meaningful. The present results indicate that with a larger 
number of national samples (Kitayama et al. studied participants in four nations) and a 
more differentiated model of self-construals, the pattern of national differences is indeed 
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meaningful and can be meaningfully explained by a range of societal variables. The 
possibility that national differences in implicit independence and interdependence may 
also be multidimensional should be noted. However, more research, with a larger 
number of nations, would be needed to investigate this possibility.   
 The importance of considering multiple dimensions was particularly salient in 
the present study at the individual level of analysis. The correlations between the seven 
dimensions varied widely in different cultural groups, suggesting that the way the 
different facets are interrelated is very much dependent on the cultural context in which 
one lives. Hence, the three broad dimensions identified at the cultural level were not 
mirrored at the individual level. This means that although cultures that are high on 
commitment to others also tend to be high on inclusion of others in the self, this is not 
automatically the case for individuals. For some participants, living in Ghana for 
example, these two dimensions were completely unrelated. The three higher-order 
dimensions are therefore not appropriate for characterizing individuals’ self-construals, 
and in order to avoid committing the ecological fallacy, the seven dimensions should 
always be considered separately at the individual level of analysis.  
  Unlike other self-construal models in the literature, the present dimensions do 
not refer to different types of relationships at different levels of inclusiveness, such as 
the individual, relational and collective self (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 
1996; Cross et al., 2000; Kashima & Hardie, 2000). Rather, different ways of being 
related to other people were identified that varied meaningfully across cultures. 
Nonetheless, focusing on different domains of relatedness, the present model does not 
rule out the possibility that conceptions of the self also vary in relation to different types 
of relationships, such as close relationships or group memberships. I used the family as 
the most common reference group as it has been shown to be the most important group 
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for most people (Fischer et al., 2009), but it would be possible to vary this category, for 
example in terms of romantic partner or the community, to see whether the same seven 
dimensions could be identified. It would also be interesting to investigate these kinds of 
relationships along the horizontal/vertical axis, in order to see the impact of a varying 
sense of equality to others.  
 
6.4.2 Self-construals at the Cultural-Level  
 The present research is one of the first empirical investigations that 
systematically tries to explain variation in self-construals across cultures using a wide 
range of nation-level variables. The results showed that self-construals are related to I-
C, but that this relationship is not as straightforward as previously thought, and several 
additional important nation-level variables were identified.  
A noteworthy finding was the unexpected positive relationship between other-
focus and national affluence. Given that collectivism has often been associated with 
lower affluence (e.g. Hofstede, 1980), the fact that other-focus was higher in wealthier 
nations may be surprising. An important question then is to understand in what ways 
other-focus is different from collectivism. The present analyses showed that other-focus 
was also related to egalitarianism (vs. hierarchy) and harmony (vs. mastery) values, 
which have also been shown to be higher in richer nations (Van Herk & Poortinga, 
2011).  
Egalitarianism (vs. hierarchy) refers to the importance of emotional attachment 
and concern about others in close interaction (in terms of loyalty, benevolence, and 
honesty) and in wider groups (in terms of equality, social justice and freedom; 
Schwartz, 1994). Other-focus overlaps conceptually with the former facet of this value 
dimension. Schwartz (1994) describes the concern about others manifest in 
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egalitarianism as a voluntary commitment, rather than being ascribed or based on 
obligation as is more typical of collectivistic cultures. It is possible that other-focus also 
represents voluntary actions and motivations, which are likely to be more prevalent in 
affluent nations. For instance, in poorer cultures where children are depended on for 
economic and utilitarian support, family relationships are often based on authority and 
obedience and there is little choice in terms of close relationships; in richer nations, in 
contrast, economic independence allows a degree of autonomy in relationships but does 
not necessarily mean emotional separateness (see Kağitçibaşi, 2005). 
The low scores of our African samples on other-focus are also in line with 
Adams and colleagues’ (Adams & Dzokoto, 2003; Adams & Plaut, 2003; Adams, 2005) 
arguments about the nature of the interdependent self in West African contexts. Based 
on extensive research into friendship and enemyship, he suggests that rather than being 
associated with pro-social orientations including desire and promotion of connections 
with other people, interdependence is the default state of being, the taken for granted 
nature of relationships. Thus, it is possible that other-focus captures a pro-social side of 
social relationships which are not highly endorsed in the African context. This would 
also suggest that the more implicit, taken for granted nature of social relationships may 
be missing in the present model of self-construals, which suggests additional self-
construal dimensions should be explored from a more emic perspective (see below in 
Section 6.4.3).    
Other-focus also shares some characteristics with harmony (vs. mastery) given 
that they both deemphasize achievement and success. In many developing nations, a 
shift has taken place from traditional to modern values. As a product of economic 
scarcity and uncertainty, these modern values emphasize economic achievement and 
growth (Inglehart, 2000). Modern values are contrasted against postmodern and post-
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materialist values in cultures which have achieved economic security. These latter 
values include self-expression, tolerance and concern for nature. Thus, it is possible that 
the lower scores on other-focus that we observed among many of our African samples 
are also a reflection of the relatively higher importance given to individual achievement 
in an economically tough environment.  
As noted above, other-focus was only positively related to collectivism when 
controlling for national affluence. Comparing Japan and the US, for example, Japan 
scored higher on other-focus and lower on autonomy (vs. embeddedness). However, 
comparing Japan and Cameroon, Japan scored higher on both dimensions. This 
illustrates the problem of relying on comparisons of a small number of nations when 
drawing conclusions about culture. It also highlights the problematic assumption that all 
collectivistic cultures will share the same attributes when in fact factors such as 
affluence and modernization can generate fundamental differences (Cheng et al., 2011). 
Following the argument made above, it is possible that when removing differences in 
choice and autonomy in relationships, which are caused by economic differences, other-
focus and collectivism are actually not that different. These findings highlight the 
pervasive influence of national affluence and raise the question that was noted in the 
General Introduction of whether it should be considered part of, or separate from, 
culture and whether culture and economic development can ever be completely 
disentangled (see Hofstede, 2006; Javidan et al., 2006; Smith, 2006, for a discussion). 
Adams et al. (2012) suggest that rather than trying to disentangle culture and wealth, we 
should study the patterns in the world and the corresponding patterns in the mind, 
regardless of what has produced them, and trying to separate ‘the structural’ and ‘the 
cultural’ may not be helpful since it can obscure relationships of power.  
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Moreover, the fact that self-differentiation and other-focus were both related to 
I-C, may highlight different facets of collectivism. Kim (1994) distinguished the 
relational mode of collectivism, which refers to devotion and close interdependence 
where people share the thoughts and feelings of others, and the coexistence mode of 
collectivism, which refers to the importance of social norms and roles in public 
behaviour in order to maintain harmony. The former is very similar to the present other-
focus whereas the latter corresponds to low self-differentiation, i.e. harmony as opposed 
to uniqueness. The importance of separating these facets is illustrated by the European 
samples, for example the Italian and Swedish samples, which scored high on the former 
and low on the latter. Thus, the present findings support the notion that I-C can take 
different forms which may show different cross-cultural patterns (Brewer & Chen, 
2007; Green, Deschamps, & Páez, 2005; Kağitçibaşi, 1997; Oyserman et al., 2002). 
However, I-C explained only a small proportion of variance in self-containment 
and was far from the only important predictor of other-focus. In the same way as I-C is 
here considered to be more than only self-construals, these results show that self-
construals are more than simply a reflection of I-C. The current preoccupation with I-C 
in the self-construal literature can therefore be considered problematic. It presents a 
danger of reducing self-construals to cultural stereotypes and ignores many other 
important ways in which cultures differ (Gregg, 2007). Among these additional factors, 
religious heritage stood out as particularly important alongside national wealth. This is 
in line with findings by Georgas et al. (2004) and by Inglehart & Baker (2000) who 
found that religious traditions influenced psychological variables independently of 
economic development.  Thus, although the importance of the church has diminished in 
many nations, in particular in Western Europe, the influence of religious traditions is 
still great. This finding supports the notion that it is not only religious beliefs of 
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individuals that matter, but also the religious heritage of a nation (Inglehart & Baker, 
2000). Different religious traditions provide different answers to the question of how the 
self and one’s relation to others are defined, and are therefore a powerful explanation 
for patterns of cross-cultural differences in self-construal. I therefore agree with 
arguments that psychological research needs to pay more attention to how religious 
traditions interact with national cultures (see Johnson, Hill, & Cohen, 2011; Saroglou & 
Cohen, 2011, in recent special issue in Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology).  
 
6.4.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
The most common self-construal scales were used as the starting point for this 
research, which are based on Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) original descriptions of 
self-construals, and the dimensions I identified correspond to their descriptions in many 
ways. However, as noted above, Markus and Kitayama’s focus was on differences 
between the US and East-Asia and their conceptions of self-construals were driven by 
this contrast (Markus & Kitayama, 2003). Thus, the starting point for the present 
research largely reflected Markus and Kitayama’s theory and the emic input was 
limited. There may therefore be further differences in self-construals that are salient in 
other parts of the world but which are yet unexplored, as Markus and Kitayama (2003) 
themselves have pointed out. Hence, more indigenous research from African, Middle 
Eastern, and South American cultures may identify additional important dimensions of 
self-construals (see Kim & Berry, 1993). For instance, as noted above, there may be an 
implicit, taken for granted nature of social relationships which is more common in 
African contexts which is not captured by the present model. The seven-dimensional 
model should therefore not be considered final but instead be thought of as a step 
towards a more culturally decentred model of self-construals.   
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Moreover, the focus in the present research was on clarifying cross-cultural 
differences in self-construals and explaining these differences in terms of different 
national contexts. Hence, less attention was paid to correlates of self-construals at the 
individual level. Future research should therefore explore the antecedents of individual 
differences in the seven self-construal dimensions. A further limitation was that I used 
only three items per self-construal dimension. Although this is sufficient for the purpose 
of testing the factorial structure of self-construals, it is not ideal from the point of view 
of scale development. Hence, Chapter 7 describes the development and validation of an 
extended version of this scale, as well as showing how the separate dimensions can be 
useful in predicting different psychological and behavioural outcomes.  
 
6.4.4 Conclusion  
Based on data from 38 diverse nations, including both student and adult 
samples, it can be concluded that cross-cultural variation in people’s sense of self is not 
well represented by the broad constructs of independence and interdependence.  Rather, 
this thesis presents a more multifaceted picture which at the individual level involves 
seven dimensions of variation in how people construe themselves and their relations 
with others. At a cultural level of analysis, these can also be organised into three higher-
order dimensions, which can be thought of as referring to different social constructions 
of the self. This new model of self-construals provides a greater understanding of 
cultural diversity in representations of the self. Moreover, beyond simply describing this 
diversity, significant progress has been made towards explaining it in terms of societal 
structures and norms, most importantly in terms of I-C, affluence, and religion. These 
findings provide insight into the factors that shape people’s conceptions of the self 
across cultures and therefore shed new light on the link between culture and self. 
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Gaining a richer understanding of cross-cultural diversity in the self and its likely 
origins has the potential to make self-construals more relevant and useful as explanatory 
constructs. It raises new and interesting questions and opens up the potential for novel 
predictions in diverse areas such as health promotion, education, business management, 
and international relations. 
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Chapter 7  
Self-construals at the Individual Level 
 
Chapter 6 identified multiple dimensions of self-construals which showed 
meaningful cross-cultural patterns and nomological networks at the cultural level. These 
findings provide insight into the meaning of constructions of the self across cultures and 
they can help us understand differences between national or cultural groups. However, 
so far in this thesis I have paid less attention to the individual level of self-construals. 
Chapter 6 showed that individual constructions of the self should be organized into 
seven different dimensions, referring to different ways of seeing the self and its relation 
to others. Unlike at the cultural level of analysis, these dimensions did not form higher-
order dimensions but should be considered separately. Nonetheless, questions still 
remain with regards to how these seven dimensions can be useful in understanding the 
role of self-construals in psychological outcomes and behaviour.  Moreover, as noted in 
Chapter 6, the scale measuring the seven dimensions was very limited, which could be a 
particular problem at the individual level where reliability is of greater concern.   
Chapter 7 therefore had two aims: firstly, to improve and extend the scale which 
was developed in Study 4 and secondly, to explore how the seven dimensions of self-
construals relate to a range of outcomes, in particular variables related to socio-
emotional adjustment. Most importantly, I investigated whether the multiple dimensions 
would show a differentiated pattern of relationships with these outcomes, which would 
highlight the value of using multiple dimensions. To this end, I used samples from the 
UK, Romania, Thailand, and Malaysia.  
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7.1 Study 6: Self-construals predicting socio-emotional 
adjustment 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggested that self-construals fundamentally 
influence cognition, emotion and motivation such that for example people with 
independent construals of the self will pay more attention to information that confirms 
their internal attributes and will express more self-focused emotions. People with 
interdependent constructions of the self, on the other hand, will pay more attention to 
contextual stimuli and are more likely to express other-focused emotions. Since then, a 
large body of research has built on and extended these claims and self-construals have 
been used to explain a wide range of psychological and behavioural outcomes (see 
Cross et al., 2011).  
In this study I chose to focus on outcome variables related to socio-emotional 
adjustment, such as wellbeing, resilience, and constructive psychological functioning, 
which have received less attention in the literature compared to cognitive outcomes 
(Cross et al., 2011). These included life-satisfaction, depression, social anxiety, self-
efficacy, self-esteem, coping strategies, narcissism, modesty, and authenticity. There are 
indications in the literature that independence is related to higher life-satisfaction and to 
lower depression and social anxiety (Elliott & Coker, 2008; Hyun, 2000; Okazaki, 
1997; Sato & McCann, 1998; Trung Lam, 2005), higher self-esteem (Oyserman et al., 
2002; Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Lai, 1999), higher authenticity (Heine, 2003; Ito & 
Kodama, 2007), higher narcissism (Konrath, Bushman, & Grove, 2009), and more 
direct coping strategies (Cross, 1995). On the other hand, interdependence has been 
shown to be related to higher depression and social anxiety (Okazaki, 1997; Sato & 
McCann, 1998), lower self-esteem (Singelis et al., 1999), relational and collective 
136 
 
 
 
coping styles (Hardie, Critchley, & Morris, 2006), and higher modesty (Kurman, 2011; 
Chen, Bond, Bacon Chan, Donghui Tang, & Buchtel, 2009). 
However, there are also indications that these relationships are in fact much 
more complex than what is suggested above. For instance, the relationship between self-
construals and life-satisfaction has been shown to be mediated by self-esteem and 
relationship harmony (Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997) and the link between self-
construal and depression has been argued to depend on social anxiety (Okazaki, 1997), 
while other studies have found self-construals to be unrelated to these variables (Lam, 
2006).  Moreover, these relationships appear to depend on the cultural context. For 
example, Cheng et al. (2011) found that independence was related to wellbeing in 
Western countries whereas the same was true for interdependence in sub-Saharan 
African regions, and East Asian participants’ wellbeing was promoted by an integration 
of the two. Thus, it is clear that the relationship between self-construals and socio-
emotional adjustment is far from straightforward and may depend on a range of 
different conditions.  
Given this complexity, it is likely that there is something to be gained from 
refining the conception of self-construals. As Cross et al. (2011) suggest, the traditional 
measures of self-construals may be unable to distinguish between more fine-grained 
meanings which have differential impact on wellbeing and resilience. In line with these 
arguments, Hardin (2006) found that the specific dimensions of self-construals 
explained more variance in social anxiety than higher-order independence and 
interdependence. 
The aim of this present study was to test whether the seven self-construal 
dimensions showed different patterns of relationships to a range of socio-emotional 
adjustment outcomes and whether they could therefore be considered important in 
137 
 
 
 
different psychological processes. Based on an intuitive understanding of the meaning 
of the seven self-construal dimensions, some predictions were made. I predicted that 
self-direction would be positively related to self-efficacy and direct and active coping 
styles, such as confrontive coping and planful problem solving. Uniqueness was 
predicted to be positively related to self-esteem and narcissism and negatively related to 
modesty and social anxiety. On the other hand, harmony was predicted to be positively 
related to social anxiety, modesty, and relationship harmony and negatively related to 
narcissism and confrontive coping. Inclusion and commitment were both predicted to be 
positively related to social support as a coping style and inclusion was also 
hypothesized to relate negatively to distancing as a way of coping. Self-reliance was 
predicted to positively relate to self-controlling coping and acceptance of responsibility 
and negatively to social support, and consistency was predicted to be important for 
authenticity.  Given that the seven-dimensional model has not previously been used in 
the cross-cultural literature, I did not make any specific predictions of how these 
relationships would vary across the four national samples.  
 
7.1.1 Method 
7.1.1.1 Participants and procedure 
 The study included data from four nations (Malaysia, Romania, Thailand and the 
UK), although only a subset of the measures were included in Malaysia. Participants in 
the UK were undergraduate psychology students (N = 106), who completed the 
questionnaire in their own time in return for course credit, and high-school students (N 
= 87), who completed the questionnaire during normal teaching time. Participants in 
Romania, Thailand, and Malaysia were undergraduate students who also completed the 
study during normal teaching hours (see Table 7.1 for demographic details).  
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Table 7.1 Demographic Details Study 6 
Country N Mean age SD 
% 
females 
Language 
Malaysia 465 22.81 1.31 51 Malay 
Romania 435 22.04 3.59 70 Romanian 
Thailand 534 20.11 2.30 71 Thai 
UK 193 18.89 2.94 71 English 
 
7.1.1.2 Instruments  
Self-construals scale. I included 58 items, with eight or nine items per dimension, 
in order to have a wide selection of items when refining the scale and allowing for some 
items to be dropped (see Appendix C). These were designed based on the existing 21 
items, aiming to add fidelity more than bandwidth.  In the same way as in Study 4, 
participants were asked “How well does each of these statements describe you” and the 
items were rated on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (exactly), with 
three intermediate anchor-points. In the scale-refinement part of the analyses, I 
controlled for acquiescence by modelling it as a latent factor (see below). In order to 
control for acquiescence in the regression analyses, however, I identified nine pairs of 
items which had almost exact reverse meaning (e.g. “You see yourself the same way 
even in different social environments” vs. “You see yourself differently in different 
social environments”; Appendix C shows which items were included in these pairs). 
Given that it would not make meaningful sense to answer positive to both items in these 
pairs, a mean across these 18 items provided an improved measure of acquiescence 
compared to ipsatization based on all items. This mean was subtracted from each of the 
58 items. 
Life-satisfaction. I used the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) which includes five items (e.g. “So far I have got the 
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important things I want in life”) and which were rated on seven-point scales ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Reliabilities were good in all four 
national samples (Malaysia: α = .81;  Romania: α = .81; Thailand: α = .81; UK: α = .85). 
I decided not to control for acquiescence when computing these variables since most of 
the outcome variables did not include any reversed items, which makes it difficult to 
calculate an acquiescence score for each participant. I did not aim to compare means of 
the outcome variables across the national groups in this study, which would have been 
problematic with acquiescence as a confound. Rather, the aim was to look at 
relationships between dimensions of self-construals and these outcomes, and given that 
I had controlled for acquiescence in the self-construal dimensions, spurious correlations 
because of response style were unlikely. 
Depression. Participants were asked to rate a range of feelings and behaviours in 
terms of how frequently they had experienced them during the past week (see Radloff, 
1977, 1991). I used 20 items (e.g. “I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother 
me”) which were rated on four-point scales ranging from 1 (rarely or none of the time) 
to 4 (most or all of the time). Reliabilities were good in all four national samples 
(Malaysia: α = .86;  Romania: α = .90; Thailand: α = .86; UK: α = .92). 
Self-esteem. I used the Single Item Self-Esteem Scale (SISE; Robins, Hendin, & 
Trzesniewski, 2001) which, as the name suggests, contains one item (I have high self-
esteem). This item was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). This 
one item measure has been shown to function in a very similar way  to longer, more 
traditional measures of self-esteem (Robins et al., 2001).      
Self-efficacy. This variable was measured by 10 items (e.g. “I can always manage 
to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough”) which were rated on four-point scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (exactly true; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). 
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Reliabilities were good in all four national samples (Malaysia: α = .89;  Romania: α = 
.85; Thailand: α = .82; UK: α = .84). 
Social anxiety. I used six items to measure social anxiety (e.g. “When mixing 
socially I am uncomfortable”) which were rated on five-point scales ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (extremely; see Mattick & Clarke, 1998). This variable was not included in 
Malaysia. Reliabilities were good in the three national samples where it was measured 
(Romania: α = .83; Thailand: α = .83; UK: α = .86). 
Narcissism. I used the short version of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-
16; Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006). This measure includes 16 pairs of items where 
participants chose between a narcissistic response (e.g. “I really like to be the center of 
attention”) and a non-narcissistic response (e.g. “It makes me uncomfortable to be the 
center of attention”) as closest to their feelings and beliefs about themselves. The 
narcissitic repsonse was coded as 1 and the non-narcisitic response was coded as 0 and a 
mean was calculated across all 16 items. Reliabilites in the three national samples where 
this variable was included was good  (Romania: α = .71; Thailand: α = .70; UK: α = 
.70). 
Modesty. This variable was measured by seven items (e.g. “I feel uncomfortable 
whenever I have to describe my successes to others”) and was rated on five-point scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely; see Cialdini, Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-
Dion, & Heszen, 1998). Reliabilities were good in Romania (α = .75) and in the UK (α 
= .83) and acceptable in Thailand (α = .66). This variable was not included in Malaysia. 
  Authenticity. I measured the tripartite model of authenticity comprising of 
authentic living (e.g. “I live in accordance with my values and beliefs”), self-alienation 
(e.g. “I feel alienated from myself”), and accepting external influence (e.g. “Other 
people influence me greatly”; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). The 
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latter two dimensions are measuring lack of authenticity. These three dimensions all 
comprise of four items each, however, one item from the authentic living dimension (“I 
am true to myself in most situations”) was not included in the UK analyses because it 
had substantial negative impact on reliability in this sample
47
. Reliability of authentic 
living was still low in the UK and results should therefore be treated with caution 
(authentic living: UK α = .53, Romania α = .63, and Thailand α = .66). Reliabilities of 
the other two dimensions were good in all three samples (self-alienation: Romania α = 
.78, UK α = .87, Thailand α = .78; accepting external influence: Romania α = .73, UK α 
= .76, Thailand α = .74). Items were rated on five-point scales ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (extremely). These three dimensions were not measured in Malaysia.  
Relationship harmony. I used the Interpersonal Relationship Harmony Inventory 
(IRHI; Kwan et al., 1997) which assess the degree of harmony participants have 
achieved in different relationships. Participants were asked to specify their five most 
important relationships and indicate the gender of the targets and the types of 
relationships (e.g. friend, family, classmate etc.). They were then asked to indicate the 
degree of harmony characterising each relationship on seven-point scales ranging from 
1 (very low) to 7 (very high). These five ratings were then averaged to create a 
relationship harmony score. Reliabilities were acceptable in Romania (α = .62) and 
Thailand (α = .61) but slightly lower in the UK (α = .58). 
Coping styles. These were measured using a modified version of the Ways of 
Coping checklist (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986; 
Folkman & Lazarus, 1985). The original version includes 68 items, describing a broad 
range of cognitive and behavioural coping strategies. However, because of space 
                                                          
47
 I kept this item in the other two samples since it contributed substantially to the 
reliability there and the analyses were run separately for each sample. Parallel analyses 
without this item in Romania and Thailand revealed almost identical results.  
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restrictions the number of items had to be substantially reduced to 35 in total. The 
format of the scale was also modified. Rather than asking about coping styles in relation 
to a specific stressful situation, I used the following instructions:  “Sometimes people 
have problems or feel upset about things, for example when they have an argument with 
a friend, fail to achieve something they really wanted to achieve, or when they are 
treated unfairly. When this happens, they may do different things to solve the problem 
or to make themselves feel better. Below is a list of things people may do when faced 
with a problem. For each statement, circle the number that represents the response that 
best describes how often you usually do the behaviour when you have a problem. There 
are no right or wrong answers, just indicate how often you usually do each thing.” The 
scale measures eight different dimensions of coping: confrontive coping (four items, 
e.g.  “Stand my ground and fight for what I want”); self-controlling coping (five items, 
e.g.  “I try not to act too hastily or follow my first hunch”); seeking social support (five 
items, e.g. “ I talk to someone about how I am feeling”; accepting responsibility (four 
items, e.g.  “I criticize or lecture myself”); planful problem-solving (four items, e.g. “I 
make a plan of action and follow it”); positive reappraisal (four items, e.g.  “I change or 
grow as a person in a good way”); escape-avoidance (five items, e.g. “I hope a miracle 
will happen”); distancing (four items, “I go on as if nothing has happened”). These were 
rated on five-point scales ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (most of the time). Given that the 
number of items per dimension had to be reduced, reliabilities were generally low 
(confrontive coping: Romania α = .44, UK α = .53, Thailand α = .44; self-controlling 
coping: Romania α = .48, UK α = .50, Thailand α = .46; seeking social support: 
Romania α = .62, UK α = .82, Thailand α = .67; accepting responsibility: Romania α = 
.49, UK α = .41, Thailand α = .23; planful problem-solving: Romania α = .67, UK α = 
.55, Thailand α = .59; positive reappraisal: Romania α = .59, UK α = .60, Thailand α = 
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.53; escape-avoidance: Romania α = .50, UK α = .60, Thailand α = .33; distancing: 
Romania α = .51, UK α = .57, Thailand α = .49. Despite their low reliabilities, I decided 
to retain these variables in the analyses in order to provide as much of a full picture as 
possible of how the self-construal dimensions relate to outcomes. It should be noted, 
however, that these analyses provide only an initial overview of patterns of relationships 
and more research with more reliable measures will be needed into the mechanisms of 
coping and how these are influenced by constructions of the self.  
 
7.1.2 Results 
7.1.2.1 Refining and testing the self-construal scale 
The aim of these analyses was to find a final set of items which would make up 
the optimal measurement of the seven self-construal factors and show the most cross-
cultural comparability. In a similar way to Study 1 (see Chapter 5), I ran a series of 
single group and multigroup CFA in MPlus version 5. Once again I modelled 
acquiescence as a separate uncorrelated factor which loaded onto every indicator at a 
fixed value of 1(Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al., 2003). Model fit was assessed using the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), 
and the Standard Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR). Values of CFI above .90, 
RMSEA up to .08, and SRMR up to .10 are seen as acceptable (Kline, 2005). 
Achieving configural invariance. Firstly, I tested the seven-dimensional model 
with all 58 items in the four samples separately. Any items that did not load 
significantly on their respective factor or loaded opposite to the intended direction in 
any of the four national samples were removed from further analyses, which brought the 
number of items down to 56 (items 8 and 9 removed, see Appendix C). The fit of the 
model with the remaining items was still poor in all four samples and it was clear from 
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the modification indices that several items had a large number of cross-loadings. In 
order to identify the most problematic items, I inspected the modification indices 
closely and I ran partial correlations where each item was set to correlate with the 
means of the other dimensions, while controlling for the mean of its intended 
dimension. From these analyses I found 21 problematic items, which were removed 
from further analyses. I tested the resulting model in each national sample separately 
(see Model 1 – 4, Table 7.2) and as can be seen from the table, all three fit indices 
suggested good fit in Romania and the UK and RMSEA and SRMR indicated good fit 
in Thailand and Malaysia (Appendix C shows which items were included in the final 
model).  
This difference between fit indices deserves some further discussion. CFI has 
been criticised for being based on an independence model, which assumes zero 
covariances between variables. Such a baseline or null model is unrealistic in most SEM 
research (see Kline, 2005). Rigdon (1996) argued that compared to CFI, RMSEA is 
more useful in re-evaluating earlier research and confirming existing models because no 
such baseline model is involved in the calculation of RMSEA. SRMR is similar to 
RMSEA in that it is based on residuals rather than comparison with baseline model. Hu 
and Bentler (1998) recommend using SRMR in combination with either RMSEA or 
CFI. In line with the argument above, considering the aim of Study 6 was to confirm the 
seven-dimensional model identified in Study 4, it seems that SRMR and RMSEA are 
more useful for evaluating model fit in the present analyses. 
Testing metric and scalar invariance. I then created a multigroup model, again 
including a method factor, analyzing all samples simultaneously (see Table 7.2, Model 
5), and I tested the impact on model fit of constraining first the factor loadings (for 
metric invariance: Model 6) and then the intercepts (for scalar variance: Model 7) to be  
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Table 7.2 Single-group and Multigroup Invariance Analysis Study 6 
Model χ² df CFI RMSEA 
RMSEA  
90% CI SRMR 
LL UL 
Model 1, Malaysia seven-
factor model 
1527.51*** 538 .81 .06 .06 .07 .08 
Model 2, Romania seven-
factor model 
1045.21*** 538 .90 .05 .04 .05 .06 
Model 3, Thailand seven-
factor model 
1251.60*** 538 .86 .05 .05 .06 .07 
Model 4, UK seven-factor 
model 
862.75*** 538 .90 .05 .05 .06 .08 
Model 5, multigroup 
configural invariance  
4687.06*** 2152 .87 .06 .05 .06 .07 
Model 6, factor loadings 
constrained  
 5221.18*** 2257 .84 .06 .06 .06 .10 
Model 7, factor loadings 
and intercepts constrained 
6110.40*** 2338 .80 .06 .06 .07 .10 
Model 8, factor loadings 
and 28 intercepts 
constrained 
5580.22*** 2317 .83 .06 .06 .06 .10 
Model 9, factor loadings 
and 21 intercepts 
constrained 
5380.65*** 2296 .84 .06 .06 .06 .10 
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; RMSEA = Root mean square error of 
approximation. CI = Confidence intervals; LL = Lower level; UL = Upper level. 
Multilevel analyses did not provide confidence intervals for RMSEA. 
*** p < .001. 
 
equal across samples. The impact of constraining factor loadings and intercepts was 
small according to RMSEA and SRMR, which suggests that invariance is tenable. 
However, CFI dropped substantially, especially when the intercepts were constrained. I 
therefore investigated whether CFI could be improved by testing for ‘partial intercept 
invariance’ (Byrne et al., 1989) in the same way as in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.2.1).  
By inspecting modification indices, I identified seven problematic intercepts 
(one per factor). Freeing these intercepts improved CFI to some extent (see Model 8). 
Freeing another seven intercepts (again one per factor) provided an additional small 
146 
 
 
 
improvement (see Model 9) and reached the same level of invariance as when only 
factor loadings were constrained. Hence, it did not seem worthwhile freeing more 
intercepts.  
Overall, these results provide a somewhat mixed picture. Configural, metric, and 
scalar invariance of the seven factor could be considered tenable when assessing model 
fit according to RMSEA and SRMR. CFI on the other hand suggested a poor fit for the 
constrained models. As noted above, there are arguments in favour of using RMSEA 
rather than CFI when confirming models from previous research and hence the present 
results provide some confidence in the cross-cultural validity of the 35 item self-
construal scale.  
Latent mean differences. Considering these indications of invariance, I then 
moved on to look at how the four samples differed in their levels of endorsement of the 
self-construal dimensions. When investigating latent means, groups are compared 
against one reference group which has its mean set to zero. In line with common 
practice in the literature where other cultures are compared against the West (e.g. 
Oyserman et al., 2002), I chose the UK sample as the reference group. A significant 
result should therefore be interpreted as a significant difference from the UK sample. 
Table 7.3 shows that the Thai and Malaysian samples scored lower than UK participants 
on uniqueness whereas the Romania sample scored higher. The opposite pattern was 
observed for harmony. Considering Study 5 found self-differentiation (high uniqueness 
and low harmony) to be related to individualism, this pattern fits in with the common 
view in the literature which describes East Asia as less individualistic (e.g. Triandis, 
1995). Interestingly, these results suggest that Romania may be more individualistic 
than the UK, which was also the case in Study 5. Malaysian and Thai participants 
scored lower on self-direction whereas the Romania sample did not differ from the UK 
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sample. British participants scored the lowest on inclusion and the Malay and Thai 
samples also scored higher on commitment, while Romanian participants scored lower 
than the UK sample. These results differ from those in Study 5 where the UK scored 
high on inclusion and commitment—a discrepancy which could be the result of the 
present student samples and the large proportion of rural UK participants in Study 5. In 
terms of self-reliance, the UK and Thai samples did not differ, whereas the Malaysian 
and Romanian samples scored higher. Finally, the Malaysian, Thai and UK samples did 
not differ on consistency but the Romanian sample scored higher. Mirroring results 
from Study 5, the Romanian sample was again found to score relatively high on self-
reliance and consistency, whereas unlike the previous study where the Thai sample 
score higher on these dimensions, the present results suggested comparable levels 
between the Thai and UK sample.  
Table 7.3 also shows reliabilities based on ipsatized scores for each of the seven 
dimensions, which were good or acceptable in all four samples.  
 
Table 7.3 Latent Means and Reliabilities Study 6 
 Malaysia Romania Thailand UK 
   Mean α  Mean α  Mean α Mean α 
Uniqueness - 0.24*      .73   0.33** .78 - 0.50*** .80 0.00 .84 
Harmony   0.98***       .62 - 0.23* .73   0.85*** .68 0.00 .80 
Self-
direction 
- 0.87***       .63 - 0.05 .76 - 0.43*** .72 0.00 .80 
Inclusion   0.87***       .80   0.57*** .71   0.70*** .73 0.00 .77 
Commitment   0.25* .65 - 0.50*** .70   0.37** .65 0.00 .77 
Self-reliance   0.17** .73   0.76*** .84   0.00 .85 0.00 .91 
Consistency   0.33       .65   0.75*** .86   0.18 .77 0.00 .92 
Note. Table is showing standardized estimates. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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7.1.2.2 Self-construal dimensions predicting outcomes 
Given that I was unable to control for acquiescence among the outcome 
variables and these variables were not tested for invariance, I considered it safest to 
conduct single country analyses. The aim of the study was not first and foremost a 
comparison between countries, but a comparison of the different self-construal 
dimensions—hence, parallel analysis seemed appropriate.  
Zero-order correlations between self-construal dimensions and the outcomes in 
each national sample can be seen in Appendix D. These results confirm the findings 
from Study 4 that individual-level correlations among the self-construal dimensions 
show a diverse pattern across different samples. For example, although uniqueness and 
harmony were negatively related in the Romania, Thai and UK samples, they were 
unrelated in the Malay sample. Similarly, consistency and uniqueness were substantially 
negatively correlated among Malay participants, they were unrelated in the Romanian 
and Thai samples, and positively related in the UK sample. Thus, these findings support 
the conclusion that self-construals dimensions at the individual level should be 
considered separately. Next, I entered the seven self-construal dimensions into a series 
of regression models, one for each outcome variable. The results of these analyses can 
be seen in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
Depression and life-satisfaction. I had made no specific predictions in relation to 
these variables. The results suggested that inclusion (Malaysia and Thailand) and self-
reliance (Malaysia and Romania) were the most important self-construal dimensions to 
wellbeing. In the Romanian sample, a high sense of consistency also contributed to 
lower depression and higher life-satisfaction. Interestingly, a high sense of self-direction 
appears to have a negative impact on wellbeing in the Malay and the UK samples.  
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Table 7.4 Self-construal Dimensions Predicting Socio-emotional Adjustment Outcomes  
      Malaysia        Romania       Thailand UK 
Depression         
Uniqueness   .00  -.04  -.09  -.03 
Harmony  -.04  -.03  -.02  -.01 
Self-direction   .00   .04  -.05   .10 
Inclusion  -.14*   .01  -.23***  -.01 
Commitment   .04  -.07  -.05  -.02 
Self-reliance  -.15**  -.19***  -.04  -.05 
Consistency   .04  -.23***  -.04  -.02 
Life-satisfaction          
Uniqueness   .03  -.07   .13**  -.02 
Harmony  -.03   .02  -.09  -.14 
Self-direction  -.23***  -.08  -.04  -.27** 
Inclusion  -.04   .05   .15**   .06 
Commitment  -.01   .01   .04   .05 
Self-reliance   .06  .20***   .01   .12 
Consistency  -.05  .10*   .09   .03 
Self-efficacy         
Uniqueness   .10*   .08   .17***   .03 
Harmony  -.03   .05   .02  -.05 
Self-direction  -.04   .20**   .11*  -.20* 
Inclusion   .07  .19***   .07  -.09 
Commitment  -.05  -.09  -.02  -.05 
Self-reliance   .25***  .29***   .25***   .37*** 
Consistency   .03   .06   .11*   .10 
Relationship Harmony       
Uniqueness  -.03   .00   .07  -.01 
Harmony   .08  -.05  -.01  -.11 
Self-direction  -.20***   .00  -.07  -.30** 
Inclusion  -.05   .13*   .21***   .09 
Commitment   .08   .08   .01   .09 
Self-reliance   .05   .04  -.09   .10 
Consistency  -.08   .05   .08  -.06 
Narcissism        
Uniqueness    .23***   .30***  .16* 
Harmony   -.12**  -.08 -.29*** 
Self-direction    .05   .05 -.10 
Inclusion   -.04  -.13** -.17* 
Commitment   -.12**  -.14** -.18* 
Self-reliance    .08   .00  .11 
Consistency   -.14**  -.04 -.11 
Social anxiety        
Uniqueness    .11*  -.18*** -.02 
Harmony    .11*  -.05  .31*** 
Self-direction   -.08  -.04  .03 
Inclusion   -.17**  -.23*** -.11 
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  Romania Thailand UK 
Commitment    .11*  -.00 -.16** 
Self-reliance   -.22***  -.13** -.05 
Consistency   -.09  -.06 -.05 
Modesty       
Uniqueness   -.04  -.13**  .07 
Harmony    .14**   .00  .31*** 
Self-direction    .03  -.00  .03 
Inclusion   -.02  -.20***  .06 
Commitment    .20***   .03 -.06 
Self-reliance   -.03   .01  .13 
Consistency    .05   .05  .10 
Self-esteem       
Uniqueness    .11*   .26***  .19* 
Harmony   -.05  -.10* -.10 
Self-direction    .09   .03 -.13 
Inclusion   -.02   .03 -.02 
Commitment   -.07  -.03 -.10 
Self-reliance    .07   .12*  .12 
Consistency    .09  -.04  .12 
Authentic living       
Uniqueness    .11*   .21***  .06 
Harmony    .01  -.07 -.22** 
Self-direction    .08   .11* -.10 
Inclusion    .09   .15**  .01 
Commitment    .03   .08  .09 
Self-reliance    .26***   .19***  .24** 
Consistency    .10   .14**  .22** 
Self-alienation       
Uniqueness   -.01  -.14**  .09 
Harmony    .10*  -.02  .10 
Self-direction    .03  -.10*  .18 
Inclusion   -.10*  -.31***  .01 
Commitment    .09  -.01 -.04 
Self-reliance   -.25***  -.12* -.20* 
Consistency   -.21***  -.06 -.04 
External influence       
Uniqueness   -.02  -.16*** -.09 
Harmony    .19***   .09*  .25*** 
Self-direction   -.15**  -.15** -.14 
Inclusion   -.03  -.24*** -.05 
Commitment    .05   .08 -.05 
Self-reliance   -.28***  -.24*** -.14 
Consistency   -.12**  -.16*** -.24** 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Other socio-emotional adjustment outcomes. Self-efficacy was most strongly 
and positively predicted by self-reliance in all four groups, whereas self-direction 
showed a contradictory pattern—it appeared to contribute to the one’s sense of self-
efficacy in Romania, as predicted, but have opposite effect in the UK. Thus, although 
self-reliance and self-direction appear to fulfil a similar function in Romania, this was 
not the case in any of the other samples, in fact they appear to have the opposite effect 
in the UK. Uniqueness was also found to contribute to a higher sense of self-efficacy in 
the Thai sample, and inclusion seemed to have a similar function among Romanian 
participants. In terms of relationship harmony, I had predicted that harmony would be 
the most important self-construal dimension. This was not the case in any of the 
samples. Rather, self-direction was a negative predictor in the Malay and the UK 
samples and inclusion was a positive predictor in the Romanian and Thai samples.  
As predicted, narcissism was positively predicted by uniqueness in all three 
samples for which there was available data and negatively predicted by harmony in the 
UK and Romanian samples. Although with generally smaller effects, commitment and 
inclusion were also negative predictors in all samples, with the exception of inclusion 
among Romanian participants. In terms of social anxiety, I predicted that a self that 
emphasised harmony would also be more socially anxious whereas a self constructed in 
terms of uniqueness would show the opposite effect. In fact, uniqueness was only a 
negative predictor in the Thai sample and harmony was a positive predictor in the UK 
sample, with a very weak positive effect in the Romanian sample. Rather it appears that 
inclusion and self-reliance are more important for low social anxiety in Romania and 
Thailand. I had made the same predictions for modesty as for social anxiety, and the 
results showed a similar pattern. Uniqueness as a negative predictor in the Thai sample 
and harmony was a positive predictor in the Romanian and UK samples. In the 
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Romanian sample, however, it was inclusion which was the most important (negative) 
predictor and commitment was the most important (positive) predictor. Consistency was 
originally hypothesized to be an important predictor of authenticity. This was confirmed 
in terms of accepting external influence in all three samples and for authentic living in 
the Thai and UK samples. In Romania, on the other hand, consistency was a negative 
predictor of self-alienation. However, a range of other self-construal dimensions were 
also important for authenticity, most notably self-reliance which positively predicted 
authentic living and negatively predicted self-alienation and accepting external 
influence in all three samples. Uniqueness also seems important to authenticity in 
Thailand whereas endorsing harmony appear to lead to low levels of authenticity in the 
UK and Romania. Finally, as predicted, uniqueness positively predicted self-esteem in 
all samples, although the effect was small in the Romanian sample.    
Coping styles. Self-construal dimensions predicting coping styles are shown in 
Table 7.5. Confrontive coping was hypothesised to be positively predicted by self-
direction and negatively predicted by harmony. The former prediction was not 
confirmed whereas the latter was—harmony was a negative predictor in all three 
samples, with a particularly strong effect in the UK sample. I predicted that self-
controlling coping would be positively related to self-reliance which was confirmed in 
all samples although the effects were small among Romanian and Thai participants. 
Instead, harmony was a stronger positive predictor in all three samples. Coping in terms 
of social support was predicted to be more important among people who emphasise 
inclusion and commitment in the construction of their self and less important among 
people who are highly self-reliant. These predictions were partially supported—
inclusion was a positive predictor in the Romanian sample and self-reliance was a 
negative predictor among Romanian and Thai participants, but commitment was   
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Table 7.5 Self-construal Dimensions Predicting Different Coping Styles Study 6 
                          Romania                 Thailand                    UK 
Confrontive        
Uniqueness  -.14**   .14**  -.03 
Harmony  -.35***  -.19***  -.60*** 
Self-direction   .01   .05  -.15 
Inclusion   .11*   .06  -.05 
Commitment  -.15**   .05   .03 
Self-reliance   .03  -.06   .03 
Consistency   .02  -.06  -.16* 
Self controlling        
Uniqueness   .03   .02   .05 
Harmony   .28***   .34***   .46*** 
Self-direction   .09   .01   .09 
Inclusion   .09  -.16**   .00 
Commitment  -.09  -.02  -.07 
Self-reliance   .14**   .14**   .26** 
Consistency   .02   .08   .13 
Social support       
Uniqueness  -.01   .04  -.04 
Harmony  -.19***  -.06  -.28*** 
Self-direction  -.19**  -.23**  -.45*** 
Inclusion   .27***   .10*    .09 
Commitment  -.01   .06    .11 
Self-reliance  -.20***  -.22***  -.12 
Consistency  -.01  -.02  -.14* 
Planful problem solving      
Uniqueness  -.01   .17**   .07 
Harmony   .16*   .05   .02 
Self-direction  -.01  -.04  -.47*** 
Inclusion   .10   .14**   .05 
Commitment  -.18**  -.02  -.15* 
Self-reliance   .26***   .17***   .34*** 
Consistency   .12*   .11*   .04 
Positive reappraisal      
Uniqueness   .08   .27***   .09 
Harmony  -.04   .07  -.09 
Self-direction   .12*   .02  -.32*** 
Inclusion   .20***   .14**   .12 
Commitment  -.05   .02  -.01 
Self-reliance   .14**  -.00   .22** 
Consistency   .07   .08   .13 
       
154 
 
 
 
                                                     Romania          Thailand    UK 
Escape avoidance      
Uniqueness   .05   .04   .05 
Harmony   .01   .06  -.05 
Self-direction   .10   .01  -.00 
Inclusion   .12*  -.15**   .02 
Commitment   .01  -.05   .05 
Self-reliance  -.17**  -.16**  -.06 
Consistency  -.15**  -.02  -.09 
Accepting responsibility      
Uniqueness   .08   .08   .12 
Harmony  -.04   .06  -.13 
Self-direction   .00  -.02  -.09 
Inclusion   .23***  -.10   .02 
Commitment  -.09  -.00   .18* 
Self-reliance  -.04   .03  -.02 
Consistency  -.11*   .02  -.05 
Distancing       
Uniqueness  -.14*   .01  -.16* 
Harmony  -.09   .03   .21 
Self-direction   .27***  -.05   .08 
Inclusion   .11  -.14**  -.15 
Commitment  -.02  -.03   .04 
Self-reliance  -.08  -.03   .18* 
Consistency  -.03   .09   .17* 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
unrelated to social support in all three samples. Rather, self-direction was a negative 
predictor in all three samples with a strong effect in the UK sample. Harmony was also 
negative predictors in two out of three samples. Contrary to predictions, planful problem 
solving was not positively predicted by self-direction. Rather, this self-construal 
dimension was a strong negative predictor in the UK sample. Instead, self-reliance was 
a positive predictor in all three samples and commitment was a negative predictor in the 
Romanian and the UK samples. No predictions were originally made in relation to 
positive reappraisal as a coping style. Nonetheless, the results revealed inclusion as a 
positive predictor in the Romanian and Thai sample and self-reliance was a positive 
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predictor in the Romanian and the UK samples. Self-direction was a negative predictor 
in the UK sample and uniqueness predicted positive reappraisal among Thai 
participants. The effects in relation to escape avoidance were generally small and 
variable, with no significant effects in the UK sample. Accepting responsibility was 
predicted to positively relate to self-reliance, which was not confirmed in the results. 
Rather, inclusion was a positive predictor in the Romanian sample and commitment was 
a positive predictor in the UK sample. Finally, inclusion was hypothesised to be a 
negative predictor of distancing, which was confirmed with a small effect in the Thai 
sample. However, in the Romanian sample it was self-direction and in the UK sample it 
was self-reliance and consistency that were positive predictors, while uniqueness was a 
negative predictor among UK participants. 
 
7.1.3 Discussion 
Study 6 was designed to improve the measure of self-construals which was 
developed in Study 4 and test its cross-cultural invariance, as well as exploring how the 
self-construal dimensions differentially relate to a range of socio-emotional adjustment 
outcomes. After some refinement, I settled on 35 items which showed good model fit 
according to RMSEA and SRMR, acceptable reliabilities, and indications of metric and 
scalar invariance. Mean differences largely confirmed findings from Study 5 with some 
exceptions—the UK sample scored relatively low on inclusion and commitment and the 
Thai sample scored on par with the UK sample on self-reliance and consistency.   
The results also demonstrated a different pattern of relationships between the 
seven self-construal dimensions and socio-emotional adjustment. As a general pattern, 
consistency appeared to mainly play a role in dimensions of authenticity, but was also a 
negative predictor of depression in the Romanian sample. Considering this sample 
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scored relatively high on consistency, it may be that this self-construal dimension is 
particularly important for psychological wellbeing in Romania. Self-reliance was related 
to a range of outcomes—most strongly it positively predicted self-efficacy, dimensions 
of authenticity and planful problem solving but also self-controlling coping and low 
depression. Unexpectedly, constructing the self in terms of self-reliance appears to have 
a range of psychological benefits in all samples.   
Commitment negatively predicted narcissism and planful problem solving but 
also modesty in Romania (positively) and accepting responsibility in the UK 
(positively). Although a less straightforward pattern, it seems that this self-construal 
dimension is about putting the self second and facing responsibility. Furthermore, in 
two out of three samples, inclusion positively predicted social support, positive 
appraisal and relationship harmony and was a negative predictor of depression and 
social anxiety. Including others in the self can therefore be thought of as important for 
stable and constructive social relationships and a positive outlook in life. 
Harmony, on the other hand, showed to some extent the opposite pattern. In two 
or three of the samples, it was positively related to social anxiety, modesty, and self-
controlling coping and negatively related to social support, confrontive coping, 
narcissism, and dimensions of authenticity. Thus, it is clear that harmony is important in 
psychological processes where the self is constrained and restricted. It should be noted, 
however, harmony was not negatively related to wellbeing in any of the four samples 
which may indicate that these self-restricting processes are not necessarily damaging for 
the person. Conversely, uniqueness positively predicted narcissism and self-esteem in 
all three samples and was a positive predictor of positive reappraisal in Thailand. As 
predicted, uniqueness appears to play a part in processes where the self is promoted. 
Finally, self-direction was a negative predictor life-satisfaction, relationship harmony, 
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and social support in two or three samples. It was also a strong negative predictor of 
planful problem solving in the UK and positive predictor of distancing in Romania. 
Interestingly, self-direction therefore seems to be less beneficial than other self-
construal dimensions and strongly endorsing this construction of the self may have 
negative consequences, especially in the Malaysia and the UK.    
These results highlight the importance of separating dimensions which 
previously were grouped together under ‘independence’ and ‘interdependence’. For 
instance, I found self-reliance to be related to a range of positive socio-emotional 
variables whereas self-direction showed the opposite pattern to some extent. 
Furthermore, uniqueness appeared unrelated to such variables and instead seemed more 
important to self-promotion. These three dimensions are normally confounded in 
traditional theory and measurement of self-construals. Similarly, inclusion appears to 
play an important role in maintaining constructive and trusting social relationships 
whereas harmony showed the opposite pattern to some extent by predicting self-
restricting processes. Again, these are often grouped together in traditional conceptions 
of interdependence. It is clear that in order to increase the predictive validity of self-
construals, these dimensions should be considered separately. Other dimensions, such as 
consistency and commitment, showed fewer significant correlations overall and they 
therefore seem to pay a less important role in socio-emotional adjustment. Rather, it 
could be that these dimensions are more important in cognitive and motivational 
processes (I return to this issue in Chapter 8).  
The main aim of the study was not to compare national samples, nonetheless, it 
is interesting to note that although the results showed some variation across the 
four/three samples, in many respects they are similar. With only four samples it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about cross-cultural variability, however, it is interesting to 
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note that these samples (with the exception of Romania) are usually contrasted in the 
literature (the West vs. East Asia) with the accompanying expectation of differences. 
The present findings suggest instead that there are common processes in the functioning 
of the self and its consequences. Nonetheless, the results suggest that inclusion appears 
to be particularly important for wellbeing in Thailand and self-reliance and consistency 
seem more important in Romania. Moreover, self-direction appears to have negative 
consequences for wellbeing in particular in the UK and Malaysia.  
Finally, some limitations with this study should be pointed out. As noted above, 
some of the outcome variables had very low reliabilities and these results therefore need 
to be treated with caution. I was also unable to control for acquiescence among the 
outcome variables since most of them did not include any reversed items and I was 
restricted to single country analyses. Hence, there seems to be a lot of scope in 
developing better measures of these constructs, which should include reversed items.  
Moreover, the present study included a relatively small number of national 
samples which were chosen mainly based on practical considerations. In order to get a 
much richer picture of these relationships, future research should include a larger 
number of samples, preferably chosen on theoretical grounds. There is also a lot of 
potential to investigate the seven-dimensional model in relation to a much broader set of 
outcomes, as I discuss further in Chapter 8. Nonetheless, these results provide some 
initial indications of the usefulness of the seven-dimensional model, suggesting that it 
can increase our understanding the relationship between socio-emotional adjustment 
and the self. 
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7.1.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter has focused on self-construals at the individual level. Building on 
the findings in Chapter 6, it had two aims. Firstly, I investigated whether the scale 
developed in Study 4 could be extended and improved, and whether cross-cultural 
invariance could be established. Based on these analyses, I was able to identify a 35 
item model which showed acceptable reliabilities and configural, metric and scalar 
invariance was considered tenable. Secondly, I tested how the seven self-construal 
dimensions related to a range of socio-emotional adjustment outcomes. The 
differentiated pattern of correlations highlighted the importance of considering the 
seven dimensions separately. For instance, self-reliance was linked to a range of 
positive outcomes whereas self-direction showed the opposite pattern, in particular in 
the Malaysian and the UK samples. This study provides some initial findings of the 
usefulness of the seven-dimensional model in understanding the role of the self in 
psychological process and behaviour.  
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Chapter 8 
General Conclusions 
The aim of this final chapter is to sum up the aims, findings and conclusions of 
this thesis. After a short summary of objectives and results, it will discuss implications 
for definitions of culture, for research into beliefs and self-construals, and potential 
practical implications. It will also raise some points for consideration, taking a more 
critical stance on some of the fundamental assumptions underlying this research. 
Finally, it will outline some potentially valuable avenues for future research. 
 
8.1 Summary of objectives and findings 
This thesis aimed to disentangle the concept of culture and provide greater 
understanding of how nations and social groups differ on measures of cultural 
orientations. Building on Brewer and Chen’s (2007) tripartite model, I distinguished 
values, beliefs and self-representations as important facets of culture. Given that 
research into values has reached an advanced stage with a clear model of different value 
domains and how these differ across cultures (Schwartz, 1992, 2004), the focus was on 
beliefs and self-construals. The aims for these two facets were, however, very different. 
In terms of beliefs, I was interested in beliefs in a more narrow sense than the 
commonly used social axiom approach to cultural beliefs. In particular, I aimed to 
develop a belief dimension which would tap the cultural syndrome of I-C. In terms of 
self-construals, the aim was to go broader than the common distinction between 
independence vs. interdependence and West vs. East, by redefining the model and 
looking for alternative ways of construing the self.  
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The main conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that we need a more fine-
grained and nuanced understanding of culture. This involves going beyond the common 
focus on values and including other facets of culture such as beliefs and self-construals. 
It was shown that such an approach can add explanatory power (Study 2). This also 
involves investigating dimensions of cultural variation beyond I-C, in the present case 
other-focus and self-containment seem to be the product of very different nation-level 
processes (Study 5). Finally, it also involved distinguishing between different levels of 
analysis and recognising that describing cultural orientations of individuals may not be 
the same as describing the culture of social groups. This more nuanced understanding of 
culture can help breaking down cultural stereotypes and increase our understanding of 
the impact of culture on behaviour.  
Across six studies, these two different facets of culture, self-construals and 
beliefs, were refined and validated. Study 1 developed a measure of contextualism and 
showed it to be part of cultural collectivism. Study 2 built on these results and 
demonstrated that contextualism plays a role in explaining societal processes where 
sharp distinctions are made between ingroups and outgroups, above and beyond the role 
of values and self-construals. Moving on to self-construals, Study 3 and 4 tested and 
rejected the one and two-dimensional models and instead identified a seven dimensional 
model of different constructions of the self, which at the cultural level could be 
organized into three higher-order dimensions (self-differentiation, other-focus and self-
containment; Study 4). These three dimensions were shown to have different 
nomological networks—self-differentiation was best predicted by I-C, other-focus was 
best predicted by national wealth, and self-containment was best predicted by religious 
heritage. The three dimensions also differentiated clusters of national samples, 
highlighting the need to include a wider range of samples than the common West vs. 
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East dichotomy (Study 5). Finally, Study 6 improved the self-construal scale and looked 
at the role of self-construals in predicting socio-emotional adjustment at the individual 
level. I found that each dimension showed a unique pattern of relationships, highlighting 
the need to keep these dimensions separate.  
It was noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) that this thesis includes two different 
perspectives on the individual. Using the framework put forward to by Mauss 
(1938/1985), I differentiated between the person, which refers to representations of the 
person within society, and the self, which refers to an individual’s own awareness of 
their unique identity and their relation to other people. The former is concerned with 
ontological beliefs about what a person is, whereas the latter is concerned with people’s 
own understanding of who they are within their social relationships. Nonetheless, this 
thesis has shown these two approaches to have a common theme: they are both 
concerned with ‘the social’. In the form of contextualism, this means the social context, 
answering questions about the person vs. the social environment. In the form of self-
construals, this means interpersonal relations, answering questions about the self vs. the 
other. Although both are related to notions of social patterns, it is clear that we need a 
nuanced understanding of the type of patterns that these two approaches are based on in 
order to make sense of cross-cultural variation.  
 
8.2 Implications  
8.2.1. Implications for conceptions of culture 
 The general introduction (Section 1.1) outlined several questions in relation to 
how culture is defined. Here I briefly review how the present results bear upon these 
issues. In terms of the distinction between subjective and objective culture, my starting-
point was culture defined as subjective orientations in the form of values, beliefs and 
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self-construals. However, the results suggested that the subjective-objective distinction 
is far from straightforward. Most prominently, the complex interrelationship between 
other-focus and national affluence highlighted that ‘collectivism’ may mean different 
things depending on the material wealth of the country. Perhaps Adams et al.’s (2012) 
argument (see Section 6.4.2.) against separating ‘the structural’ and ‘the cultural’ are 
useful here. A definition of culture in line with their arguments would take a wider 
perspective than the one adopted in this thesis, but may ultimately prove more beneficial 
when trying to move away from conceptions of culture based on constructions of ‘the 
other’ (see below Section 8.3.1).  
 Moving on to the question of whether culture is unique to particular groups and 
societies or whether universal ways of describing cultures can be identified, the present 
results strongly support the latter position. Using more culturally diverse samples than is 
normally found in the social psychological literature, aiming for a decentered approach 
when developing the scales, and testing the validity of the instruments across these 
diverse samples, the present results suggest that cross-culturally valid and meaningful 
dimensions can be identified, even though this is far from claims of universality.  
 The present findings also have implications for the question of whether culture 
should be considered the property of individuals or groups. The approach adopted in 
this thesis recognised that culture exists at both levels, nonetheless, it was shown that 
culture often takes different forms depending on the unit of analysis. Notably, the 
results suggested that I-C does not form a coherent dimension of individual-level 
cultural orientation (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1; see also Triandis, 1993). It was shown 
that the different facets of I-C hang together meaningfully at the cultural level of 
analysis, whereas this was not the case at the individual level. It therefore seems to 
make more sense to conceive of I-C as a cultural-level construct, which is how it was 
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originally defined (Hofstede, 1980). Moreover, it was only at the cultural level that the 
seven self-construal dimensions could be organised into the three higher-order 
dimensions, emphasising that culture may not have the same meaning at different levels 
of analysis.  
 The distinction between cultures and nations has been important in the current 
research and rather than using ‘nation’ as proxy’s for culture, the core idea developed in 
this thesis is that cultural orientations can and should be measured, in order to be able to 
say anything meaningful about the culture of a nation or social group. Although Study 4 
made use of different cultural groupings within nations, most of the research presented 
here used the nation as the unit of analysis. In line with other recent research (Minkov & 
Hofstede, 2011), the fact that I found meaningful cross-cultural patterns and meaningful 
effects of external nation-level indices suggest that the nation is a useful unit of analysis 
in cross-cultural research.  
 Most importantly, as noted above, the present results have implications for 
conceptions of culture in terms of highlighting the need to adopt a more nuanced and 
multifaceted approach. In order to increase the predictive power of cultural 
explanations, different facets, dimensions and levels need to be carefully considered.  
 
8.2.2 Implications for research into beliefs 
 This thesis has introduced a new way of looking at personhood beliefs. Rather 
than comparing the relative importance of traits to the importance of contextual 
attributes, as is common in cross-cultural research into personhood beliefs (e.g. Church 
et al., 2003, 2005), it was argued that investigating the importance of the social context 
in its own right was a more useful approach. In fact, items tapping the importance of 
dispositional attributes did not load negatively against items tapping the importance of 
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the context (Pilot Study, Chapter 5), suggesting these are not conceptual opposites. It 
may be that the tendency to think of the context as the opposite of traits is based on a 
very Western perspective. Hence, research moving forward in this field would benefit 
from adopting a more fine-grained definition of personhood beliefs, focusing on each 
aspect in turn rather than assuming Western dichotomies are universally valid.   
 The current research complements investigations into other broader belief 
systems such as social axioms. Targeted specifically at beliefs which define I-C, it is 
hoped contextualism can contribute to a more detailed understanding of the role of 
beliefs. Social axioms refer to generalised beliefs about oneself, the social and physical 
environment and how concepts and entities are related. Hence, dimensions of social 
axioms are on a higher level of abstraction than contextualism, which instead targets a 
very specific type of relationship—that between the person and the environment. At the 
individual level, it is possible to imagine that contextualism would fit within the broader 
social axiom social complexity, given that this axiom includes beliefs about how human 
behaviour changes with the social context. Nonetheless, this social axiom dimension 
also refers to beliefs about flexibility in behaviour, thinking and problem solving, and 
beliefs about science. As such, it taps a wider notion of lack of rigid rules. Future 
research should further explore the relationships between contextualism and social 
axioms, in order to gain a fuller understanding of how these belief systems are related. 
Contextualism as a more specific belief dimension may be even more useful at 
the nation level of analysis. As noted elsewhere, social axioms have been found to form 
two broad cultural dimensions at the nation level, dynamic externality and societal 
cynicism. Although these appear to capture broad cultural belief systems, the exact 
meaning of these dimensions, in particular dynamic externality, is not always clear and 
they may be less useful in predicting specific societal processes. As was shown in Study 
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2, contextualism has the potential to be useful in answering questions about ingroup-
outgroup distinctions and may also be related to social determinism and social mobility 
(see also section 8.4 below).  Hence, the decision of whether one should use a general 
belief dimension such as dynamic externality or the more specific beliefs about the 
importance of the context in defining a person must be guided by one’s research 
question.  
 
8.2.3 Implications for research into self-construals 
 There are a number of important implications of the present findings for self-
construal research. First and foremost, it is clear that we should no longer talk about 
independence and interdependence as unidimensional constructs. Using a wide range of 
national samples, cultural groups within nations, adults as well as students, and different 
versions of the self-construal scale, a multidimensional model was confirmed as 
superior to a one or two-dimensional model. The value in differentiating between 
multiple dimensions was shown by meaningful cross-cultural patterns, different 
nomological networks and unique patterns of correlations with socio-emotional 
adjustment variables. Thus, it is clear that holding on to a simple one or two-
dimensional model of self-construals is too simplistic and risks overlooking important 
variation and losing explanatory power. 
 The present findings into antecedents of self-construals also cast light on the 
processes involved in producing cross-cultural patterns of constructions of the self. As 
noted in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.2), the present preoccupation with I-C in the self-
construal literature may not be helpful. Instead, this thesis argues that in order to 
understand variation in self-construals we need to look at a range of societal processes. 
These alternative perspectives, such as religious heritage, equality, affluence, and other 
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beliefs and value system are likely to give us a much richer picture of how and why 
cultures differ and are likely to be more useful in trying to identify solutions to societal 
problems.  
 This research has also highlighted the importance of sampling more widely than 
the simple West vs. East comparison. In fact, it was samples not normally included in 
the self-construal literature, such as the Middle Eastern samples, that most clearly 
illustrated the need to look at multiple dimensions. Although the present research goes 
some way towards adding a more diverse perspective on self-construals, there is still 
much work to be done in this area. This refers not only to sampling, but also to idea 
generation. As noted in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.3), more indigenous research or emic 
input from for example South America, the Middle East and Africa could potentially 
really add to the current model.  
 
8.2.4 Practical implications 
 The overall aim of this thesis was to advance knowledge and theory around 
culture—to provide an alternative, more nuanced approach to cultural orientations and 
(re)define important constructs. However, alongside these theoretical implications, it is 
also possible to imagine some practical implications of the present research. Firstly, it 
could have implications for reducing cultural stereotypes, in particular by highlighting 
that all non-Western cultures, or what are often classed as ‘collectivistic’ cultures, are 
far from the same. Perceiving the outgroup as more heterogeneous has been known to 
reduce prejudice (Brauer & Er-rafiy, 2011), hence, encouraging a more differentiated 
understanding of other cultures could contribute to reduction in xenophobia.  
Secondly, some recent developments in health persuasion have shown that 
matching health communications with self-construals can lead to greater endorsement of 
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health messages (see Sherman, Uskul, & Updegraff, 2011).  This research has mainly 
made use of the independence vs. interdependence distinction, but it is possible that a 
more fine-grained model of self-construals and health messages designed to match this 
model would have even greater benefits.  
Finally, findings in Study 6 hinted on the potential of promoting certain 
constructions of the self that may be beneficial for wellbeing and resilience. For 
instance, self-reliance was related to a range of positive outcomes in all four samples. 
Although this research is still in its infancy, there appears to be some scope for looking 
at which are the most adaptive constructions of the self and how these patterns may or 
may not vary across different cultural contexts. Such knowledge could then be used in 
clinical contexts to promote certain ways of looking at the self, thereby helping reduce 
levels of depression, for example.  
 
8.3 Points for consideration 
8.3.1 Similarities and differences 
 The starting point for this research was to identify dimensions of cultural 
orientations and investigate how cultural groups differ on these dimensions. Hence, 
from the outset I aimed to investigate cultural variation and difference. In psychology, 
such an approach has in many ways been a worthwhile endeavour—focusing on cultural 
variation has highlighted the problems with simply importing Western theories to non-
Western contexts and it has brought attention to the value of indigenous research. The 
fact that this quest for difference gave non-Western researchers a voice and a way to 
challenge the hegemony of Western research traditions made it a prominent aim of 
cross-cultural and cultural psychology. However, this search for difference could also 
be seen as problematic. It involves the construction of ‘the Other’, either as different 
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and inferior based on colonialist traditions, or different and surprise superior based on 
orientalist traditions (Burman, 2007). This ‘Other’ is normally measured against a 
Western standard and it is constructed as strange and exotic. The discourse of difference 
runs the risk of reifying, essentialising, and homogenizing cultures. Moreover, focusing 
on purely ‘cultural’ differences may obscure other factors, such as differences in power 
and affluence, an argument which relates to Adams et al.’s (2012) point above that 
separating these things may not always be helpful. 
Questions have started to be raised regarding whether this focus on difference is 
justified in cross-cultural psychology (Poortinga, 2012).  Arguments for a more careful 
consideration of ‘difference’ refer to the fact that normally only about 10-12% of 
variance of cultural orientation measures is found at the cultural level (Fischer, 2012). 
However, perhaps discussions about when a difference is large enough to be considered 
meaningful should focus on whether the differences matter. As noted in Section 6.3.2, 
even small nation-level differences have been shown to meaningfully predict 
psychological outcomes (Becker et al., 2012; Gheorghiu et al., 2009). At the same time, 
our research agendas (as well as publication practices) should equally allow for quests 
for difference and similarity, cultural uniqueness and universality. Moreover, rather than 
a blind search for difference, we need to be better at developing theory of why we 
would expect differences or similarities in specific areas. The present research into 
antecedents of self-construal provides a small step in that direction by identifying 
factors which appear to produce differences.  
 
8.3.2 Can we really measure the self? 
 Self-construals are often defined as “how individuals see the self in relation to 
others” (Cross et al., 2011, p. 143). Thus, the core idea refers to self-perceptions—the 
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image in our mind of who we are. Nonetheless, a closer inspection of the items used in 
the present research as well as  the more traditional scales reveal a wide range of items, 
including behaviours, preferences, emotions, values, as well as self-perceptions. Thus, 
the way self-construals are most often operationalised is closer to Singelis’ (1994, p. 
581) definition of self-construals as “a constellation of thoughts, feelings, and actions 
concerning one’s relationship to others, and the self as distinct from others”. One reason 
for operationalising self-construals in this way is practical. Experience of working with 
such a large number of translations and some semi-literate groups highlighted the need 
for straightforward and concrete language and concepts, which makes it difficult to 
capture the idea of self-perceptions. If the goal is to put together a measure that can be 
used in a range of different cultural contexts, the present thesis suggests it needs to be 
based on concepts that are relatively easy and straightforward to grasp. Nonetheless, 
theoretically this opens up questions about what we are actually measuring. Is it really 
constructions of the self, or is it their manifestations and consequences? The question 
then arises—can we ever measure the self? And can these things really be separated? As 
hinted to above, this thesis adopted a very pragmatic approach to this question. At the 
same time it recognises that there is a lot of scope in investigating this issue further, 
which may require a multimethod approach (see below in section 8.4.1). This also raises 
the question of whether self-construal is the best label for these constructs. In fact, 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) had originally chosen the wording ‘modes of being’ and 
‘modes of operating’, but reviewers thought such terms sounded awkward and advised 
them to change them (Markus & Kitayama, 2003). Considering the difficulties in 
measuring the self and the lack of clarity around these constructs, it may be more 
constructive to broaden the terminology more in line with Markus and Kitayama’s 
original idea. 
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8.3.3 Issues of representativeness and comparability  
Throughout the thesis I have brought attention to the fact that our samples were 
not representative of their nations, nor were they matched on specific criteria (with the 
exception of being students in Study 1, 3 and 6). It is possible that this may have 
influenced the pattern of results. Nonetheless, it is worth reiterating that analyses 
controlled for the compositional differences of our samples in terms of gender, age and 
subjective wealth in Study 5. Moreover, in many nations we sampled more than one 
cultural group in order to increase the diversity of our samples. Considering that a large 
proportion of cross-cultural research is conducted using undergraduate student samples, 
this can be considered a strength of this research. The fact that I found meaningful 
cross-cultural patterns and meaningful effects of external nation-level indices in spite of 
not having representative or comparable samples further speaks to the adequacy of this 
approach. Sampling different groups within a culture does not necessarily pose a 
problem to the validity of a nation-level analysis. As noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.4, 
Minkov and Hofstede (2011) demonstrated that regional groups within nations tended to 
cluster together and did not tend to cluster with groups from other nations. Nonetheless, 
future research should attempt to use representative samples in order to be able to draw 
more firm conclusions.       
 
8.4 Future research directions 
  The present research aimed to explore new ways of looking at culture, in 
particular by developing new dimensions of cultural orientations focusing on beliefs and 
self-construals. Having developed and validated these constructs and conducted some 
initial analyses into how they can be useful for understanding societal and individual 
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level processes, there is a lot of scope for developing this research further. In terms of 
contextualism, it is clear that at the cultural level, this belief system can help to explain 
societal processes where sharp distinctions are made between ingroups and outgroups. 
Future research could investigate whether this is also the case at the individual level of 
analysis. Moreover, it could further explore the consequences of holding beliefs about 
the contextual determination of the person. Do such beliefs make one more or less likely 
to believe people can change, or more or less likely to endorse social mobility? In terms 
of self-construals, there is a lot of scope to look at previous research linking self-
construals to cognitive, emotional and motivational consequences to see whether the 
new seven dimensional model can add explanatory power. Building on the findings 
presented in Chapter 7, it would be particularly interesting to investigate whether there 
are some ways of constructing the self that may be more beneficial to wellbeing and 
resilience in certain cultural contexts. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 7, some self-
construal dimensions, such as consistency and commitment, appeared to play a less 
important role in socio-emotional adjustment. It may be that these dimensions are more 
important in other areas of psychological functioning. In the case of consistency, it may 
be more important for cognition, such as need for closure and essentialism. For 
commitment, it may be more important for motivation, playing a role in pro-social and 
helping behaviour.  
 I have noted elsewhere that, although this research has identified dimensions of 
cultural orientations that seem valid and useful for cross-cultural research, they are far 
from definitive. Future research should explore alternative belief and self-construal 
dimensions and how these relate to the existing dimensions. The search for these 
alternative ways of looking at self-construals and beliefs is likely to benefit from more 
emic input, in particular from African, South American and Middle Eastern contexts. In 
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order to fully explore such alternative perspectives, it may be necessary to utilise a 
wider range of methods—starting with a ‘bottom-up’ approach and incorporating 
qualitative as well as quantitative analyses. Considering the difficulties with complex 
questionnaires in non-Western contexts, such an approach could add something to the 
question raised above of whether the self can ever be measured and how best to go 
about it. 
 The question of method is also inextricably linked to how culture is defined. The 
approach taken in this thesis is based on the idea that people’s self-reports on their own 
beliefs and values will provide a relatively accurate picture of cultural variation. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of alternative approaches which define culture in other 
ways. For example, Morling and Lamoreaux (2008; see also Lamoreaux & Morling, 
2012) argue that self-reports only tell half of the story and they include institutions, 
practices, and artefacts in their definition of culture. By studying cultural products such 
as books, newspapers and TV adverts they find larger effect sizes studying differences 
in individualism and collectivism compared to self-report studies. From a different 
perspective, Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, and Wan (2010) extend the 
understanding of culture to also include intersubjective culture—defined as perceptions 
of other people’s values and beliefs within a culture. They find that these perceptions 
most often do not coincide with actual, internalised values and beliefs measured through 
self-report. There is scope in future research to investigate the dimensions of cultural 
orientations identified here using these alternative methods and definitions of culture. 
For instance, it would be interesting to see whether people’s perceptions of the 
importance that other people attribute to the context in defining a person shows a similar 
cross-cultural pattern to the one presented here. Similarly, investigating the seven (or 
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three) self-construal dimensions through cultural products is likely to reveal very 
interesting results.  
 Finally, future research should also investigate the role of globalisation and how 
a changing intercultural context impacts on cultural orientations. Some have suggested 
that globalisation will lead to homogenisation and uniformity of cultures (for a 
discussion, see Fu & Chiu, 2007) while others believe it will lead to sharpening of 
differences (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). Globalization has also been linked to identity 
confusion and identity anxiety (Arnett, 2002). Investigating how personhood beliefs and 
constructions of the self are affected by such changes may provide a valuable area of 
research which could potentially challenge the narrative of essentialised and 
homogenised cultures.  
 
8.5 Final remarks 
 The aim of this thesis was to disentangle the concept of culture by investigating 
different cultural orientations in the form of beliefs and self-construals. It has been 
concluded that we need a more differentiated understanding of culture that goes beyond 
the focus on values and I-C, and that simultaneously looks at the individual and cultural 
levels of analysis. I hope that the studies presented here can contribute to a greater 
understanding of how things cohere: the person vs. the self, the individual vs. society, 
and the cultural vs. the structural. Moreover, this increased knowledge of the different 
nuances of culture can potentially prove useful when solving problems in the culturally 
patterned world we live in.  
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Appendix A 
Contextualism scale 
Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements by circling a number for each statement.  
 
completely 
disagree 
moderately 
disagree 
slightly 
disagree 
slightly 
agree 
moderately 
agree 
completely 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Who a person is, is mostly defined by his/her family relationships.  
2. To understand a person well, it is essential to know about his/her role in society.  
3. To understand a person well, it is essential to know about the place he/she comes 
from.*  
4. One can understand a person well without knowing about where he/she lives 
[reversed].  
5. Who a person is, is mostly defined by his/her position in society.  
6. One can understand a person well without knowing about which social groups 
he/she is a member of [reversed].  
7. Who a person is, is mostly defined by his/her occupation.  
8. One can understand a person well without knowing about his/her family 
[reversed]. * 
9. One can understand a person well without knowing about his/her social position 
[reversed].* 
10. Who a person is, is mostly defined by where he/she lives.  
11. One can understand a person well without knowing about the place he/she comes 
from [reversed].*  
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12. Who a person is, is mostly defined by his/her educational achievements.  
13. To understand a person well, it is essential to know about which social groups 
he/she is a member of.* 
14. To understand a person well, it is essential to know about his/her family.*  
 
* Items included in the final 6 item version 
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Appendix B 
Self-construal scale Study 4 
 
Below are some statements of what you might be like. Probably some will describe you 
well and others will not describe you well. Please circle a number below each statement 
showing how well it describes you. For example, if the statement describes you a little, 
then circle 3. If the statement describes you very well, then circle 7.  
 
How well does each of these statements describe you? 
 
Not at all A little  Moderately  Very well    Exactly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Self-direction 
1. You prefer to do what you want without letting your family influence you.  
2. You follow your personal goals even if they are very different from the goals of your 
family. 
3. You always ask your family for advice before making a decision. [reversed] 
 
Self-reliance           
4. You try to avoid being reliant on others.       
5. You prefer to rely completely on yourself rather than depend on others.   
6. You prefer to ask other people for help rather than rely only on yourself. [reversed]
  
Consistency           
7. You behave in the same way even when you are with different groups of people. 
8. You always see yourself in the same way even when you are with different people. 
9. You see yourself differently in different social environments. [reversed]  
 
Inclusion of Others in the Self        
10. If someone in your family is sad, you feel the sadness as if it were your own.  
11. When someone in your family achieves something, you feel proud as if you had 
achieved something yourself.  
12. Your happiness is unrelated to the happiness of your family. [reversed] 
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Commitment to Others 
13. You value good relations with the people close you to more than your personal 
achievements.  
14. Your own success is very important to you, even if it disrupts your friendships. 
[reversed] 
15. You value personal achievements more than good relations with the people close to 
you. [reversed]   
 
Uniqueness           
16. You like being different from other people.      
17. You see yourself as unique and different from others.  
18. You try to avoid being noticeably different from others. [reversed] 
 
Harmony           
19. You try to adapt to people around you, even if it means hiding your inner feelings. 
20. You show your inner feelings even if it disturbs the harmony in your family. 
[reversed] 
21. You prefer to say what you are thinking, even if it is inappropriate for the situation. 
[reversed] 
 
Note. Items should be presented in randomized order when administering the scale. 
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Appendix C 
Self-construal scale Study 6 
 
Below are some statements of what you might be like. Probably some will describe you 
well and others will not describe you well. Please circle a number below each statement 
showing how well it describes you. For example, if the statement describes you a little, 
then circle 3. If the statement describes you very well, then circle 7.  
 
How well does each of these statements describe you? 
 
Not at all A little  Moderately  Very well    Exactly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Self-direction  
1. You prefer to do what you want without letting your family influence you. * 
2. You follow your personal goals even if they are very different from the goals of 
your family. * 
3. You like to make your own plans without seeking advice from others. 
4. You like to do things in your own way, rather than follow the wishes of others.  
5. You always ask your family for advice before making a decision. [reversed] * 
6. You always seek guidance from people close to you when making important 
choices. [reversed] * 
7. You prefer to follow your family’s advice on important matters. [reversed] * 
8. When you have to make a choice, you always prefer to know what other people 
think. [reversed] 
9. You prefer situations where you have clear instructions from others rather than 
having to decide by yourself what to do. [reversed] 
Self-reliance  
10. You try to avoid being reliant on others. *      
11. You prefer to rely completely on yourself rather than depend on others. *  
12. You tend to rely on yourself rather than seeking support from others. †  * 
13. You prefer to rely on yourself rather than accepting help from others. 
14. You like to depend on others, and not rely only on yourself. 
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15. You prefer to ask other people for help rather than rely only on yourself. 
[reversed] † * 
16. You prefer to get support from others rather than rely only on yourself. 
[reversed] * 
17. You prefer to accept help from others rather than relying only on yourself. 
[reversed] * 
Consistency  
18 You behave in the same way even when you are with different groups of people. 
† * 
19 You always see yourself in the same way even when you are with different 
people. † * 
20 You see yourself the same way even in different social environments. †  * 
21 You try to act consistently across different social situations. 
22 You see yourself differently in different social environments. [reversed] † * 
23 You see yourself differently when you are with different groups of people. 
[reversed] † * 
24 You usually behave differently when you are in different situations. [reversed] 
25 You tend to behave differently when you are with different groups of 
people.[reversed] † * 
Inclusion of Others in the Self   
26 If someone in your family is sad, you feel the sadness as if it were your own. * 
27 When someone in your family achieves something, you feel proud as if you had 
achieved something yourself. *  
28 If a close friend of yours is happy, you feel the happiness as if it were your own.  
29 If someone insults a member of your family, you feel as if you have been 
insulted personally. * 
30 Your wellbeing depends very strongly on the wellbeing of your close friends and 
family. 
31 Your happiness is unrelated to the happiness of your family. [reversed] * 
32 You rarely share family members’ happiness or sadness. [reversed] 
33 You tend to think of yourself as separate from others. [reversed] 
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34 Your feelings are generally unrelated to the feelings of people around you. 
[reversed] 
Commitment to Others  
35 You value good relations with the people close you to more than your personal 
achievements. † * 
36 Your family is more important to you than your personal goals.  
37 You always put the interests of your family above your personal interests. 
38 You would always help a friend in need, even if it disrupted your personal goals. 
39 Your own success is very important to you, even if it disrupts your 
friendships.[reversed]* 
40 You value personal achievements more than good relations with the people close 
to you. [reversed] *  
41 You sometimes put your personal needs above the interests needs of your family. 
[reversed] † 
42 You protect your own interests, even if it might sometimes disrupt your family 
relationships. [reversed] * 
Uniqueness 
43 You like being different from other people. † *     
44 You see yourself as unique and different from others. * 
45 Being distinctive is important to you.  
46 You would rather be different than be similar to others. † * 
47 You try to avoid being noticeably different from others. [reversed] † * 
48 You prefer to fit in rather than being different from other people. [reversed] 
49 Fitting in among others is more important to you than being distinctive from 
others.  [reversed] 
50 You would rather be similar than be different from others. [reversed] † * 
Harmony  
51 You try to adapt to people around you, even if it means hiding your inner 
feelings. †  * 
52 You prefer to hide your feelings to avoid disturbing the harmony in your family.  
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53 You try to act appropriately for the situation, even if it means hiding your inner 
thoughts.    
54 You prefer to preserve harmony in your relationships, rather than expressing 
your  
feelings. † * 
55 You show your inner feelings even if it disturbs the harmony in your family. 
[reversed] † * 
56 You prefer to say what you are thinking, even if it is inappropriate for the 
situation. [reversed] * 
57 You prefer to express your thoughts and feelings, rather than adapting to people 
around you. [reversed] † * 
58 You prefer to tell people what you think, even if it disturbs the harmony in your 
relationships. [reversed] 
 
Note. Items should be presented in randomized order when administering the scale.  
† Items included in the acquiescence measure. 
* Items included in the final 35 item version. 
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Appendix D 
Table D1 Zero-order Correlations Study 6 in Malaysia 
 Uniqueness Harmony Self-direction Inclusion Commitment Self-reliance Consistency 
Harmony 
-.07       
Self-direction 
  .14* -.40**      
Inclusion 
-.01  .46** -.51**     
Commitment 
   -.19**  .40** -.33** .35**    
Self-reliance 
.06   .29** -.15** .30** .02   
Consistency 
   -.36** .29 -.16**       .08     .20** .08  
Life-satisfaction .02 .04 -.19**      .07 .02 .07 -.04 
Depression -.03   -.12** .10* -.19** -.03   -.20**  .01 
Self-efficacy .12 .07         -.07 .13** -.04    .28**  .00 
Relationship harmony -.05    .17** -.24** .13**    .16** .08  .00 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
  
213 
 
 
 
Table D2 Zero-order Correlations Study 6 in Romania 
 Uniqueness Harmony Self-direction Inclusion Commitment Self-reliance Consistency 
Harmony 
-.26**       
Self-direction 
.39**  -.19**      
Inclusion 
       -.06        .05 -.47**     
Commitment 
-.31**  .28** -.43** .28**    
Self-reliance 
.26** -.27**  .26**      -.00 -.17**   
Consistency 
        .06 -.29**           .00 .13**         .07 .22**  
Life-satisfaction       -.05      -.03         -.09      .18*        .06 .18** .14** 
Depression       -.06       .07          .00      -.06      -.07 -.23** -.27** 
Self-esteem .20** -.16** .20**      -.08 -.17** .17** .12** 
Self-efficacy .24** -.12* .24**       .08 -.18** .38** .13** 
Social anxiety       -.03   .20**        -.08 -.12* .12* -.28** -.18** 
Narcissism .33**  -.20** .25** -.13* -.28** .17**        -.09 
Modesty      -.13**  .19**         -.10* .04 .25** -.10*         .01 
Authentic living .20** -.13** .14** .06       -.05 .33** .17** 
Self-alienation -.13**  .25**         -.05 -.11* .11* -.33** -.30** 
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 Uniqueness Harmony Self-direction Inclusion Commitment Self-reliance Consistency 
External influence  -.22
**
    .35
**
    -.27
**
 .05   .21
**
   -.41
**
   -.24
**
 
Relationship harmony       -.01 -.05 -.07   .15
**
 .10
*
 .05 .09 
Confrontive coping .01   -.37
**
 .04 .06 -.18
**
 .12
*
   .13
**
 
Self-controlling 
coping 
.06   .19
**
 .08 .04       -.06 .11
*
 -.02 
Social support  -.10
*
 -.08   -.34
**
   .35
**
 .13
**
  -.21
**
 .03 
Planful problem 
solving 
.08 -.04 .06 .08 -.15
**
   .28
**
   .15
**
 
Positive appraisal   .18
**
   -.15
**
    .17
**
  .13
**
 -.10
*
   .23
**
   .14
**
 
Escape avoidance .02 .08 .01 .06 .01  -.17
**
   -.17
**
 
Accepting 
responsibility 
.09 -.03 -.03  .18
**
 -.07 -.01 -.08 
Distancing -.03 -.08   .18
**
 -.04 -.08 -.02 -.01 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
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Table D3 Zero-order Correlations Study 6 in Thailand 
 Uniqueness Harmony Self-direction Inclusion Commitment Self-reliance Consistency 
Harmony 
    -.31**       
Self-direction 
    .26**    -.20**      
Inclusion 
-.03     .18**   -.37**     
Commitment 
   -.13**     .26**   -.21**    .28**    
Self-reliance 
    .23** -.06   .20** .09 -.01   
Consistency 
-.02 -.00   .07** -.04 .04 .10*  
Life-satisfaction   .14
**
 -.08 -.05    .16
**
 .06 .06 .08 
Depression -.10
*
 -.03 .02   -.23
**
   -.09
*
 -.10
*
 -.04 
Self-esteem   .32
**
   -.18
**
   .14
**
 -.00 -.08   .19
**
 -.03 
Self-efficacy   .24
**
 -.04   .19
**
 .04 -.03   .33
**
     .13
**
 
Social anxiety   -.19
**
 -.03 -.02    -.23
**
 -.05    -.20
**
 -.06 
Narcissism   .35
**
  -.22
**
   .22
**
   -.21
**
   -.24
**
 .08 -.04 
Modesty   -.13
**
 .01 .04   -.19
**
 -.01 -.04  .06 
Authentic living  .28
**
  -.12
*
   .15
**
   .12
**
 .06    .30
**
     .16
**
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 Uniqueness Harmony Self-direction Inclusion Commitment Self-reliance Consistency 
Self-alienation   -.18
**
 -.01 -.05  -.28
**
 -.06  -.21
**
 -.07 
External influence   -.27
**
    .15
**
   -.20
**
  -.16
**
 .09  -.35
**
   -.17
**
 
Relationship harmony .02 .03   -.15
**
   .23
**
 .08 -.07  .06 
Confrontive coping   .19
**
   -.21
**
 .08 .02 -.02 -.01 -.06 
Self-controlling 
coping 
-.05   .29
**
 .04  -.10
*
 .02  .12
*
   .09
*
 
Social support -.07 .02  -.31
**
   .17
**
   .12
**
   -.25
**
 -.05 
Planful problem 
solving 
  .18
**
 .02 -.02   .17
**
 .02   .22
**
  .12
*
 
Positive appraisal    .24
**
 .01 .03  .13
**
 .04 .08  .07 
Escape avoidance .00 .02 .04   -.17
**
 -.08  -.16
**
 -.03 
Accepting 
responsibility 
.06 .02 .04 -.09 -.02 .04  .02 
Distancing -.01 .01 .01   -.13
**
 -.05 -.04  .09 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
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Table D4 Zero-order Correlations Study 6 in the UK 
 Uniqueness Harmony Self-direction Inclusion Commitment Self-reliance Consistency 
Harmony     -.36**      
 
Self-direction      .23**     -.25**     
 
Inclusion  .07  .04      -.50**    
 
Commitment    -.19**  .30      -.25**   .14*   
 
Self-reliance     .28**     -.27**       .39** -.08   -.32**  
 
Consistency     .24**     -.27**      .22** -.04   -.15**   .32** 
 
Life-satisfaction -.01 -.07    -.22
**
  .18
*
 .05 .01   .03 
Depression -.01 -.02  .08 -.07 -.03 -.00 -.02 
Self-esteem    .27
**
    -.23
**
  .05  .03    -.20
**
   .21
**
     .22
**
 
Self-efficacy .12 -.14  .05 -.03  -.16
*
   .36
**
    .21
**
 
Social anxiety -.11    .27
**
  .01 -.13 -.06 -.07 -.12 
Narcissism    .26
**
   -.38
**
  .15
*
  -.15
*
    -.31
**
    .22
**
  .05 
Modesty .04   .20
**
 .03 .04 -.04 .12  .10 
Authentic living   .31
**
  -.24
**
 -.01 .10 -.01    .26
**
    .36
**
 
Self-alienation .05 .06 .10 -.06 -.01 -.12 -.06 
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 Uniqueness Harmony Self-direction Inclusion Commitment Self-reliance Consistency 
External influence   -.29
**
   .39
**
   -.29
**
 .03   .15
*
   -.33
**
   -.39
**
 
Relationship harmony -.05 .01   -.31
**
   .24
**
 .12 -.06 -.08 
Confrontive coping  .11   -.50
**
 -.01 .01 -.10 .06 -.03 
Self-controlling 
coping 
 .02   .29
**
 .12 -.06 -.06   .26
**
 .12 
Social support -.13 -.03   -.53
**
   .33
**
   .22
**
  -.33
**
   -.23
**
 
Planful problem 
solving 
 .08 -.03   -.30
**
   .24
**
 -.15
*
   .22
**
 .08 
Positive appraisal  .13 -.12   -.21
**
   .25
**
 -.04 .16
*
  .17
*
 
Escape avoidance  .03 -.02 -.05 .03 .07 -.07 -.10 
Accepting 
responsibility 
 .10 -.08 -.10 .10  .16
*
 -.06 -.03 
Distancing -.13  .14
*
   .16
*
   -.21
**
 .00  .18
*
  .15
*
 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
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